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l. INTRODUCTION

One cannot study the history of antitrust law without running headlong into the
opinions of Associate Justice William 0. Douglas. In his thirty-six years on the
Supreme Court, he authored thirty-five majority opinions and nearly as many
dissenting or concurring opinions in cases involving antitrust questions or issues. It
is quite probable that Justice Douglas authored more antitrust opinions, both for the
majority and in dissent, than any Supreme Court justice in history. And since
antitrust law is largely case law, it seems axiomatic that Douglas, one of the Court's
leading liberals, must have had a significant influence on the development of
antitrust law. The question remains, however. whether this influence was positive or
negative and. given recent doctrinal changes, lasting.
In teaching the antitrust course for thirty years, I have annually been surprised by
the unevenness of the Douglas antitrust opinions. One, United States v. Socony-

"Professor of Law and former Dean. Dedman School of Law. Southem Methodist
University. B.A. 1970. J.D. 1973. University of Texas; LL.M. 1977, Columbia University.
The author would like to express appreciation to Julie Patterson Forrester for her unwavering
support of this project, as well as to a number of very able former research assistants including
Mark Hanna, Catherine Bright. Jed Franklin, Lila Johnson. Patrick Hanchey, and Daniel
Gomez. Special thanks also to the always professional and timely research support of Greg Ivy
and Laura Justice of the Underwood Law Library and to the financial support of the Tucker
Law Faculty Research Fund.
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Vacuum Oil Co., 1 has stood the test of time and become a bedrock of antitrust law.

Many more, however, are quite dated and, dare I suggest, result-oriented. 2 Certainly
Justice Douglas is thought of as one of the leading antitrust hawks of the Warren
Court era, when the government or private plaintiff seemingly always prevailed. 3
Antitrust law has evolved and changed dramatically over the thirty-three years since
Douglas finally and most reluctantly retired from the Supreme Court. One can
almost imagine the good justice's upset as more and more of his opinions are
discarded or simply ignored by the present day Court.
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy can be easily characterized. He firmly
believed that "big is bad" and that the Sherman Act was designed to make illegal
significant concentrations of economic power, no matter how attained. As a result,
he has been characterized as an economic conservative in apparent contrast to his
political liberalism. 4 He believed in the expansive power of the federal government
to regulate the economi and thought that the Sherman and Clayton Acts gave effect
to that authority. There is also significant evidence that Douglas believed that a
principal aim of antitrust was to protect the viability of small businesses, even at the
expense of the consumer." Those ideals have arguably all been discarded by
contemporary antitrust policy.
Justice Douglas did have a lasting impact on antitrust law, however. He
understood the havoc that competitor collaboration could wreak on a competitive
1

Unitcd States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co .. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).

2

0thers have come to the same conclusion looking at Justice Douglas' opinions in other
areas of the law. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Anti-Judge: William 0. Douglas and the
Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17, 46 (1988) (''The doctrinal dimensions of
judging, for Douglas, were relatively insignificant; what counted were the results in cases and
the political philosophies that those results signified."). See also Melvin I. Urofsky, William
0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE L.J. 133, 134 (1991); Robert J. McKeever,

The Fall and Rise of' Judicial Activism in the United States: The Case of Justice William 0.
Douglas, II J. OF LEGAL HIST. 437, 442-45 ( 1990).
3

See, e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) ("The sole consistency that I can tind is that in litigation under [Section] 7, the
[g]overnment always wins."). See also United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 585
( 1966) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
4

See Alden Whitman. William 0. Douglas is Dead at 81: Served 36 Years on Supreme
Court, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1980, at I. 28.
5

This was in stark contrast to his "vittually uncompromising stand in behalf of protection
for civil liberties against usurpations by federal and state governments . . . . " G. EDWARD
WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 246

(1976).
"See. e.g., Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 320-21 (1949)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[W]c can expect that the oil companies will move in to supplant
[independent stations] with their own stations. There will still be competition between the oil
companies. But there will be a tragic loss to the nation. The small, independent business man
will be supplanted by clerks.").
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economy, even if he did sometimes take that notion too far. 7 He was a staunch
advocate of the so-called "price mechanism," believing that the free and open market
should determine output and price. He authored the seminal opinion on the issue 8
shortly after taking his seat on the Supreme Court and never wavered from the idea
that any collective interference with the setting of price was illegal.
With this background, this Article will attempt to further define and refine Justice
Douglas' antitrust philosophy by examining his written opinions and writings. It will
then attempt to measure that philosophy's effect on the Supreme Court during his
tenure and its contemporary impact in the context of the rapidly shifting antitrust
doctrine of the last thirty years or so.
II. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

William 0. Douglas was appointed to the Supreme Court from the chairmanship
of the Securities Exchange Commission in 1939 by President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt. He was, at forty years of age, the second youngest person ever appointed
to our highest court. 9 He would become the longest serving justice upon his
retirement in 197 5.
Raised in very humble circumstances in Yakima, Washington, he lost his father
at the age of six. He then contracted polio before working his way through Whitman
College in nearby Walia Walia by holding three jobs so he could send money home.
He headed east for law school at Columbia virtually penniless where, after working
his way through law school, he claimed, to his chagrin, to have graduated only
number two in his class. 10 He was bitterly disappointed when Supreme Court Justice
Harlan F. Stone, who each year selected a Columbia law graduate as his law clerk,
picked the person who had finished first in the class, AI McCormack. 11
While in law school he worked as a research assistant for Professor Underhill
Moore who had been commissioned to write a treatise by the trade association for
the cement industries, one of many trade associations under antitrust attack by the

7

See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 338 n.4 (1969). See
also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,636 (1953) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
~ScJcony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 150.
9
See JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY- THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 191
(1980). Only Joseph Story, who was thirty-two when he joined the Court in 1811, was
younger. ld.

10
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, Go EAST, YOUNG MAN: THE EARLY YEARS 148 (1974). Recent
biographer Bruce Allen Murphy disputes Justice Douglas' claim about his class rank, noting
that Douglas was not named a James Kent scholar after his first or second years of law school
and was not selected to the Columbia Law ReFiew staff until the middle of his second year.
He also managed to make a grade of "C" in his third-year Constitutional Law class. See
BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, WILD BILL: THE LEGEND AND LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 49-51
(2003).

11

DOUGLAS, supra note I 0, at 149.
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Justice Department. The work involved legal and economic research and analysis as
12
well as travel to interview executives of cement plants in the east.
After graduation, Douglas went to work for the Wall Street firm of Cravath,
deGersdorff, Swaine, and Wood and taught Bankruptcy, Damages and Partnership
law as an adjunct professor for Columbia, working himself into exhaustion while
plagued by stomach problems. 13 He left after two years to return to practice in his
hometown of Yakima, but after only a few unhappy months, he returned to New
York to a full-time faculty position at Columbia. 14 The Columbia Jaw faculty was
the center of the legal realism movement, which was questioning the underlying
basis for judicial decision-making. Douglas resigned after only two years there in
protest of University President Nicholas Murray Butler's hiring of a law school dean,
Young B. Smith, without consulting the law faculty. 15 He was quickly recruited to
the Yale Jaw faculty by its boy-wonder dean, Robert Maynard Hutchins. He taught
at Yale for six years, eventually declining Hutchins' invitation in 1930 to move to
the University of Chicago when Hutchins became president there. 16 To keep him,
Yale appointed him to the prestigious Sterling Professorship of Law. He was but
thirty-one years old. 17
At Yale, he formed many friendships, including a close relationship with
Thurman Arnold, later to become famous as an aggressive and creative assistant
attorney general for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 1x He
12

ln his memoirs. Justice Douglas described Moore as having "a cutting edge [mind],
sharper than any other.... [A] year at his feet was a prodigious experience-in the exactitude
with which he dealt with minutiae; in the broad dimensions of the practical world where he
framed his questions; in his concern with the roots of the law and their modem incidence." /d.
at 145.
11

/d. at 150.

14

/d. at 157-5S.

1

'Butlcr was apparently hostile to the legal reali>m movement and so appointed a dean
with a more traditional view of law and legal education. !d. at 161. Douglas' two years at
Columbia have been described as '·among the most famously intense and troubled in the
history of American law faculties.'' William W. Bratton, Berte and Means Reconsidaed 1lf
the Ceutury's Tum, 26 J. CoKP. L. 737,743 12001).
1

"1n his autobiography. Justice Douglas reports that Hutchins characterized him as "the
most outstanding law professor" in the country when persuading the University of Chicago
Board of Trustees to offer Douglas two and one-half times the then top law school salary of
$10.000. DouGLAS, supra note I 0. at 163-64.
17

ld. al 164.

:s:\rnoJJ was from Laramie, Wyoming. and thus he and Douglas "were conspicuous
Westerners in an elite eastern institution.'' SPENCER WEBER WALLER, THURMOND ARNOLD: A
BIOGRAPHY 48 (:2005). The two also shared a "passion for the regulatory side of the law,"
unlike most of their Yale colleagues whose focus continued to be the courts and the common
law. /d. On Arnold's impact on the Antitrust Division, sec, e.g., SUZANNE WEAVER, DECISION
TO PROSECUTE ORGANIZATION AND PUHUC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION 28-30, 32-36
( 1077).
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became a recognized expert in corporate law, bankruptcy, and financial institutions
and produced or helped produce seven casebooks in those areas 19 as well as a bevy of
law review articles. 20 His scholarship "virtually defin[ed] progressive bankruptcy
theory in the 1930s." 21
Douglas took a one-semester leave in 1934 to conduct a study on bankruptcy
reorganizations for the newly created Securities and Exchange Commission, which
laid the groundwork for an extensive revision of federal bankruptcy law. 22 Despite
stated intentions to the contrary, he would never return to Yale. His rise to national
prominence in the New Deal would be meteoric.
At the SEC, Douglas worked for Joseph P. Kennedy, the commission's first
chairman.
They were like-minded about a no-nonsense approach to the
commission's enforcement responsibilities and became life-long friends and allies. 23
With Kennedy's influence, President Roosevelt appointed Douglas as an SEC
commissioner in 1936 and then as chairman one year later. 24 During this time, he
became a member of President Roosevelt's inner circle, one of his Sunday night
poker companions, and an unofficial economic adviser.
During his tenure as chairman, he took the unprecedented step of taking over the
New York Stock Exchange for a time after disclosures that the former exchange
president had misappropriated funds. Earlier he had refused the demand of the
1
"His casebook on the law of financing business institutions contained a substantial section
on the law of mergers and acquisitions. See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF FINANCING OF BUSINESS UNITS 844-47 (1931 ).

c0See. e.g., William 0. Douglas. Protective Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47
HARV. L. REV. 565 (1934); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, Stock "Brokers" as
Agents and Dealers, 43 YALE L.J. 46 (1933); William 0. Douglas & George E. Bates, The
Federal Securities Act of 1933,43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933); William 0. Douglas & George E.
Bates, Some Effects of' the Securities Act Upon lm•estment Banking, I U. CHI. L. REv. 283
(J 933 ); William 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of' Bankruptcy, 41 YALE L.J. 329
( 1932 J; George E. Bates & William 0. Douglas, Secondary Distribution of' SecuritiesProblems Suggested by Kinney v. Glenny, 41 YALE L.J. 949 (1932); William 0. Douglas & 1.
Howard Marshall, A Faczual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 25 (1932); William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, The Business Failures
Pro)eCl- II. An Analysis of Methods (~llnvestigation, 40 YALE L.J. 1034 (1931); William
ClarJ.., William 0. Douglas & Dorothy S. Thomas, The Business Failures Project- A Prohlem
in Methodology, 39 YALE. L.J. 1013 (1930); William 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks,
Insulation fron; Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations. 39 YALE L.J. 193 ( 1929); William
0. Douglas. A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673
(1929).
"David A. Skeel. Jr .. Vern Cowztrvman and the Path of Progressive (And Populist)
Bilnkmptcy Scholarship, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1075. 1080 (2000); Bratton, supra note 15, at
744.
22

See Bratton, supra note 15. at 744-50.

2

\)ee SIMON. supra note 9, at 140.

'

4

See. e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, at 132-33.
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exchange to close during a steep sell-off period. He reorganized the SEC to better
protect the interests of the investor and is generally thought to have been an excellent
administrator. 25
In early 1939, the Yale Law School selected Douglas as its next dean. He
expected to return to New Haven to begin his duties later that year. On February I 3,
however, Justice Louis Brandeis retired from hi~ seat on the Supreme Court.
President Roosevelt had earlier announced that the next Supreme Court vacancy
would go to the west coast, which had not had a Supreme Court justice appointed for
fourteen years. Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes was a chief advocate for
Douglas and, after establishing his bona fides as a westerner, Douglas got the
nomination. The Senate confirmed him by a vote of sixty-two to four, with the
dissenters asserting that he was a reactionary who was too friendly to Wall Street. It
all happened very quickly: Douglas was nominated on March 19, he was confirmed
on April 4, and he took his seat on the Court on April 17. 26
He came close to leaving the Court in I 944 for the Democratic vice-presidential
nomination. President Roosevelt dropped incumbent Henry Wallace from his ticket
and the choice came down to Harry Truman or Justice Douglas. The convention
chose Truman, who ascended to the presidency when President Roosevelt died in
1945. Truman offered Douglas the vice presidency on his ticket in 1948 but Douglas
declined because he believed Truman would lose the election. 27 That was his last
dalliance with elective office.
He became a leader of the Warren Court uprising in the 1950s and 1960s and due
to his long recognized expertise with corporations and business, authored many
antitrust opinions during that period. In I 970. House Republican leader Gerald Ford,
with the active support of President Richard Nixon, instigated a Judiciary Committee
investigation of Douglas' relationship to a couple of left-leaning foundations, with a
view toward impeachment. The inquiry was likely a politically motivated act to rid
the Court of its leading liberal and give President Nixon another appointment to the
Court. 2 x The committee inquiry exonerated him and the scheme otherwise backfired
because, although Douglas had been seriously considering retirement prior to the
investigation, he would stay on the Court five more years. 2Y
25

See SIMON, supra note 9, at 165-89. See also Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas:
Etpositon!f'the Bankruptcy Law. 16 UCLAL. REV. 773 (1969).
26

The speed of the confirmation process 'eems all the more remarkable today when one
recalls that the Douglas nomination came only two years after FOR's failed Court-packing
plan.
27

Justice Douglas was widely reported to have said. "I don't want to play second fiddle to
a second fiddle." See MURPHY. supra note 10, at 254-55.
2

xSee SIMON, supra note 9, at 406-07; MURPHY. supra note l 0, at 429-38.

2

YJustice Douglas' private life was controversial with four marriages, with two in his
sixtie' to women in their early twenties. He had an apparently well-known reputation i:1
Washington as a womanizer well into his eighth decade. See MURPHY, supra note l 0, at 42729. After his fourth marriage. an Alabama congressman called for a House investigation of his
character, but nothing came of it. See Whitman, supra note 4, at 28.
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Justice Douglas continued to serve on the Court until failing health from a
debilitating stroke forced his retirement on November 12, 1975 after thirty-six and a
half years on the Court. 30 He died on January 19, 1980 at the age of eighty-one.
III. DOUGLAS AND LEGAL REALISM
Justice Douglas was a product of the legal realist movement largely emanating
from Yale and Columbia in the 1920s and 1930s. 31 Surprisingly, viewed from today
when constitutional and social issues dominate the legal landscape, the early realists
mostly focused on and impacted private law areas like corporate and commercial
32
law. At least one commentator has argued that by the late 1930s, as legal realists
were moving into positions of real executive and judicial influence, antitrust became
the principal vehicle for economic and social reform for some, with Douglas chief
among the reformers. 33
Legal realism was in large measure a rejection of the Langdellian approach,
which sought to discover fixed, abstract principles from the case law and apply them
in an ordered, predictable way to new cases. 34 The Langdellian view prized accurate
30

Although physically debilitated by a stroke suffered on New Year's Eve 1974, Justice
Douglas insisted that his resignation was a necessary formality but that he had not retired and
was still a member, the tenth member, of the Supreme Court. He further contended,
unsuccessfully, that he was still a voting member of the Court on all cases pending when he
resigned, even writing and circulating an opinion in a campaign finance case. See SIMON,
supra note 9, at 451-54.
31

See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 169-92 ( 1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, 1927-1960 (1986); WILFRED J. RUMBLE, JR., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (1968).
Although Justice Douglas did not specifically refer to himself as a realist in his autobiography,
he noted that "[a]t Columbia, revolt against the traditional approach to law was now under
way .... I joined their ranks." DouGLAS, supra note 10, at 159-60. As early as 1931, Karl
Llewellyn, one of the leading realists, identified Douglas as one of the movement's most
dedicated proponents. Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1227 ( 1931 ).
32
Leading realists Underhill Moore, Wesley Sturges and Karl Llewellyn were all
commercial law scholars. See KALMAN, supra note 31, at 20-35; WILLIAM TWINING, KARL
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 128-40 (1973) (describing Llewellyn's
transformation of sales law).
33

See William H. Page, Legal Realism and the Shaping of Modern Antitrust, 44 EMORY
L.J. I, 4, 23-26, 32-34. 38-40 (1995). Thurman Arnold, a Yale law professor who President
Roosevelt appointed to head the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department in the spring of
1938, was the legal realist who literally transformed antitrust enforcement. See generally
Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 569
(2004); Neil Duxbury, Some Radicalism about Realism? Thurman Arnold and the Politics (~l
Modern Jurisprudence, I 0 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. II, 34-35 ( 1990); Douglas Ayer, In Quest
o{ t1ficiency: The Ideological Journey of Thurmond Arnold in the Interwar Period, 23 STAN.
L. REV. 1049 (1971); Corwin D. Edwards. Thurman Arnold and the Antitrust Laws, 58 PoL.
SCI. Q. 338 ( 1943 ); Page, supra, at 19-23.
34
See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, II (1983). The
"heart" of realism has been broadly described as "an effort to define and discredit classical
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fact-finding and the analytically precise interpretation and application of legal
principles.·15 To Justice Douglas. the Langdell "so-called case method" was mere
"library law" that "grossly oversimplifies and distorts the nature of law" by ignoring
"other psychological, political, economic, business, [and] social factors" that should
influence the law and the way legal decisions are made. 3"
Realists tried to close the gap between "law in books" and "law in action." 37
Justice Douglas' principal approach was to endorse "functionalism" while debunking
the more traditional ·'conceptualism" approach to legal reasoning. Functionalism
emphasized facts over legal principles. Douglas asserted, for example, that a
corporation is "not a thing. It is a method. It defies definition when removed from
the background of the purpose attempted to be accomplished and the manner of
accomplishing it." 3x He argued that "analysis has been so conceptualized that the
attention is too frequently focused on the device used rather than on the function
which the device is intended to perform." 39 He believed that a functional approach
would increase legal certainty and thus efficiency by focusing on the law's
operational effects rather than static rules. 40
Douglas believed that the functional approach depended on facts, so while an
academic he conducted empirical research to collect data about business failures to
set the stage for urging reform of the bankruptcy laws. 41 He also applied
legal theory and practice and to offer in their place a more philosophically and politically
enlightened jurisprudence." AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xiii-xiv (William W. Fisher III,
Morton J. Horwitz, & Thomas A. Reed, eds., 1993 ).
35

See, e.g., HowARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT: HUGO BLACK,
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 41 ( 1992).
36

Jerome Frank, Democracy and Finance. 54 HARV. L. REV. 905, 907-08 (1941) (book
review) (quoting William 0. Douglas. Education for the Law. Address Before the American
Association of Collegiate Schools of Business (April, 1936 ), in DEMOCRACY AND FiNANCE 280
(James Allen ed., 1940).
37

See KALMAN. supra note 31, at 9 (quoting Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in
Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 ( 191 0)). Pound is generally described as a "nonrcalist."
3

xWilliam 0. Douglas & Carrol M. Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations, 39 YALEL.J. 193. 194 (1929).
39

William 0. Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23
ILL. L. REV. 673, 675 (1929).

/d. at 675-76. See also Douglas & Shanks, supra note 38, at 210; Willia~ 0. Douglas &
1. Howard Marshall, A Factual Study of Bankruptcy Administration and Some Suggestions, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 25 (1932); William 0. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies-State vs.
Federal Control, 42 YALE L.J. 591 (1933 ).
40

41

See, e.g., William 0. Douglas, Protectivl! Committees in Railroad Reorganizations, 47
HARV. L. REV. 565 (1934); William 0. Douglas, Some Functional Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41
YALE L.J. 329 ( 1932); Douglas & Man,hall supra note 20; Douglas & Thomas, supra note 20;
Clark, Douglas & Thomas, supra note 20; William 0. Douglas & John H. Weir, Equity
Receiverships in the United States District CourtjiJr Connecticut: 1920-1929, 4 CoNN. B.J. I
(1930).
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functionalism to his courses and casebooks, focusing on the life cycle common to
every business association-beginning with organizing and financing an enterprise,
moving to managing it, and concluding with bankruptcy and reorganization. 42 The
casebooks required a complete retooling of the corporate law curriculum into a
sequence of courses titled losses, management and finance. 41 The academic world,
even populated by realists, was not ready for such a radical change. The casebooks
found virtually no takers and left little legacy. 44
The Court Douglas joined in 1939 was controlled by New Dealers, of whom
45
Douglas was one. The New Deal was, of course, populated by legal realists intent
on political reform and economic recovery. 46 It fostered the federal government's
authority to regulate business a!> it deemed necessary, but at least early on antitrust
and competition were not prominent tools utilized to combat the Depression. 47 In
fact, scholars have described the entire history of the New Deal and competition as a
study in contradiction. 48 President Franklin Roosevelt himself apparently had doubts
42

See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS. CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS
UNITS-LOSSES,
AND ASSETS ( 1932); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M.
LIABILITIES,
SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS UNITS (1931 );
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
FINANCING OF BUSINESS UNITS ( 1931 ); WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS & CARROL M. SHANKS, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW Of CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1931 ).
43

See KALMAN, supra note 31, at 85-86.

44

/d. at 86-87.

45

See Barry Cushman, Rethinking the New Deal Court, 80 VA. L. REV. 20 I, 234-35
(1994).
46

0ne leading realist argued that legal realists made New Deal liberalism possible. Jerome
Frank, Realism in Juri~prudence, 7 AM. L. ScH. REV. 1057, 1063-69 (1934). See also LAURA
KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 17 ( 1996 ); PETER H. IRONS, THE NEW
DEAL LAWYERS 6-9 (1982); G. Edward White, From Sociological Juri.1prudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999
( 1972); Edward A. Purcell, Jr.. American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and
the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424, 436-37 (1969). C.f NEIL DUXBURY,
PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 155-58 ( 1995) (expressing skepticism about the
impact of realists in the New Deal).
47

See, e.g., RUDOLPH J. R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA, 1888-1992 112
(1996); BERNARD STERNSHER, REXFORD TUGWELL AND THE NEW DEAL 342-43 (1964);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS Of UPHEAVAL 272-394
( 1960).
48
The early New Deal emphasized the National Industrial Recovery Act, which was
intended to restrict production and raise prices, and the promulgation of industry codes
typically sought to control prices. prevent price discounting, legalize open price systems, limit
production, and minimize non-price competition. See CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN
AMERICA: EMPIRE BUILDERS AND THEIR ENEMIES fROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES 140-43
(2000); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND
WAR Ill (1995); ELLIS W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A
STUDY IN ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 57-60, 123-24, 136 (1966); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG,
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about the value of unfettered competition. 49 Only with his controversial appointment
of Thurman Arnold in 1938 to head the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice, did the pendulum swing and antitrust begin to be a force to be reckoned
with. 50
Although Justice Douglas is often viewed as perhaps the most activist judge in
our history, it would be wrong to assume that the new justice came to the Court with
that predisposition. For one thing, judicial activism was precisely what President
Roosevelt wished to avoid. His New Deal social legislation had frequently run
headlong into the conservative activism of the existing Court, which delighted in
striking down his New Deal policies on constitutional grounds. Thus, President
Roosevelt chose for his first nominations to the Court men who had promoted and
been engaged in New Deal policies. 5 1
Further, the evidence suggests that early on Justice Douglas indeed did exercise
judicial restraint. 52 That restraint was surprisingly but arguably consistent with his
realist predilections. Douglas believed that judging was inescapably subjective.
Therefore, restraint was necessary to prevent judges from imposing their own values
and wills on democratically elected officials. 53 Otherwise, judges would be intruding
on the responsibilities of the executive and legislative branches of government. Of
course, judicial restraint is much easier when the judges in fact agree with the social
and regulatory agendas of the executive and legislative branches. President
Roosevelt selected New Dealers for the Court for expressly that purpose. But as the
substance of the Court's docket changed after World War II, "Douglas found the lure
of judicial activism irresistible."54
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 1932-1940, 56-60, 64-70, 163-65, 248-49, 258
(1963). There is substantial thinking that the New Deal never really followed or adopted a
single, coherent vision but is better remembered as a time of conflict and compromise or what
has been described as a "chaos of experimentation." See PERITZ, supra note 47, at 329
(quoting RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. ( 1955)).
49

See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER's PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 124 (2003); HAWLEY, supra note 48, at 123-24; REXFORD G. TUGWELL, THE
DEMOCRATIC ROOSEVELT 563 (1957); Wilson D. Miscamble, Thurman Arnold Goes to
Washington: A Look at Antitrust Policy in the Later New Deal, 56 Bus. HIST. REv. I, 5
(1982).
50

See Waller, supra note 33; Miscamble, supra note 49.

51

Roosevelt's first four nominations were New Deal Senator Hugo Black ( 1937), SolicitorGeneral Stanley Reed ( 1938), Harvard law professor and presidential adviser Felix Frankfurter
( 1939) and chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission William Douglas ( 1939).
52

See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) (upholding search without a
warrant); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 336 (1941) (dissenting from majority's
application of federal law to state primary election fraud); McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound
Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 188-89 (1940) (dissenting from majority's declaring Arkansas state tax
of gasoline unconstitutional).
53

See McKeever, supra note 2, at 441 ( 1990).

54

See id. at 442.
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True to his realist's roots, during his long tenure on the Court Justice Douglas
adapted and evolved, as the nation also changed dramatically after World War II
with the first steps towards integration and then the rampant excesses of
McCarthyism. 55 He joined the Court as an expert in corporate finance and
bankruptcy and was not, initially, at the frontiers of the First Amendment. 56 He
became the most ardent civil libertarian of his time and, the evidence suggests,
shifted dramatically in other areas such as tax and perhaps labor law. 57 One of his
former law clerks has suggested that Douglas may have changed more while on the
Court than any other Supreme Court justice with a lengthy tenure. 5 8
In contrast, however, and perhaps not surprisingly given his early academic and
government work in bankruptcy and securities, there seems to be less change in
those fields. 5Y And it would appear from this study that Justice Douglas was
predictably consistent in the antitrust field, even though the quality of his opinions
was uneven at best.
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy was heavily influenced by the man he
replaced on the Court, Justice Louis Brandeis. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and
Brandeis were Douglas' judicial heroes, and Brandeis, Douglas claimed, was his
mentor. 60 Douglas himself acknowledged that Brandeis "helped crystallize fmy]
views" on "the free enterprise system."" 1 Brandeis' influential book, Other People's
Money, 62 became Douglas' economic and political bible." 3 In a 1936 letter written to
55
See generally L.A. Powe, Jr., Justice Douglas After Fifty Years: The First Amendmeni,
McCarthyism and Rights, 6 CONST. COMMENT. 267 (1989).
56

See generally L.A. Powe. Jr .. Evolution to Absolutism: Justice Douglas and the First
Amendment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 371 ( 1974).
57

See BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., DISSENT WITHOUT OPINION: THE BEHAVIOR OF JUSTICE
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS IN FEDERAL TAX CASES ( 1975) (suggesting a profound shift towards the
taxpayer and perhaps in labor law as well).
58

See Po we, supra note 56, at 372, 410.

SYSee John W. Hopkirk, William 0. Douglas-His Work in Policing Bankruptcy
Proceedings, 18 V AND. L. REV. 663, 698 ( 1965) ("William 0. Douglas' major contributions to
the field of bankruptcy law are marked by a high degree of continuity in approach and in
solutions."); see also Vern Countryman. Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law.
16 UCLA L. REV. 773 ( 1969); Richard W. Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on
Corporate and Securities Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920 ( 1964 ).
60

See MURPHY, supra note I0, at 183. 188. But see id. at 574 (suggesting that Justice
Douglas' claimed relationship with Brandeis before Douglas succeeded him on the Court was
overblown or false).
01

DoUGLAS, supra note 10, at 306. See also WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, AN ALMANAC OF
LIBERTY 187-89 (1954).
62

LoUIS D. BRANDEIS. OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY ( 1913 ).

63 See,

e.g., Leon Epstein. Ecollomic Predilections of Justice Douglas, 1949 WIS. L. REV.
531' 560 ( 1949).
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Brandeis while Douglas was chairman of the SEC, Douglas described Other
People's Money as a "monumental work" which "has been a guiding star and
inspiration .... " 64 References to Brandeis would make their way into Douglas·
judicial opinions more than once. 65
Central to Justice Brandeis' economic philosophy was "the curse of bigness"
which posited that nothing good and everything bad came from large corporations
and unchecked corporate growth. To Justice Douglas. this curse was "a blight on the
industrial world." 66 His assumption was that companies gained size "not in the
interest of efficiency but largely in the interest of monopoly."r' 7 According to
Douglas, large companies cannot be run efficiently because they outgrow the
competence of management to manage effectively .6K
Of course, both of those premises are the polar opposite of much of today's
Chicago School philosophy that growth and even monopoly power is often achieved
through innovation, the development of new and better products, and because the
dominant firm is simply more efficient than its competition. Thus, the emphasis.
they assert, is that antitrust should focus on market performance rather than market
structure. r'9
Justice Douglas, however, thought it was just a bad idea, as a matter of policy. to
permit such wealth and financial power in the hands of so few. In his view. the
decisions of those few could tip the national scales towards prosperity or
depression. 7° Further, Douglas cautioned that unabated bigness threatened our
capitalistic and free enterprise system because it threatened competition, individual
initiative and freedom of opportunity. 71 He believed it would transform "a nation or
shopkeepers" into ''a nation of clerks," which would stifle individual initiative and
independence. 72

64

See THE DOUGLAS LETTERS 35 (Melvin I. Urofsky & Philip E. Urofsky eds., 1987).

65

See, e.g., United States v. Columbia. Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534-36 ( 1948) (Douglas,
1., dissenting) (quoting LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS 105, 114-15, 120-21 (1934) (discussed infra notes 179-85)).
66

6s

DouGLAS, supra note 61, at 187.

5ee DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 14 (James Allen ed., 1940); DoUGLAS, supra note 61, at

187.
69

See, e.g., William G. Shepard, Economic Analysis to Guide Antitrust Enj(JI"cement, 35
N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 917, 922-23 (1990); Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School '!{Antitrust
Analysis. 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979).
70

72

DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE. supra note 68, at 15.

/d.; see also DouGLAS, supra note 61, at 187.
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Even beyond that, Ju;.tice Douglas believed that large corporations fostered
dishonesty and ·'resulted in ruthless sacrifices of human values." 73 They are so
impersonal and remote from their investors, Douglas argued, that management feels
free to serve themselves rather than the enterprise they work for. 'There can be no
question that the laxity in business morals has a direct relationship to the size of
business.'' 74 One can almost see him saying "I told you so" after the recent Enron.
W orldCom and other corporate scandals. 75
Justices Douglas and Brandeis did part company with respect to resale price
maintenance. While Douglas favored the per se rule for any type of vertical price
fixing and cited the historic Dr. Miles decision with approval, 76 Brandeis thought that
Dr. Miles was wrongly decided. He believed, along with Justice Holmes, who
famously dissented in that case, 77 that producers of goods should be able to control
their prices to market. 7x Douglas, in contrast, was concerned about protecting the
small businessman, who often was a distributor or retailer subject to manufacturer
price controls. 79
The two also appeared to disagree about the impact on competition of
information exchanges by competitors. Justice Douglas was so protective of the
price mechanism that he was likely to find any exchange of price information, no
matter how informal or infrequent, illegal.xo In contrast, Justice Brandeis believed
that some data exchange, including price in some instances, could be necessary to
allow competition to proceed with the lights on.x 1 But those differences do not
73

DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 68, at 15-16.

74

/d. at 16.

75
But of course. many huge corporations, even monopolists, are free from scamlal and
many smaller companies are not.

76
See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co .. 390 U.S. 145, 154 ( 1961\) (Douglas, J ., concurring);
White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
77
Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 37.3, 412 ( 1912) (Holmes, L
dissenting) ("!cannot believe that in the long run the public will profit by this cou1t permitting
knaves to cut reasonable prices for some ulterior purpose of their own and thus to impair. if
not to destroy. the production and the sale of articles which it is assumeu to be Jesirahle that
the public should he able to get.").
78
See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, BUSINESS- A PROFESSION 243, 245. (1914) ("Why should one
middleman have the power to depreciate in the public mind the value of the maker's hranu and
render it unprofitable not only for the maker hut for other middlemen'?").

79

See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (Douglas, J.. concurring):
White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253 ( 1963): Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United
States. 337 U.S. 293. 315 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting); United States v. Paramount
Pictures. Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154 (1948).
xoSee United States v. Container Corp. of Am .. 393 U.S. 333 ( 1969 ).
x1See. e.g., Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377. 413 (1921)
(Brandeis. J., dissenting).
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significantly diminish the influence of Brandeis on Douglas with regard to the evils
of economic concentration.
Justice Douglas' business philosophy was also heavily influenced by the
iconoclastic economist and social critic Thorstein Veblen who viewed financial
institutions and investors with great skepticism and distrust. 82 So did Douglas,
characterizing as "financial termites" those opportunists who prey on other people's
money and destroy the legitimate function of finance and investment. 83 Among the
several factors that provided hospitable conditions for the termites were the curse of
bigness and the centralization of financial power. 84
Justice Brandeis and Veblen undoubtedly influenced Justice Douglas' efforts to
reform Wall Street in the 1930s, where he sought to protect legitimate investors and
reduce the influence of Wall Street bankers and lawyers, as well as his views on the
proper goals of the antitrust laws. And while the New Deal is famous (infamous?)
for the expansion of the federal government as a cure for society's ills, Douglas
seemed to resist direct government intervention in both areas. 85 He believed in the
merits of capitalism, which was deeply rooted from his boyhood in Yakima, but was
suspicious of its manifestations and excesses. 86 His belief in individual initiative and
opportunity fostered a view that the antitrust laws should protect competitors. If the
antitrust laws could not do the job, then he viewed government regulation as
necessary to cure the curse of bigness. 87
IV. PRICE FIXING
It is no small irony that Justice Douglas' first antitrust opinion was his best and
was most influentia\. 88 It came in United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 89 when
82

See, e.g., Max Lerner, Wall Street's New Mentor, THE NATION, Oct. 23, 1937, at 429;
HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER AND RIGHT-HUGO BLACK, WILLIAM 0.
DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 45 (1992). Veblen's best known
works are his The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study of Institutions (1899) and
The Theory of Business Enterprise (1904). It was he who coined the term "conspicuous
consumption."
83

DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE, supra note 68, at I, 8, 44.

84

/d. at 14-15.

85

See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 21, at 1092 ("Douglas's vision for progressive reform meant
breaking the grip of the Wall Street bankers and lawyers and protecting investors-not direct
government control.").
86

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 538.

87

/d. at 560.

88

See, e.g., Vern Countryman, Mr. Justice Douglas' Contribution to the Law-Business
Regulation, 74 CoLUM. L. REV. 366, 366-67 (1974) ("Without doubt, Justice Douglas' greatest
contribution to antitrust was his 1940 opinion in the Socony- Vacuum Oil Co. case ... that
opinion ... laid the foundation for the development of an effective antitrust policy for the last
three decades."); see also PERITZ, supra note 47, at 173 (describing Socony-Vacuum as
"[p ]erhaps the best known and most ruthless evocation of the consumer").
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Douglas had been on the Court scarcely a year. and involved a significant
government enforcement action against eight major oil companies accused of
conspiring to increase the so-called spot market price for gasoline. 90 The defendants
sold large amounts of gasoline to jobbers and, in eighty percent of those transactions,
the price was dependent on the spot market price. An oversupply of gasoline,
however, resulted in smaller independent refiners dumping surplus or distress
gasoline on the market, significantly reducing the spot market price.
To remedy the situation, the defendants agreed to purchase distress gas from the
independents to stop it from affecting the spot market price. Pursuant to the
conspiracy, each defendant had "dancing partners," independent oil companies
assigned to the defendants for the purchase of their distress gasoline. 91
Justice Douglas' recitation of the complex facts was considerably more detailed,
forming a substantial part of his nearly 100-page opinion. 92 Although the law was
anything but settled, Douglas boldly declared the defendant's scheme unlawful per
se, reversing the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in a 5-2-2 opinion (Chief Justice
89

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Thurman Arnold, in his
second year as head of the Antitrust Division, argued the appeal himself. Arnold, of course,
would become legendary as the Antitrust Division chief who transformed the division and
greatly increased government enforcement of antitrust. See Waller, supra note 33. He was
also Justice Douglas' former colleague, drinking buddy and neighbor when the two taught at
Yale together in the early 1930s and remained one of Douglas' closest friends in Washington.
See MURPHY, supra note 10, at 81, 91-92, 507; SIMON, supra note 9, at 116-19, 179 nn.22930; DOUGLAS, supra note I 0, at 167-69, 171-72 (describing Arnold as "a brilliant lawyer and
wild and wonderful companion").
One of the ironies of Socony- Vacuum is that Justices Douglas and Arnold, two former
New Dealers, were so instrumental in its decision, which dramatically cut against the
underlying policies of the National Recovery Act and the New Deal. See WALLER, supra note
18, at 98.
~he case had a long, tortured history. The original indictments were brought in late
I 936 and encompassed much of the oil industry. After a number of guilty and nolo contendre
pleas, twenty-six companies and forty-six individuals went to trial. Over I 00 lawyers
represented the defendants. The trial court dismissed the case against ten companies and
sixteen individuals. The remaining defendants were found guilty by the jury, although the trial
judge granted new trials to some of the defendants and dismissed the charges against some
others. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 165 n.l. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit granted new
trials to all the remaining defendants on the grounds that informal arrangement was not illegal
per se and that the trial judge had thus given improper jury instructions as well as improperly
excluding much of the defendants' proffered evidence. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 105 F.2d 809, 832-33 (7th Cir. 1930), rev'd, 310 U.S. 150 ( 1940).
9

91

Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 179-80.

92

Justice Roberts observed that "[t]he opinion fully and fairly sets forth the facts proved at
the trial, and to its statement nothing need be added." !d. at 255 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
Douglas' former colleague at Yale, Walter Hamilton. was more eloquent in his stylistic praise
of the opinion:
The Court may insist upon a clean-cut separation between "the recitation of facts" and
the "conclusions of law"; and Mr. 1ustice Douglas may, in an elaborate opinion, which
is virtually a Papal Bull to the bishops of the judicial dioceses, give a superb
demonstration of how it is done.
Walter H. Hamilton & George D. Braden, The Special Competence of the Supreme Court, 50
YALEL.J. 1319, 1370 (1941) (citing Soconv-Vacuum, 310 U.S. 150).
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Hughes and Justice Murphy not participating). In doing so, Douglas made it clear
that per se price fixing included any agreement or combination formed to affect
prices, even if the agreement did not fix a specific or uniform price. 93 Thus, a
conspiracy that "tampers with the price structure" is per se unlawful. 9• The
defendants attempt to stabilize the spot market price by reducing oversupply in effect
created a price floor which was illegal price fixing. Douglas rejected any notions of
reasonableness or the elimination of so-called competitive evils, noting that to do so
would open the door to a reasonableness argument in every price fixing case, thus
emasculating the Sherman Act. which he regarded as Congress' "charter of
freedom." 95
Although these notions are well settled today, they are so largely because of
Socony- Vacuum. At that time, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 96 was the
strongest horizontal price fixing precedent extant, but had fallen short of establishing
an unequivocal per se rule primarily because the defendants collectively shared
eighty-two percent of the market. Although the Trenton Potteries Court rejected the
defendant's reasonable price defense, 97 it did limit its condemnation to "those
controlling in any substantial manner a trade or business." 98 Further, the conspiracy
involved "uniform" prices (prices fixed literally and specifically), rather than the
type of collective action in Socony- Vacuum which merely influenced prices by the
removal of part of the market supply.
Further, at the time of Socony- Vacuum, Justice Douglas had the inexplicable
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States case, 99 decided only seven years earlier, to
contend with. There, in an industry plagued with excess capacity, 137 coal
producers accounting for twelve percent of the national production and up to
seventy-five percent of the regional market formed an exclusive selling agent to sell
their coal "at the best prices obtainable and, if all cannot be sold, to apportion orders
upon a stated basis .... " 100 Although the defendant apparently sought government
93

Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222. 223 ("Nor is it important that the prices paid by the
combination were not fixed in the sense that they were uniform and inflexible . . . . Under the
Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing,
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce is
illegal per se.").
94

/d. at 224.

95

!d. at 220-21.

%United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 ( 1927).
97

!d. at 397.

<>X ld. at 398. See also LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK Of THE LAW Of ANTrTRUST 183
( 1977). Professor Sullivan also noted that while Trenton Potteries rejects reasonableness as a
defense to price fixing, it does not exclude the possibility that other non-competitive societal
goals might sometimes weigh in as a defense. !d. at 184.
99

Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).

100

/d. at 358.
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approval before commencing operations. not surprisingly, the Antitrust Division
responded by obtaining an injunction. asserting that the plan would eliminate
competition among the individual coal producers and substantially effect the price of
bituminous coal. 101
The Supreme Court. in an 8-1 opinion written by Chief Justice Hughes, reversed
the district court's injunction. 102 It refused to concede that defendants' plan would
fix prices and held that the government had failed to establish that any affect on
prices would be "detrimental to fair competition." 103 To justify its conclusion, the
Court referred to Trenton Potteries. where the defendants had collectively dominated
the market, to distinguish the situation before it. 104 The Court, however, did leave
itself an escape clause, holding that since the case was tried in advance of
implementation of defendants' scheme, the government could return to court if their
actual operation proved to be an undue restraint of trade. 105
Thus, in writing the Socony- Vacuum decision, Justice Douglas was faced with the
seven-year-old Appalachian Coals decision with its clear interpretation that Trenton
Potteries was limited to situations in which the alleged price fixers dominated the
market. And while Appalachian Coals is today often written off as an outgrowth of
the New Deal's National Recovery Act response to the Great Depression, 106 SoconyVacuum was born of the same era in a likewise fundamental fuel supply industry
with an identical problem, overcapacity for the present demand. 107 Although the
conspiratorial "solution" in the cases differed, both involved plans designed to
collectively remove excess supply from the market.
101

United States v. Appalachian Coals, Inc., I F. Supp. 339,349 (W.D. Va. 1932).

102
Justice McReynolds dissented but did not write an opinion. Appalachian Coals, 288
U.S. at 378.
103
/d. at 373. The Court went on to say that "Ia] cooperative [e]nterprise, otherwise free
from objection, which carries with it no monopolistic menace, is not to be condemned as an
undue restraint merely because it may effect a change in market conditions, where the change
would be in mitigation of recognized evils and would not impair, but rather foster, fair
competitive opportunities." !d. at 373-74.
104
/d. at 375. It also ruled that the elimination of competition among the 137 producer
defendants was not sufficient to violate Section I since most of the coal that defendants
produced was sold outside their region where they faced additional competition. /d. at 375-76.

105

/d. at 377-78.

106

See, e.g .. C. PAUL ROGERS IlL STEPHEN CALKINS, MARK PATI'ERSON & WILLIAM R.
ANDERSEN, ANTITRUST LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 246 (4th ed. 2008); STEPHEN F. ROSS,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 133 ( 1992).
107
Indeed, in both cases the defendants sought government assistance to develop and
initiate their plans to reduce serious oversupply problems as pait of the New Deal's National
Recovery Act. Compure Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 364-65
(1933) with United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 171-73 (1940). In
Soconv-Vacuum, Justice Douglas flatly rejected the argument that the government's
(Petroleum Administrative Board) knowledge or even acquiescence in the "dancing partner"
scheme was a defense. Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 225-28.
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Thus, one might assume the second youngest man ever appointed to the Supreme
Court might be reluctant to draft such a sweeping opinion, given Appalachian Coals
and the deference such a junior justice would seemingly give his new brethren. Of
course, New Deal politics suggests otherwise.
Much had happened in the
intervening seven years between the Appalachian Coals and Socony- Vacuum
decisions. The Franklin Roosevelt presidency had inherited a Supreme Court
occupied by Justices Willis Van Devanter, Pierce Butler, James C. McReynolds and
George Sutherland, who together would come to be known as "the Four Horsemen"
for their ironclad and uniform opposition to the legislative reforms of the New
Deal. 108 Their obstinacy precipitated President Roosevelt's infamous Court-packing
plan, which went up in smoke in 1937. 109 As it turned out, however, all was not lost
as, through normal attrition, President Roosevelt was able to appoint Justice Hugo
Black in 1937 to succeed the retiring Justice Willis Van Devanter, and Felix
Frankfurter and Douglas in 1939, to replace Justices Cardozo and Brandeis,
respectively. 110
Thus, began what is widely referred to as the "Judicial
Revolution." 111
In writing the sweeping Socony- Vacuum opinion, Justice Douglas did have to
deal with Appalachian Coals. He did not do so very convincingly, although that is
not to say anyone else could have done better in dealing with that aberrant decision.
According to Douglas, the cases had little in common except for "the presence in
each of so-called demoralizing or injurious practices." 112 He characterized the
collective action in each as "quite divergent" since the Appalachian Coals plan "was
1118

See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 5. at 178-99. Learned Hand, in contrast, dubbed Justices
Brandeis, Cardozo. and Stone, who distrusted the New Deal but did not uniformly oppose it,
the 'Three Musketeers." /d. at 211.
109

0f course, the mercurial Justice Owen Roberts probably played an important role in
heading off the Court-packing plan when he switched his vote in West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), resulting in a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the
National Labor Relations Act. A year earlier, in a very similar case, he had joined the Four
Horsemen in striking down the Act. Roberts' position change became known as "the switch in
time that saved nine." For a full account of the Court-packing plan, see JOSEPH ALSOP &
TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS ( 1938 ). See also GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE
JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 161-73 ( 1977); ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 205-

19 (1994).
1111

0ne Justice Douglas biographer observed that by the time Douglas was sworn in on
April 17, 1939, "it was clear that Roosevelt had lost the Court-packing plan but won the
Court." SIMON, supra note 9, at 199.
111

See Hamilton & Braden, supra note 92. Of course, most of the attention on the "new"
Court concerned its expansion of civil liberties, shift in constitutional theory, and expansion of
the role of the federal government. See, e.g., Vincent M. Barnett, Jr., Constitutional
Interpretation and Judicial Se!rRestraint, 39 MICH. L. REV. 213 (1940); Kenneth Culp Davis,
Revolution in the Supreme Court, 166 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 85 (1940); Thomas Reed Powell,
Changing Constitutional Phases, 19 B.U. L. REV. 509 (1939); Frank J. Hogan, Important
Shifts in Constitutional Doctrine. 25 A.B.A. J. 629 (1939). See also DUNNE, supra note 109.
112

Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. at 216.
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not designed to operate vis-a-vis the general consuming market and to fix the prices
on that market." 113 He further characterized the Appalachian Coal plan as "not only
incidental but also highly conjectural" because it was entirely prospective. 114
These are at best make-weight distinctions. It is impossible to explain how a
scheme to remove distress coal from the supply of coal to be sold to coal consumers
such as public utilities differs in any meaningful way from a scheme to remove
distress gasoline from the supply of gasoline sold to jobbers or middlemen. Can the
effect on the "general consuming market" for gasoline somehow differ from that for
coal? Further, the so-called prospective nature of the coal scheme is a distinction
without a difference. Justice Douglas was happy to apply basic economic analysis,
not to mention general common sense, to the facts of Socony-Vacuum. If part of the
supply is removed from a market, the price, given constant demand, will tend to
increase. Application of the same fundamental truths in Appalachian Coals would
have led inalterably to the same foolproof prediction. 115
Of course, Justice Douglas' Socony- Vacuum opinion effectively overrules, not
distinguishes Appalachian Coals. 116 In reality, Douglas dismantled the "excessive"
competition argument accepted by the Court in Appalachian Coals. 117 In doing so,
he harkened back to the early cartel cases such as United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Association 118 and United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel, 119 in which the
Court had early on rejected ruinous competition defenses in favor of the free
market. 120 According to Douglas, if allowed, competitive abuses would be proffered

113
/d. Justice Douglas' nod to consumers in attempting to distinguish Appalachian Coals
is not without irony since he so often sought to protect competitors, particularly small
inefficient ones, at the ultimate expense of consumers. See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390
U.S. 145, 154 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 315 (1949) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948); see infra text
accompanying notes 494-518.

114

Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 216.

115 Jn Appalachian Coals, the whole reason for the plan was to reduce supply and eliminate
"destructive competition" between 137 coal producers. 288 U.S. at 359.

116

Accord Ross, supra note 106, at 131.

117 Justice

Douglas noted that every cartel could proffer a ruinous competition justification
and flatly rejected the notion that competition could be sufficiently "ruinous" to be against the
public interest as embodied in the Sherman Act. Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 22 I.
munited States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897). See also United
States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, I 71 U.S. 505 ( 1898).
119

United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 Fed. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
120 Trans-Missouri
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as a justification for every price fixing conspiracy, in direct contradiction to the free
121
market philosophy underlying the Sherman Act.
Justice Douglas. however, was not content to end with a reaffirmation of TransMissouri and A;fdvston Pipe & Steel. Instead, in dicta in his now famous footnote 59
he made it clear that the per se rule for price fixing did not require a showing of
market power or dominance. 122 With this dictum. Douglas usefully closed the door
left ajar in Trenton Potteries. m He did not stop there. however, but went on to write
that a conspiracy that has the purpose or intent to affect prices is all that is necessary
for Sherman Act condemnation, even where no "overt act" or actual affect is
shown. 124 Thus, a mere conspiracy to fix prices. as that term is broadly defined in the
opinion. violates Section I even if effect is lacking.
As a result of the footnote 59 dicta, the per se rule for price fixing is both
simplified and significantly expanded. 125 Proof of market power is dispensed with
and either a purpose (or intent) to fix prices or a purpose and effect on prices brings
on the per se rule. 126
With the broad, sweeping dicta of footnote 59, Justice Douglas began to sow the
seeds of a reputation as an activist judge. Douglas could have written the SoconyVacuum decision by reference to Trenton Potteries. Trans-Missouri, and Addyston
Pipe & Steel and by distinguishing Appalachian Coals, as he unconvincingly tried to
do. The only doctrinal expansion necessary to support the result in the case had to
do with expanding the definition of price fixing beyond literal or actual fixed prices.
In subsequent decisions, Justice Douglas reaffirmed his expansive interpretation
of price fixing. 127 In his view, "lp]rice fixing in any form is perhaps the most
powerful of all inducements for abandonment of competition." 128

121

Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 220-21.

122
/d. at 224 n.59. See also, e.,;., E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON,
UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 130 (4th ed. 2003).
12

-'-'il'e sources cited supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.

1
I.' "1A I conspiracy to fix prices violates !Section] I of the Act though no overt act is
shown. though it is not established that the conspirators had the means available for
accomplishment of their objective ... :· Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59.

125

See, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and American and American Business
Ahmad TodaY. 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1251, 1256 ( 1995 ), characterizing footnote 59 as
"formulating the strictest possible per se condemnation of agreements between competitors
affecting the pricing mechanism."
126
That leaves so-called ·'effect only"' cases, in which there is no proof of purpose or intent
to fix prices. as the only pos-;ible circumstances for application of the rule of reason and
consideration of justifications for the restraint. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia
Broad. Sys .. Inc., 441 U.S. I ( 1979); Nat' I Soc'y of Prof! Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679 (IY78)

1

''See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143 (1948) (majority
opinion condemning a horizontal price fixing conspiracy to fix the prices of first run movies);
United States v. Masonite Corp .. 316 U.S. 265 (1942) (majority opinion holding that
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He expressed similar sentiments in United States v. National Association of Real
Estate Roards, in vvhich the Court considered whether real estate commissions fixed
by a real estate board were simply fees or could be considered wages and thus under
the labor exemption. 1 "~ Justice Douglas, writing for a six-judge majority with two
judges not participating, ruled that price fixing prohibitions applied to services as
well as goods and that prices fixed by the board were fees, not wages, because real
estate brokers are independent entrepreneurs, not employees. 130 As a result, he
rejected defendants' assertion that the fixed commissions should fall within the
statutory labor law exemption. He also took pains to characterize defendants'
actions as illegal price fixing, even though they were authorized by the board's "code
of ethics" and were "non-mandatory" in the sense that defendants imposed no
penalties for deviation from the prescribed fee percentage.
Justice Douglas also again rejected any consideration of the relevance of a
reasonableness defense, writing:
It is not for the courts to determine whether in particular settings pricefixing serves an honorable or worthy end. An agreement, shown either by
adherence to a price schedule or by proof of consensual action, fixing the
uniform or minimum price. is in itself illegal under the Sherman Act, no
matter what end it was designed to serve. 131

Thus, he at once applied price fixing to the rendering of personal services, again
shut the door to reasonableness arguments, and made it clear that exceptions were
not lightly or easily to be allowed. 132
Justice Douglas took his view that the Sherman Act was "the charter of freedom"
quite literally, generally refusing to allow the Sherman Act to be displaced by other
legislation. For example, in Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers Corp.,
Douglas, writing for a 6-3 majority, ruled that the non-signor provision in the
restrictive licensing by patent holder amounted to price fixing); Wayne Pump Co. v. United
States, 317 U.S. 200. 210 ( 1942) (dissenting against the dismissal of a criminal price fixing
complaint for insufficiency and indefiniteness).
12
x united States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 320 ( 1948) (Douglas, J., concurring).
He went on to state:
[Price fixing] ot'fen, security and stability; it eliminates much of the uncertainty of
competitive practices; it promises high profits. It is therefore one of the most effective
devices to regiment whole industries and exact a monopoly price from the public. The
benefits of competition disappear. The prices charged by the regimented industry are
determined not by representatives of the public ... but by private parties who incline
to charge all the traffic will bear.
/d.
129

United States v. Nat'! Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950).

1

w/d. at 490-91.

111

/d. at 489.

112

See Note. Price-Fixing <!( Sen·ices Under the Sherman Act, 45 ILL. L. REV. 115, 120
( 1950).
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Louisiana fair trade law, which purportedly bound all retailers to maintain retail
prices fixed by a manufacturer once one retailer signed an agreement to do so, was
not authorized by the federal Miller-Tydings Act, which exempted state authorized
resale price agreements from the Sherman Act. 133
The Schwegmann decision, which today because of the repeal of the MillerTydings Act in 1975 is of historical interest only, "was met with banner headlines,
wailing, rejoicing, and some retail bedlam." 134
It effectively denuded the
effectiveness of state fair trade price fixing since non-signers could not be bound to
the established price and could thus cut prices without violating state law. 135
Schwegmann was decided on May 21, 1951, and by May 28, Macy's Department
Store in New York City, a perennial non-signer, had cut prices six percent on about
6,000 consumer items. Long-time rival Gimbel's and every other major New York
department store quickly followed suit. 136
Congress, however, quickly acted to rehabilitate state fair trade law, passing the
McGuire Act in 1952. That Act sanctioned state non-signer provisions, effectively
overruling Schwegmann. 137 Both the McGuire Act and Miller-Tydings Act were

133
Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The MillerTydings Act was passed in 1937 to amend the Sherman Act in response to wholesaler and
retailer objections to the condemnation of vertical price fixing under Dr. Miles Med. Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). By 1941 all but Vermont, Texas, and
Missouri had enacted fair trade statutes which provided, in substance, that there was nothing
illegal about a contract specifying the resale price of a trade-marked or similarly identified
commodity. The state laws also specified that knowingly advertising or selling a commodity
at less than the specified price amounted to unfair competition and gave rise to a right of
action by any injured party. See ROBERT PITOFSKY, ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 643 (5th ed. 2003).

134

See James A. Rahl, Resale
Effect of Schwegmann Brothers v.
most spectacular trade regulation
Supreme Court Term: I950-5I, 19
created a sensation.").

Price Maintenance, State Action and the Antitrust Laws:
Calvert Distillers, 46 ILL. L. REV. 349, 350 (1951) ("the
decision in years"); John P. Frank, The United States
U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 175 (1952) ('The Schwegmann case

135

See, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III, The State Action Antitrust Immunity, 49 U. COLO. L. REV.
147, 156 n.47 (1978).
136

Alfred R. Zipser, Jr., Macy's Cuts Prices 6% on 'Fixed' Items; A 'War' is Foreseen,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1951, at I. Apparently the price war remained front page news for week
afterwards. See Frank, supra note 134, at 176. Department store retail price-cutting also
"broke loose" in Detroit and Denver as stores scrambled to reduce high inventories. Rahl,
supra note 134, at 350 n.S.
137

McGuire Bill, Pub. L. No. 542, 66 Stat. 632 (1952); 15 U.S.C.
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repealed by Congress in 1975, however, effectively sending state fair trade laws
packing. 138
In reaching his conclusion in Schwegmann, Justice Douglas relied heavily upon
the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Act in concluding that the Act did not
include non-signers. That he got it wrong was made clear by the Report of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, which accompanied the
McGuire Act. 139 Even his fellow realist and former colleague at Yale, John Frank,
found that "as a bit of statutory construction, the case was, to put it sedately,
novel .... " 140
A close look at Justice Douglas' statutory construction in Schwegmann does
reveal some judicial sleight of hand. He begins by noting that the language of the
Miller-Tydings Act sanctioned only state-authorized contracts or agreements
prescribing minimum prices for resale. 141 The normal and customary meaning of
"contracts or agreement," he asserted, does not include non-signers to stateauthorized resale price maintenance schemes. 142 In referring to the legislative
history, however, he notes the House Report specifically mentioned non-signers as
within the ambit of the bill. He concludes, however, that the House Report should
not control because the bill that the report endorsed was later amended before it
became law. 143 The minor language changes in the amendment had nothing to do,

138

By that time, at least twenty-four state supreme courts had held their state fair trade
laws unconstitutional in toto or with respect to the nonsigner provision, and six state
legislatures had repealed at least the non-signer portion of their law. See MILTON HANDLER,
ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 574-80 (1975).
139
The primary purpose of the [McGuire] bill is to reaffirm the very same proposition
which, in the committee's opinion, the Congress intended when to enact into law when
it passed the Miller-Tydings Act. ... The end result of the [Schwegmann] decision has
been seriously to undermine the effectiveness of the Miller-Tydings Act and, in tum,
of the fair-trade Jaws enacted by 45 States. HR 5767, as amended, is designed to
restore the effectiveness of these acts by making it abundantly clear that Congress
means to Jet State fair-trade Jaws apply in their totality; that is, with respect to nonsigners as well as signers.
H.R. Rep. No. 82-1437 at 1-2 (1952). See also Hudson Distribs. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S.
386,391-92 (1964).
14

°Frank, supra note 134, at 175.

141

Schwegmann Bros .. 341 U.S. at 387-88.

142

/d. at 388.

143

/d. at 392-93.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

23

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

918

[Vol. 56:897
144

however, with the non-signer coverage urged in the House Report,
despite
Douglas' weak attempt to say that it did. 145
Although fair trade legislation was largely the product of small retailers who
146
believed themselves undercut by larger rivals, particularly chain store outlets,
Justice Douglas' aversion to price fixing, even of the vertical variety, was stronger
than his sympathy for the independent retailer. For it was the larger retailers, such as
Macy's and Gimbel's, that were likely to be the non-signers. One might conclude
that in fact Douglas was exhibiting a pro-consumer bias, since by protecting nonsigners he left the way open for continuing price cutting. 147
Justice Douglas' anathema to price fixing showed itself in patent cases as well,
although his dislike of the rights flowing from patent law was perhaps even
stronger. 148 In United States v. Line Material Co., 149 for example, he agreed with the
Court that a patentee could not use a cross-licensing agreement to control the price of
another patented article. As he made clear, however, in a concurrence joined by

144
"[0]ther conditions" was deleted from language which formerly read "nothing herein
contained shall render illegal contracts, or agreements prescribing minimum prices or other
conditions for the resale of" specified commodities. /d. at 386.
145

See Frank, supra note 134, at 176 (noting that Justice Douglas' argument was
"weakened by the fact that the language changes had no perceptible relation to the minimum
price clauses here in issue"). Justices Jackson and Minton concurred but slammed Douglas for
his selective use of legislative history to support his result. Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at
395-96 (Jackson. J., concurring). Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Black and Burton,
vigorously dissented and attached both the House and Senate Reports to establish that
Congress clearly intended non-signers to be covered. /d. at 397 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
146

See, e.g., A.D. NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 29399 (2d ed. 1970); GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRN W. WATKINS, MONOPOLY AND FREE
ENTERPRISE 321-25 (1951 ); Rahl, supra note 134, at 351-52.
147

The decision also suggests that Justice Douglas prefers federal over state economic
regulation since his reading of the legislative history of the Miller-Tydings Act is that
Congress needs to be crystal clear when delegating economic regulatory authority to the states.
Schwegmann Bros., 341 U.S. at 395.
148
See infra text accompanying notes 237-55. See also Justice Douglas' majority opinions
in FunkBrothers Seed Co. v. Kalb lnoculallf Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), General Electric Co. v.
Jewel Incandescent Lamp Co., 326 U.S. 242 (1945), Me1wid Corp. v. Mid-Continent
Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator
Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944), United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), Cuno
Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941 ). See also Special Equip.
Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370,380 (1945) (Douglas, J., dissenting). q: Transparent-Wrap Mach.
Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947). See also Epstein, supra note 63, at 55859.
149

United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948).
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three other justices, 150 he would go further and invalidate the ability of the patent
holder to control the price charged by licensees. 151
In his view, the patent laws, through their silence on the issue, did not authorize
price-fixing agreements. 152 The Court had, by permitting the patent holder to fix
prices, "saddled the economy with a vicious monopoly." 153 According to Justice
Douglas, when the patentee controls the price charged by licensees, "fc]ompetition
tends to become impaired not by reason of the public's preference for the patented
article but because of the preference of competitors for price fixing and for the
increased profits which that method of doing business promises." 154
In his concurrence in Line Material, Justice Douglas took pains to characterize
price fixing as "perhaps the most powerful of all inducements for abandonment of
competition.'' 155 It is clear that he still felt that way twenty-one years later when he
wrote for the Court in United States v. Container Corporation of America. 156 That
case involved a challenge to a practice in the corrugated container industry of
providing price quotes to competitors when asked. The price exchanges were
characterized as infrequent and irregular but Douglas, writing for a 5-3-1 majority,
made short work of finding a violation of Section 1. 157 In doing so, he managed to
inject great confusion and uncertainly into the state of the law.
The main difficulty is that the opinion is so vague and conclusive that one is left
guessing as to whether the Court has just articulated a new per se rule or applied the
rule of reason. 158 First, Justice Douglas characterized the case as within the per se
150

/d. at 315. They were Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge.

151

/d. Justice Douglas acknowledged that to do so would necessitate overruling prior
decisions such as United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), and Bement v.
National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
152

Line Material Co., 333 U.S. at 318.

153 /d. at 318.
He went on to observe that "[b]y protecting [the patent holder] against
competition from low-cost producers, it strengthens and enlarges his monopoly." !d. at 319.

155 /d. at 320. See also Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at
281 ("[C]ontrol over prices [of competing patented goods] thus becomes an actual or potential
brake on competition.").
156

United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 ( 1969).

157 /d. at 335.
The majority opinion is about three and a half pages long in the U.S.
Reporter while Justice Marshall's dissent i' more than twice that length.
158Law review commentators strained to interpret Container. See, e.g., Note, Antitrust
Liability for an Exchange of Price Information-What Happened to Container Corporation?,
63 VA. L. REV. 639, 654 ( 1977) (moditied per se rule established); James M. Kefauver, The
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ban of Socony-Vacuum. 159 In the very next sentence he seemed to reverse direction
completely, writing that "[p]rice information exchanged in some markets may have
no effect on a truly competitive price." 160 Reading and rereading the passage, one
gets the feeling of a letter that is dictated but not read. Further, his subsequent
cursory analysis of the corrugated container market and finding of an effect on price
leaves one wondering just when price exchanges might be allowed.
In the opinion, Justice Douglas noted that the industry was expanding, had excess
capacity, ease of entry, an inelastic demand and, not surprisingly, downward price
trends. 161 Nonetheless, he found, seemingly without any supporting evidence, that
the price exchanges had the effect of slowing the general price decline in the
industry. 162 His antipathy to any potential interference with price competition or the
price mechanism was so strong that he was willing to assume an effect on price, even
when industry conditions suggested otherwise. 163 Douglas ended the brief opinion
with "[p]rice is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to be used even in an
informal manner to restrain competition." 164
Justice Fortas concurred to attempt to clarify the majority opinion, stating that he
did not read the majority as enacting a per se rule for exchanges of price
information. 165 Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart, wrote a
pointed, somewhat sarcastic dissent, stating that he "would prefer that a finding of
anticompetitive effect be supported by 'evidence in the record."' 166 He concluded
Legality of Dissemination of Market Data by Trade Associations: What Does Container
Hold?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 785-86 (1972) (no per se rule); Note, Antitrust Implications
of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors: The Container Corporation Case,
68 MICH. L. REv. 720, 730-31 (1970) (no per se rule).
15

~is exact language is "(t]he limitation or reduction of price competition brings the case
within the ban, for as we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., ... interference
with the setting of price by free market forces is unlawful per se." Container, 393 U.S. at 337.
160

/d. at 337.

161

/d. at 336-37.

162

/d. at 336.

163

Arguably Justice Douglas' approach in Container is at least consistent with SoconyVacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59, in which he posits that a conspiracy to affect prices is unlawful
even though no effect on prices is shown.
164

Container, 393 U.S. at 338.

165

/d. at 338-39 (Fortas, J., concurring).

166

/d. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall also did "not find the inference
that the exchange of price information has had an anticompetitive effect as 'irresistible' as
does the Court." /d.
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that in the corrugated container market, where total demand was increasing and entry
was easy, "it [was] just as logical" that competitors would try to capture market share
by cutting prices as by maintaining them through occasional price exchanges. 167
Not surprisingly, Justice Marshall interpreted the Douglas majority as
establishing a per se rule for price exchanges, spending the first four paragraphs of
his dissent pointing out why the per se rule should be inapplicable to price exchange
agreements. 16 s He noted that the Court had historically refused to apply a per se rule
to exchanges of price and market information. 169 Douglas, in contrast, had largely
ignored precedent in his majority opinion, citing the earlier trade association cases
sparingly, if at all.
One cannot read the Douglas majority and the Marshall dissent in Container
without concluding that the dissent is by far the strongest, best reasoned opinion of
the two. Marshall effectively dismantled the Douglas majority opinion for reaching
conclusions about the occasional price exchanges' effect on price "[i]n the absence
of any proof whatsoever." 170
Nonetheless, Container was now the law and it took the Supreme Court six years
to clear up the confusion that Justice Douglas had wrought. In United States v.
Citizens & Southern National Bank, a case involving the dissemination of interest
rates and service charges by a parent bank to branch banks in which, due to Georgia
law, the parent could own no more than a five percent interest, the Court stated "the
dissemination of price information is not itself a per se violation of the Sherman
Act." 171 To support its statement the Court cited two old trade association cases 172
and Justice Fortas' concurring opinion in Container.
167

/d. at 343. Marshall pointed out that because industry demand is inelastic, price
changes do not have an immediate bearing on quantities purchased. Given the uncertainty
about likely effect, he would have required the government to prove an anticompetitive
purpose or effect. /d.
168

/d. at 340-42.

169
/d. at 341 (citing Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925);
Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); United States v. Am.
Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S.
377 (1921)).

17
°Container, 333 U.S. at 345.
The Government admits that the price trend was down, but asks the Court to assume
that the trend would have been accelerated with less informed, and hence more
vigorous, price competition. In the absence of any proof whatsoever, 1 cannot make
such an assumption. It is just as likely that price competition was furthered by the
exchange as it is that it was depressed.
/d. at 345-46 (citation omitted).
171 United

States v. Citizens & S. Nat'! Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 113 ( 1975).

172 Maple

Flooring Ass'n. 268 U.S. 563; Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n, 268 U.S. 588.
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The Court then concluded that the sharing of information, given the branch
banking restrictions then in place, did not violate Section I of the Sherman Act. m
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas joined in a three-judge dissent authored by Justice
Brennan. 174 The dissent concluded that the government had established a Section I
violation flowing from the dissemination of interest and fee information. Although
the dissent did not directly dispute the majority's application of the rule of reason to
price sharing and exchanges, it did remark that the difficulty of applying the rule of
reason "has in many cases led us to prefer per se rules." 175
In spite of Citizens & Southern National Bank's clarification of price exchanges
as subject to the rule of reason, the fallout from Container nonetheless affected the
next price dissemination case to reach the Supreme Court. That case, United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., involved a criminal challenge to a practice of
interseller price verification within the gypsum wallboard industry.m It is almost
unheard of for the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to criminally
prosecute an offense subject to the rule of reason; 177 thus, raising the question, why
did it in U.S. Gypsum? The answer may never be known with certainty but a good
guess is that, since the U.S. Gypsum prosecution began well before the Court's
decision in Citizens & Southern National Bank, the Justice Department believed it
was dealing with a per se case, based on Container.m
Unfortunately, the U.S. Gypsum decision itself created confusion since one of the
issues before the Court was whether proof of intent was a necessary element of a
criminal antitrust violation. The Court held that it was and that the standard was a
showing that the action was "undertaken with knowledge of its probable
173

Citizens & S. Nat'/ Bank, 422 U.S. at 113-14.

174

/d. at 130 (Brennan, J.. dissenting).

175

/d. at 142. Citizens & Southem National Bank is almost surely a case whose outcome
can directly be traced to the change in Supreme Court personnel between 1969 and 1975 as the
Warren Court was transforming into the Burger Court. Chief Justice Burger. and Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, all new appointees, were pmt of Justice St~wmt's six-judge
majority. !d. at 86 (majority opinion). Justice Marshall, author of the dissent in Container,
which Justice Stewart had joined, was the sixth justice in the Citizens & Southern National
Bank majority. Citizens & S. Nat'/ Bank, 422 U.S. at 86. Further, the three dissenting justice'
in Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. at 130 (Brennan, J., dissenting), Warren Court
holdovers Douglas, Brennan and White, were all in the majority in Container.~393 U.S. at 333.
Thus, with the changes in the Court's makeup, Justices Marshall and Stewart had the vote.-, to
outtlank Justice Douglas.
176

United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co .. 438 U.S. 422,427 (1978).

177

See, e.g., WEAVER, supra note 18.

178

In addition, the interseller price verification in U.S. Gvpsum was much more sy.-,tematic
and widespread than were the "infrequent" price exchanges in Container, probahly leading the
Antitrust Division to believe they had a much stronger per se case than even Container.
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179
· too k pams
· to pomt
· out that price exchanges
consequences. "
,s·mce the c ourt agam
among competitors fell under the rule of reason, 1 ~ 0 it was uncertain whether the U.S.
Gypsum intent standard applied to per se offenses as well. 1K 1 The circuit courts
almost uniformly held that it did not. 182 thus rendering that part of the U.S. Gypsum
decision largely moot, since criminal prosecutions in rule of reason cases are so
unusual.
The root of all this uncertainty probably lies with Justice Douglas' poorly drafted.
poorly reasoned opinion in Container. The government would not likely have
criminally prosecuted the U.S. Gypsum case had Container provided better guidance,
and the issue of criminal intent and the litigation it spawned would have been
avoided. 183
Justice Douglas certainly understood the anticompetitive consequences that
collaborations of competitors could have on the market and on consumers. In his
view. no collective action that might affect the price mechanism should be tolerated.
As a result. he did not consider countervailing market conditions nor did he require
that the government establish a strong factual basis for its assertions of
anticompetitive effect. In reality, he reduced the government'~ burden of proof. The
Douglas approach certainly was effective in a case like Socony- Vacuum where intent
was clear and effect irrefutable. But in a closer case such as Container, where intent
was uncertain and competitive effect problematic, his summary disposition was
based on nothing more than the effect occasional price exchanges might have on
price levels rather than any showing of actual effect.
Jn further contrast to Justice Douglas' careful and thorough Socony- Vacuum
opinion, his opinion in Container is inexplicably vague and seemingly contradictory.
While asserting that the price exchanges in Container bring it within the per se
prohibition of Socony- Vacuum, he in the very next sentence acknowledges that

179

U.S. Gypsum. 438 U.S. at 444.

IHOJd.

Private

at44J n.J6.

IHISee, e.g., C. Paul Rogers III. Criminal Intent in Antitrust Prosecutions. Collaraal
Estoppel, and Section 5(a) of' the Clayton Act, and the Relationship r1j" Standing and Injun- in
Antitrust Suits, 56 CHI.-KENTL. REV. 45 (1980).
182
See, e.fi .. United States v. Brown. 936 F.2d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Coop. Theatres of Ohio, Inc., 845 F.2d 1367, 1373 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. W.F.
Brinkley & Son Constr. Co .. 783 F.2d 1157. 1162 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Koppers
Co., 652 F.2d 290,296 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Foley, 598 F.2d 1323, 1335 (4th
Cir.1979); United States v. Gillen, 599 F.2d 541. 545 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Brighton
Bldg. & Maint. Co., 598 F.2d II 0 I, II 06 (7th Cir. 1979 ).

183That is not to say that the Supreme Court would not have granted certiorari in U.S.
Gypsum. That case contained a second issue, the use of the Robinson-Patman Act's meeting
competition defense to justify an intersellcr price verification program. which alone, might
have caught the Court's attention. U.S. Gypsum. 438 U.S. at 426.
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"[p]rice information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly
competitive price." 184 Of course, the accepted wisdom of per se rules is that a given
185
Thus, it is
restraint is so labeled only when it is always competitively pemicious.
little wonder that confusion reigned about what standard, if any, the Container
186
decision set forth for price exchanges among competitors.
In Socony- Vacuum, Justice Douglas extended the per se rule against price fixing
beyond literal price fixing to any collective activity that interferes with the price
setting mechanism of the market. He recognized that no gray area could exist since
any affect on price by collective action disrupts the market. He arguably went too
far in the dicta of footnote 59, however, when he argued against the requirement of
an anticompetitive effect. In Container, written almost thirty years later, he eagerly
concluded, based on flimsy evidence at best, that the price exchanges at issue did
affect price. Thus, one can conclude that Douglas was our staunchest defender of the
sanctity of the price mechanism. One can as well conclude that his defense was, on
occasion, overzealous.
V. MONOPOLIZATION

Justice Douglas stridently believed that big is bad. In his scorching dissent in
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., which according to Douglas was "the most
important antitrust case ... before the Court in years," 187 he rather succinctly set
forth his views about economic power in private hands:
We have here the problem of bigness. Its lesson should by now have
been burned into our memory by Brandeis. The Curse of Bigness shows
how size can become a menace-both industrial and social. It can be an
industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing or
putative competitors. It can be a social menace-because of its control of
prices ... power that controls the economy should be in the hands of
elected representatives of the people, not in the hands of an industrial
oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It should be
scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be
dependent on the whim or caprice, the political prejudices, the emotional
184

Container, 393 U.S. at 337.

185

See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 262 (1963). More
contemporary price fixing "characterization" cases have employed increasingly sophisticated
analyses, such as the "quick look" rule of reason, to ascertain the likely competitive effect of
horizontal collaborative conduct. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999);
Nat'! Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Ariz. v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc.,
441 U.S. 1 (1979).
186

See supra notes 149-62 and accompanying text.

187

United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 534 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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stability of a few self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious
men but respectable and social-minded is irrelevant.
That is the
philosophy and the command of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a
theory of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great
that only a government of the people should have it. 188
At least one does not have to long ponder what Douglas would have thought of
Microsoft and Bill Gates.
Columbia Steel turned out to be the leading and most controversial merger case
of the 1940s. There the government challenged an acquisition by Columbia Steel, a
wholly owned U.S. Steel subsidiary of Consolidated Steel, a competitor in the
fabricated steel market. 189 Columbia, the largest steel fabricator in the country,
controlled thirteen percent of the growing western market while Consolidated had
eleven percent of the same market. 190 In addition, the acquisition foreclosed U.S.
Steel's competitors of rolled steel, a raw material needed by steel fabricators, from
selling to Consolidated. 191
Columbia Steel acquired the assets of Consolidated, forcing the government to
sue under Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act, 192 since the less permissive Section 7
of the Clayton Act then applied only to stock purchases with horizontal competitive
effects. 193 The Court, by a narrow 5-4 majority, held that the government had not
established that the acquisition amounted to an unreasonable restraint of trade 194 or
an attempt to monopolize the fabricated steel market. 195 Justice Douglas' dissent,
joined by Justices Black, Murphy and Rutledge, focused on the vertical rather than
the horizontal aspects of the merger. 196 As he saw it, U.S. Steel had one-third of the
country's rolled steel production and, in purchasing Consolidated, had effectively cut
off thirteen percent of the "plates and shapes" market from competitors. 197 He ended
188

/d. at 535-36.

189

/d. at 498 (majority opinion).

190

/d.at512.

191

/d. at 507.

192

Colurnbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. at 498 (majority opinion).

193

/d. at 508 n.8.

194

/d. at 530-31.

195

/d. at 533-34.

196

/d. at 539 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

197

/d. at 538-40. Consolidated's purchases of rolled steel generally amounted to three
percent of that market. According to Justice Douglas, "[b]y no standard . . . can that
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with his "big is bad" theme, stating "[t]he least I can say is that a company that has
that tremendous leverage on our economy is big enough." 1n
Public and congressional sentiment seemed to be with Douglas. Congress soon
passed the Celler-Kefauver Act, extending Section 7 of the Clayton Act to asset
acquisitions as well as vertical mergers. 199
Justice Douglas did not mellow with respect to his distaste for large companies or
anything that could be characterized as market concentration. Twenty-five years
after Columbia Steel, near the end of his long service on the Court, he wrote a
scathing concurrence in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., a merger case
involving the acquisition by the country's fourth largest brewery of the largest
brewery in New England. 21 x1 Douglas again quoted Brandeis, this time for the
proposition that increased business size creates not efficiencies, but inefficiencies
that simply allow the owner to garner more profits by increasing volume. 201
Justice Douglas went on to lament that the increasing concentration of economic
power into large corporations was transfening local control of business "to distant
cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss
statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or
no relationship." 202 According to Douglas. two of the purposes of the 1950 CellerKefauver Act were to retain local control over industry and protect small businesses,
goals which had "been largely defeated with serious consequences." 203
percentage be deemed immaterial.'' /d. at 538. He believed, however, that "[a] surer test of the
impact of the acquisition on competition is to be determined not only by consideration of the
actual markets reached by Consolidated but also by the actual purchases it makes," hence his
emphasis on "plates and shape~." !d.
19

R/d. at 540. To support his statement, Justice Douglas quoted a 1940 monograph
characterizing U.S. Steel as "the giant of the industry" with greater capacity than all the
German producers combined and more than twice the capacity of Great Britain and France,
respectively. !d. at 540 n.6 (quoting CLAIR WILCOX. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY, MONOGRAPH 21, at 120 (Comm. Print 1940)). See a/so Page, supra
note 33, at 24-25.
199

Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184.64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18,
21 (2000)). For a review of the legislative history of the act, see Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962).
200

United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 539 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring in part).
201

/d. at 540-41 (quoting Control of Corporations, Persons, and Firms Engaged in
llllerstatc Commerce: Hearings on S. 98 Be./(Jre the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 62
Cong. 1155 (1912) (statement of Louis D. Brandeis. Attorney at Law)).
202

/d. at 541-42.

203

/d. at 542-43.
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The result, the Justice wrote, was that local employment suffers. local payrolls
are reduced, and "responsible entrepreneurs in counties and States are replaced by
clerks." 204 He believed that ''[a] nation of clerks is anathema to the American
antitrust dream" and, if unabated. "leads predictably to socialism." 205
The Columbia Steel case was announced on June 7. 1948. About one month
earlier on May 3, 1948, Justice Douglas tied an obscure record by issuing three
majority antitrust opinions on the same day. 206 All involved the motion picture
industry: United States v. Grijfith, 207 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 20 x
and United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 209 Gr(ffith involved monopoly
leveraging rather than a market foreclosure through acquisition. Douglas succeeded
in attracting a 6-l majority, with Justices Murphy (who joined the dissent in
Columbia Steel) and Jackson not participating, and Justice Frankfurter dissenting by
substantially endorsing the district court opinion. 210
While the Gr(fflth decision is of doubtful validity today and is largely ignored as
precedent, it did provide Justice Douglas with another ample opportunity to expound
on his big is bad theory. In doing so, Douglas drafted language about exclusionary
conduct by a monopolist that is still considered fundamental to establishing the
requisite monopolistic intent necessary for a Section 2 violation? 11

204

/d. at 543.

206
In 1898, Justice Rufus Wheeler Peckham also issued three majority antitrust opinions
U.S.171604
(1898); Hopkins v. United
on the same day. See Anderson v. United States,
States, 171 U.S. 578 (1898); United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n. 171 U.S. 505 (1898). All
three involved Sherman Act jurisdictional issues.
207

United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).

208

Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. II 0 (1948).

209

United State' v. Paramount Pictures. Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). The 1947-48 Supreme
Court Term was perhaps the busiest antitrust term ever. In addition to the four cases listed
above, the Court also, in opinions written by Justice Black, decided FTC v. Morton Salt Co.,
334 U.S. 37 ( 1948), FTC 1'. Cement but., 333 U.S. o83 (1948), United States 1'. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948) and United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948). for a
total of eight antitrust cases.
21 u.Justices Jackson and Frankfurter were with the majority in United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 497 (1948).
211
Gri{fith, 334 U.S at 107. Supreme Court opinions sometimes are widely cited for an
articulated legal principle even though the application of the principle to the facts before the
Court is highly suspect. When this occurs, the case may often be cited as precedent for the
principle articulated but ignored as precedent on the merits. An example is Brown Shoe Co. v.
United States, 370 U.S. 294 ( 1962), one of the most criticized decisions of the Warren Court
era. See, e.[: .. Robert H. Bork & Ward S. Bowman, Jr.. The Crisis in Antitrust. 65 COLUM. L.
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The case involved the use by a regional movie theater chain of its power in towns
in which it had the sole theater to obtain favorable dates from distributors for films it
desired in towns in which it faced competition from other theaters. As a
consequence, competing movie theaters in the so-called open towns were allegedly
prevented from being able to obtain enough first or second run films to operate
successfully. 212
Justice Douglas made short work of this fact pattern. He held that the use of
one's monopoly position to gain a competitive advantage was all that was necessary
to violate Section 2. 213 The standard set was that one has the power to exclude
competitors "coupled with the purpose or intent to exercise that power." 214 Douglas'
distrust of and distaste for big business, however, was apparent in the opinion and he
arguably came close to establishing a no fault monopoly test when he stated that
"[s]o it is that monopoly power, whether lawfully or unlawfully acquired, may itself
constitute an evil and stand condemned under [Section] 2 even though it remains
unexercised. " 215
Thus, apparently the exercise of monopoly power is not required under Section 2
although proof of purpose or intent to exercise it is necessary. 216 While seemingly
setting a fine line between acquiring or having monopoly power and using it, Griffith
is consistent with the price fixing test in Socony- Vacuum, in which Justice Douglas
held that the purpose to fix prices, even unaccompanied by an overt act, is all that is

REV. 363 (1965); Thomas E. Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Laws: Of
Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. REV. 325 (1968). Brown Shoe is often cited
for its analytical construct for analyzing mergers under Section 7 (defining relevant product
and geographic markets and then measuring the competitive impact of the merger within the
market), even though the Court's assessment of the competitive impact is more than a little
suspect. Similarly, Griffith is oft cited for its articulation of exclusionary conduct as a means
to establish intent to monopolize although its use as a legal precedent on its merits is
questionable today. See, e.g., HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW
OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 317 (2d ed. 1999).
212

Griffith, 334 U.S. at 103.

213

/d. at 107.

214

/d. This language gives rise to the two-prong test under Section 2, which requires proof
of market power plus intent to monopolize.
215

/d. To be fair, this language came in the context of his stating that one did not have to
show an independent Section I conspiracy to prove the unlawful intent of a monopolist, but it
nevertheless does seem to eradicate any meaningful intent standard.
216

Justice Douglas acknowledges that "mere size is not outlawed by [Section] 2." ld. at
I 07 n.l 0. But he warned that size is "an earmark of monopoly power," id., and "carries with it
an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved to have been
utilized in the past." ld. (quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932)).
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necessary for a per se violation of Section 1. 217 But while "specific intent" is not
218
required, a more general purpose or intent is, which can, practically speaking, only
be discerned by looking to the conduct of the monopolist. Thus, Douglas concluded
that "the use of monopoly power, however lawfully acquired, to foreclose
competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is
unlawful." 219
Justice Douglas did therefore require some conduct, although it is not certain if
the mere acquisition of monopoly power met the standard. 220 The power and purpose
to exclude is what it comes to and that test has stood the test of time. Griffith and
Alcoa are its forebears.
Griffith falters considerably, however, in the application of the articulated
standard to the facts before it, as arguably does Alcoa. For Justice Douglas had no
qualms about condemning the leveraging of market power in one market, the closed
towns, to a second competitive market, the open towns. 221 First, it is not at all clear
that the statutory language of Section 2 applies to monopoly leveraging where the
second market does not result in a monopoly. 222 Even if it does, the lower courts are
currently split about the economic and legal effect of monopoly leveraging on a
second non-monopolistic market, with some fearing that the application Section 2

217

Socony- Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. See supra text accompanying notes I I 7- I 9.

218

Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 05.

219

Id. at 107. Thus, Griffith is seemingly in step with Judge Hand's famous opinion in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa) ("[N]o
monopolist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing." Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 05 (quoting
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at432)).
220

He is again true to the Alcoa case, in which Judge Hand observed that "the origin of a
monopoly may be critical in determining its legality ... ."Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429. Cf CARL
KAYSEN & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY: AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 I I,
265-72 (1959) (arguing that excessive market power, without more, should be illegal).
221
Griffith, 334 U.S. at I 06-07. Justice Douglas made a similar point, in the context of
vertical integration and thus leveraging by a monopolist in Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at
I 74, decided the same day as Griffith. Then, four years later, Justice Douglas and Black
joined a four-justice dissent in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594,
628 (1952) (Burton, J., dissenting), arguing that the majority "seeks to avoid the effect of
United States v. Griffith .... " The majority had reversed a lower court judgment for the
government in a newspaper tying/monopolization case. According to the dissent, the TimesPicavune's use of its monopoly power in the morning newspaper market in New Orleans with
adve.rtisers to gain a competitive advantage over a rival newspaper in the evening newspaper
market violated the Sherman Act. /d.
222
See. e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc .. 980 F.2d I 71, 203-06 (3d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921 (1993). See also 3 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 'JI 652 (2d ed. 2002).
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221

might unduly penalize "efficient and natural" monopolies.
The Supreme Court
its;lf seems to have vacillated on the issue, 224 although the recent Trinko decision
225
casts further doubt on the unlawfulness of monopoly leveraging.
Thus, with the help of 20-20 hindsight, the Gr(fflth decision appears shaky in its
application of the law to its facts, although, at least as now generally interpreted, the
case stands for the now fundamental proposition that one does not have to show a
2 6
separate Section 1 violation to prove an intent to monopolize under of Section 2. :
In fact, Judge Wyzanski, in his influential opinion in United States v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., believed that Justice Douglas may have gone further in Griffzth
and, following Judge Hand in Alcoa, 227 ruled that a monopolist "monopolizes"

22
\See, e.g .. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 948 F.2d 536, 548 (9th Cir.
1991 ). cert. denied, 503 U.S. 977 ( 1992); Fineman, 980 F.2d at 205-06. See also Lantec Inc.
v. Novell Inc .. 306 F.3d 1003, 1024 n.ll (lOth Cir. 2002) (recognizing circuit split but
refusing to decide issue); Covad Comms. Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 299 F.3d 1272, 1285 (11th
Cir. 2002) (recognizing leveraging claim); Virgin Atl. Airways v. British Airways, Pic, 257
F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (recognizing potential leveraging claim); Eleven Line, Inc. v. N.
Tex. State Soccer Ass'n. 213 F.3d 198, 206 n.l6 (5th Cir. 2000) (recognizing circuit split);
Kerm.otes Mich. Theatres v. Nat'! Amusements. 854 F.2d 135, 137 (6th Cir. 1988)
(recognizing leveraging claim), cert. dismissed, 490 U.S. I 087 (1989); Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 276 (2d Cir. 1979) C[T]he use of monopoly power
attained in one market to gain a competitive advantage in another is a violation of [Section] 2,
even if there has not been an attempt to monopolize the second market."), cert. denied, 444
U.S.l093(19X0)
22

+Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 ( 1992)
("!Plower gain ell through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or
business acumen can give rise to liability if 'a seller exploits his dominant position in one
market to expand his empire into the next."') (quoting Times-Picayune. 345 U.S. at 611 ), with
Spectrum Sports. Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 459 (1993) ("[Section] 2 makes the
conduct of a single firm unlawful only when it actually monopolizes or dangerously threatens
to do so.").
2 5
' Verimn

Comms. Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,415 n.4 (2004)
(noting that the Court of Appeals erred to the extent that it did not require "a 'dangerous
probability of success' in monopolizing a second market .... " (quoting Spectrum Sports, 506
U.S. at 459)).
2
' ''See. e.g .. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 342 (0. Mass.
195:;) ("A more inclusive approach was adopted by Mr. Justice Douglas in ... Griffith. He
'itated that to prove a violation of [Section] 2 it was not always necessary to show a violation
or ISection! 1." (citation omitted)).

'

2

'U nited States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 428 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
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whenever he does business. "apparently even if there is no showing that his business
involves an exclusionary practice."m
Justice Douglas also wrote the opinion in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United
States, the companion case to Griffith decided the same day. 229 The case is largely
forgotten today although it did involve, similar to Gr(fflth, the leveraging of
favorable film distribution and clearances by a chain of movie theaters of sixty
closed towns into sixteen open or competitive towns. 23u Unlike Griffith, however,
much of the defendant's conduct in Schine Chain Theatres seemed to be directed
toward maintaining or acquiring a monopoly as opposed to merely gaining a
competitive advantage in another market. 231 As such, Schine Chain Theatres may
not be as much of a pure leveraging case as its companion.
The opinion does reaffirm, in language more certain than in Griffith, that
otherwise lawful conduct may, in the hands of a monopolist, establish intent to
monopolize. 232 Otherwise. Douglas' opinion simply repeats key language from
Gr!ffith 233 and adds little to his "big is bad" theme. In a ruling that would be in the
mainstream today, he does hold that price cutting by a monopolist is not unlawful
absent a "showlingJ that it was in purpose or effect employed as an instrument of
monopoly power." 234
mUnited Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. at 342. The quoted language turned out to be
dicta because Judge Wyzanski found ample evidence of exclusionary behavior by the
defendant.
22

Y334 U.S. 110 (1948). As in Griffith, Justices Jackson and Murphy did not participate.

/d. at 130. Justice Frankfurter, however, concurred in the result although he had dissented in

Griffith. !d.
21

u/d. at 113.

231

See, e.g., id. at 119 ("[T]hese agreements were additional weapons in Schine · s arsenal
of power through the use of which its monopoly was sought to be extended."). See also
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948), another majority opinion by
Justice Douglas decided the same term. !d. at 140. In Paramount Pictures, Justice Douglas
found that a conspiracy to monopolize the first run movie exhibition market was exclusionary
in intent and effect and thus violated Section 2. !d. at 170.
212
See, E);., Schine Chain Theatres. 334 U.S. at 119 ("Even an otherwise lawful device
may be used as a weapon in restraint of trade or in an effort to monopolize a part of trade or
commerce."). See also id. at 124 ("But any clearance so obtained, though otherwise
reasonable. would be unlawful. for it would be the product of the exercise of monopoly
power."').
231

·"The mere existence of the power to monopolize. together with the purpose or intent to
do >O. constitutes an evil at which the Act is aimed." !d. at 130.
234

/d. at 120-21. Today, of course, a monopolist's price cuts would have to meet the
definition of predatory pricing to be considered unlawful conduct. See Brooke Group Ltd. v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 221-27 0993); Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort
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It would be many years before Justice Douglas wrote another majority opinion in
a Secti0n 2 case, due in large part to the paucity of monopolization cases to come
before the Court. He did write for the Court in the 1966 United States v. Grinnell
Corp. decision, which is mostly known for its very suspect relevant market
analysis. 235 Unfortunately, his conduct analysis is not any better. In the opinion,
Justice Douglas made very short shrift of the conduct prong, relating that the
defendant's actions in buying competitors, dividing services provided among the
companies bought and controlled, setting price according to the amount of
competition in a market, threatening retaliation against competitors, and the liberal
use of broad covenants not to compete with officials of acquired companies
"eliminated any possibility of an outbreak of competition." 236
It is quite certain that Justice Douglas considered the Grinnell defendants to be
"bad actors," concluding that the conduct analysis "presents no major problem
here."" 7 As a result, however, he spent only one paragraph of the opinion dealing
with the issue. That paragraph is devoid of real analysis but is rather laced with
conclusory statements, all of which could stand closer inspection. 238 It pales in
comparison with the careful analysis of conduct issues in at least some modern
Section 2 cases that determine whether a particular practice by a monopolist has an
exclusionary effect on competitors and competition. 239
As one commentator has noted, the Grinnell decision is symptomatic of the
indeterminacy, vacuity, and conclusory nature of the Supreme Court's Section 2
conduct decisions that have given lower courts and businesses little guidance and left
juries "to divine the metaphysical difference between" exclusionary conduct and
competition on the merits. 240 It also illustrates the perils of the big is bad theory run

of Colo., Inc .. 479 U.S. 104, 117-22 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574,588,595 (1986).
235

United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See infra text accompanying note

303.
236

Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 576.

237

The full quotation is: "We shall see that this second ingredient presents no major
problem here, as what was done in building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a
single purpose." !d. at 571.
238

For example, Justice Douglas' condemnation of defendants meeting local competition
by reducing rates would not be considered exclusionary today absent proof of predatory
pricing. ld. at 570. 576.
239

See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

e.g., Einer Elhauge, D~fining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV.
253, 255, 265-67 (2003).
2 0
• See.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol56/iss4/5

38

2008]

THE ANTITRUST LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS

933

amuck. If that is the Court's normative theory, a result-oriented conduct prong is
perhaps to be expected. 241
Equally problematic in Grinnell is that Justice Douglas announced the commonly
understood test for conduct, derived from Alcoa, 242 and then seemed to retreat from
it. That is, he defined the conduct element as "the willful acquisition or maintenance
of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence
of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 243 Since willfulness
can certainly attach itself to developing a superior product or using business acumen,
whatever that means, to gain market share, the two concepts are not mutually
exclusive. 244 One plausible interpretation of the language is that development of a
superior product or use of business acumen that resulted in monopoly power would
spare the monopolist from a finding of exclusionary conduct. That, however, was
not Douglas' reading in Grinnell. In a footnote he found that, based on defendants'
conduct, "since ... this monopoly power was consciously acquired, we have no
reason to reach" whether "the burden is on the defendants to show that their
dominance is due to skill, acumen, and the like." 245 In other words, a finding of
monopoly power consciously acquired trumps any consideration of the superior
product, skill or acumen defense rather than the other way round.
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas' attitude toward monopoly leveraging did not
change in his later years on the Court. In Otter Tail v. United States, the government
challenged a public utility's refusal to sell or "wheel" electric power to
municipalities wishing to replace Otter Tail as their retail electricity provider. 246
Otter Tail, a vertically integrated power company, produced electricity, transmitted it
over its own lines, "wheeled" electricity produced by others over its lines, and sold
power both at wholesale and retail in the Dakotas and Minnesota. 247
In a 4-3 opinion with Justices Blackmun and Powell not participating, Justice
Douglas quickly ruled that Otter Tail had run afoul of Section 2 by using its
monopoly power as the dominant electric power source in the area "to foreclose
potential entrants into the retail area from obtaining electric power from outside

241

That is, if the emphasis is on the supposed evil of monopoly power, the standard for
establishing exclusionary conduct lessens and may be almost superfluous.
242

A!coa, 148 F.2d at 430.

243

Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.

244

See Elhauge, supra note 240, at 261.

245

Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 576 n.7.

246

0tter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368 (1973).

247

/d. Otter Tail was the retail electric power supplier for 465 towns in Minnesota, North
Dakota and South Dakota. !d. at 368.
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sources of supply. '' 24 x Otter Tail attempted to assert that its wheeling contracts with
the Bureau of Reclamation and certain electrical cooperatives relieved it of any
obligation to wheel to certain municipalities. Far from a defense, however, Douglas
viewed the contracts as nothing more than territorial restrictions among potential
competitors. 249
Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist,
noted that a monopoly resulted regardless of whether Otter Tail agreed to provide
wholesale power to municipalities desiring their own retail system. 250 He noted that
Otter Tail had invested significant resources in constructing power lines throughout
the region. 251 Further, he expressed serious doubt about whether the threat of losing
business could never be a legitimate business justification for a monopolist's refusal
to deal with a competitor, as the district court had asserted. 252
Justice Douglas' Otter Tail opinion lacks clarity and it is difficult to determine
just what the case stands for. 253 It appears to require that a monopolist deal with a
competitor, even if the result is that the competitor will displace the monopolist with
its own monopoly. Perhaps, one might argue. such an extension of Section 2 should
be limited to regulated industries with natural monopolies, but the Otter Tail Court
imposed no such limits. Further, the decision seems to be quite close to a modern
"essential facilities" case, although the Supreme Court has purposefully avoided
recognizing the validity of the essential facilities doctrine. 254

248

/d. at 377. Otter Tail had also "sponsored" litigation to delay the efforts of four towns
to establish municipal systems. /d. at 372.
249

/d. at 378-79.

250

/d. at 388-89 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

251

/d. at 382.

202

ld. at 389-90. Justice Stewart's principal arguments were that Otter Tail was due an
implied immunity from the antitrust laws due to the extensive Congressional regulation of the
power industry under the Federal Power Act of 1935 or, at a minimum. the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction should have deferred the adjudication of antitrust issues to the Federal Power
Commission. !d. at 390-91.
253

For a critical view, see G.E. Hale & Rosemary D. Hale, The Otter Tail Power Case:
Regulation by Commission or Antitrust Laws, 1973 SUP. CT. REV. 99. For a positive view of
the result in Otter Tail, see Ross. supra note 106, at 79-80. Professor Ross views Otter Tail as
a vertical integration case in which the utility's integration into retail increased its monopoly
profit opportunities since it was otherwise regulated by the Federal Power Commission. /d.
Since ninety percent of Otter Tail's income derived from its sale of power at retail, 410 U.S. at
387 (Stewart, J., dissenting), Ross may be correct. In any event. his analysis is much more
detailed than the general language of Justice Douglas· opinion in Otter Tail.
254

See Verizon Comms., Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinka, LLP. 540 U.S. 398,41011 (2004); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Curp ..472 U.S. 5X5, 611 n.44 (1985).
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Although lower federal courts have struggled with the breadth of Otter Tail,
today's Supreme Court has shown an inclination to reel it in. In Veri::.on
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, the Court took pains
to distinguish Otter Tail, ruling that since the facts before it did not require that the
defendant share services already marketed, Otter Tail did not apply. 255 As a result.
the defendant's alleged reluctance to allow interconnections with its local telephone
network as required by Congress did not a Section 2 allegation make. The Trinko
Court also displayed a good deal of hostility to the essential facilities doctrine with
which Otter Tail is often associated, finding "no need either to recognize it or to
repudiate [the doctrine] here." 256
In the Section 2 context, Justice Douglas' "big is bad" predilections necessarily
took center stage.
While he reaffirmed the two prong test for proof of
monopolization, his application of the conduct prong lacked content and came close
to a no conduct standard. In short, Douglas' (and the Supreme Court's) lack of
economic analysis and the conclusory approach tended to trivialize and minimize
exclusionary conduct as a legitimate antitrust standard. The focus was on the
manner in which the monopolist competed rather than on whether the monopolist's
actions excluded competitors through use of its market power. Unfair tactics were
presumed to be anticompetitive. 2" 7
The pendulum has swung in recent years to a heightened standard for labeling
conduct as exclusionary, largely because of recognition that the indeterminacy of
Compare United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383 (1912) with Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. I (1945). Some circuits have recognized the validity of the doctrine.
See, e.g., Bellsouth Adver. v. Donnelley Info. Publ'g, 719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988),
rev'd on other grounds, 999 F.2d 1436 (lith Cir. 1993); MC! Comms. Corp. v. AT&T, 708
F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843 (6th Cir. 1979); Hecht
v. Pro-Football Inc., 570 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
255

Trinko, 540 U.S. 39X, 410. The Trinka Court's distinction of Otter Tail is questionable.

It involved the alleged failure of Verizon, a local telephone exchange carrier, to share its local

network with competitors as required by the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The Court
pointed to a new "wholesale market for leasing network elements" to distinguish Otter Tail,
which "was already in the business of providing a service to certain customers ... and refused
to provide the same service to certain other customers." !d. In fact. the issue in both cases was
quite similar: the requirement that a monopolist cooperate with competitors to displace itself,
at least partially. The purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was to provide local
telephone customers with competition, not to create a wholesale leasing market.
256
Since the 1996 Telecommunications Act granted competitors access to the defendant's
local exchange network, the Court thought "it unnecessary to impose a judicial doctrine of
forced access." !d. at 411.

~ 57 (;{ Brooke Group, Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225
{I 993) ("Even an act of pure malice by one business competitor against another does not,

without more, state a claim under the federal antitrust laws; those laws do not create a federal
law of unfair competition ... ."').
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older exclusionary conduct test may have the affect of chilling desirable, procompetitive market conduct. 258 Further, there is today recognition that it "is
sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct with long-term
anticompetitive effects." 259 Thus, if big is not necessarily bad, the paradigm has
shifted dramatically and the modern federal judiciary, faced with trying to
distinguish exclusionary from desirable, pro-competitive conduct, is without a
normative model with any substantive content.
Justice Douglas' Section 2
jurisprudence, unfortunately, is largely to blame.
VI. THE PATENT/ ANTITRUST INTERSECTION
Justice Douglas was also quite distrustful of the monopoly power granted a
patent holder and favored a quite restrictive view of the patent holders rights. Here,
as elsewhere, his concern was with the effect of the patent monopoly on small
businesses. Early in his tenure, Douglas was in the mainstream of the New Deal
Court in limiting the scope of the patent privilege. He voted with a unanimous Court
in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 260 which outlawed a scheme of patent
holders fixing resale prices of their product throughout the country. Then, two years
later Douglas voted with a still-united Court in three patent-antitrust cases, writing
the opinion in United States v. Masonite Corp. 261 There the Court found unlawful
price fixing arising from a patent holder's uniform licensing agreements to so-called
del credere agents authorized to sell the patented product. Douglas wrote that
"[s]ince patents are privileges restrictive of a free economy," the rights of patent
holders "must be strictly construed .... " 262
The post-War Court, however, did not go far enough in restricting the use of
patents as price fixing vehicles to suit Justice Douglas. In dissenting in United States
v. National Lead Co./63 he took issue with the majority's requirement that a patent
holder who had engaged in an international cartel to divide and dominate the market
258

See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312
(2007); Brooke Group, Ltd., 509 U.S. at 226 (1993); Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc.,
479 U.S. 104, 122 n.l7 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 594 (1986).
259
See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 458-59 ( 1993); Copperweld
Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 67-68 ( 1984).

260

309 U.S. 436 (1940). Justices McReynolds and Roberts did not participate. /d. at 461.

261

316 U.S. 265, 267 (1942). See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488
(1942) and B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942), in which the Court struck down
patent licenses under which patented machines were furnished only on the condition that the
licensor's own unpatentable product be used exclusively in them.
262

Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. at 280.

263

332 U.S. 319, 364 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
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for titanium pigment be required to grant non-exclusive licenses at uniformly
reasonable rates. That was not enough for Douglas, who argued that the defendant
should be required to issue licenses free of any royalty charge because "strong
measures" were needed "to provide the maximum opportunity for new ventures to
compete with the established giants of the industry." 264 According to Dou~las, if
National Lead, the world's leading producer of titanium pigments, would be at a
competitive disadvantage because of reasonable royalty rates, "what can be the
probable fate of newcomers or existing independents of small stature?" 265
Similarly, Justice Douglas did not believe that the majority went far enough in
United States v. Line Materials Co. 266 in striking down the cross-licensing of patents
as a vehicle to fix prices in the sale of patented goods. Although the decision surely
limited any interpretation of the landmark United States v. General Electric Co.
decision, 267 which would permit patent licenses to fix competitors' resale prices, 26 x
Douglas authored a concurring opinion, arguing that the Court should simply
overrule General Electric. 269 That opinion countenanced at least some price fixing
by patent holders and thus was, according to Douglas, in conflict with the
constitutional protection of inventors and Congress's "faithful" legislation of that
protection. 270
Justice Douglas also took issue with the majority in Automatic Radio
Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Hazeltine Research, lnc. 271 There the Court
264

/d. at 367-68. See al.w Epstein, supra note 63, at 557-58.

265

National Lead Co., 332 U.S. at 368 (footnote omitted). Justice Douglas expressed
similar sentiments for limiting the rights of copyright holders in his majority opinion in the
government's massive case against the movie industry, United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("The copyright law. like the patent statutes, makes reward to
the owner a secondary consideration."). See also supra text accompanying notes 153-59
discussing his concurrence in United States v. Line Material Co .. 333 U.S. 287. 315 (1948 ).
266

333 U.S. 287 (1948).

267

272 U.S. 476 (1926).

268
See, e.g., Note, Price Fixing Through Patent Licensing-A Bastion is Undermined. 6 I
HARV. L. REV. 1427. 1434 (1948); and Note. Legality of Plural Restrictive Licensing, 43 ILL.
L. REV. 400, 409 (1948 ).
269 Line Materials Co., 333 U.S. at 315-16 (Douglas. J., concurring).
Murphy and Rutledge joined the concurring opinion. /d.

Justices Black,

270 /d. at 316-21. Justice Burton, joined by Chief Justice Vinson and Justice Frankfurter.
dissented. /d. at 321 (Burton, J.. dissenting). Ironically, Justice Burton argued that the scheme
that the majority had outlawed was essential to the ability of small patent holders to compete
with giant patent holders like General Electric. !d. at 35 I.

271 339

U.S. 827 (1950), overruled hy Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 ( 1969).
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allowed a patent licensing provision requiring royalty payments of a percentage of
sales of patented and unpatented goods. Douglas· dissent characterized the case as
one in which the patent holder "bludgeon[s]" his way into a partnership with the
licensee. "A plainer extension of a patent by unlawful means would be hard to
imagine." 272 He also took issue with the majority's ruling that a patent licensee was
estopped to challenge the validity of the patent, arguing that "protection of the public
interest in free enterprise [was l above reward to the patentee."m
Justice Douglas did vote with the majority in the International Salt v. United
States 274 and United States v. Lowe's Inc., 275 cases holding that market power is
presumed when a patented or copyrighted product is at issue. Quite recently,
however, in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 276 the Supreme Court
reversed itself and removed the presumption of market power in tying cases
involving patents. The Illinois Tool Works decision is in keeping with the Court's
evolving view that tying arrangements are not generally anticompetitive 277 and in
recognition of Congress' 1988 amendment to the Patent Code that removed the
market power presumption from patent misuse cases. 278 It also represents in large
part the antithesis of Douglas' views about patents and market power.
Increasingly, contemporary antitrust views big as not necessarily bad, even
though some competitors may be harmed. Illinois Tool Works is in the same vein
because market power must now be proved, not presumed. Justice Douglas. with his
skepticism about the patent monopoly generally and distrust of anything smacking of
market power, would surely disagree.
VII. RELEVANT MARKET [SSUES

Defining the relevant product and geographic market is of course a predicate to
determining if a market is in fact concentrated and thus suffers from "the curse of
bigness." Justice Douglas' approach to relevant market definition, no doubt colored
by his abhorrence to any suggestion of economic power, can perhaps best be
described as slippery. For example, in the Rome Cable case, 279 Douglas wrote a brief
:>.

72

/d. at 836, 838 (Douglas, J .. dissenting).

271

/d. at 839.

274

332

275

371 U.S. 38, 46 ( 1962).

276

524 U.S. 28 (2006).

u.s. 392 (1947).

277

See Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner
Enters., 429 U.S. 610 (1977).

m35 U.S.C. § 27l(d)(5) (1988): 102 STAT. 4674 (1988).
279

United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Rome Cable), 377 U.S. 271 ( 1964).
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majority opinion for the Court and through tortured reasoning held unlawful the
acquisition by Alcoa, primarily an aluminum wire and aluminum conductor
producer, of Rome Cable, which was mostly a copper wire and copper conductor
manufacturer. Douglas initially held that insulated aluminum conductor was a
distinct submarket from copper conductor, overturning a district court finding to the
280
contrary.
He then inexplicably concluded that both bare and insulated aluminum
cable should be in the same submarket, since they both have the general function of
carrying electricity, even though the government had not so argued. 281 To justify this
seeming inconsistency and respond to Justice Stewart's dissent, Douglas lamely
argued that the grouping of bare and insulated aluminum cable was "a logical
extension" of the district court's findings that aluminum conductor and copper
conductor generally constitute separate lines of commerce. 282
Of course, Justice Douglas' distorted market definition was arguably nothing
more than "gerrymandering" to find the market or submarkets necessary to establish
unlawful concentration levels.m Since Alcoa produced no copper conductor, its
inclusion in the relevant market would have diminished the market concentration to a
level beyond the reach of Section 7. 284 It was apparently also necessary for the Court
280

/d. at 275-77.

mid. at 276-77. See also id. at 286 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In the very next sentence,
Justice Douglas noted that copper conductor and aluminum conductor also compete but
separated the two because "each has developed distinctive end uses.'" /d. It is hard to fathom
such logical inconsistency in a single paragraph in a Supreme Court opinion. See, e.g ..
Kauper, supra note 211, at 339-40 (calling Douglas' inclusion of bare and insulated aluminum
cable in one market in Rome Cable "astonishing" and labeling the market analysis there as
"cast[ing] doubt on the entire definitional process"'); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARRENS.
GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 624 (2d ed. 2006) ("iT]he
Court acted on the irrational proposition that any combination of submarkets could abo
constitute a relevant product market.").
2 2

x Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 277 n.4. Justice Stewart characterized .Justice Douglas·
grouping of the two kinds of aluminum cable as ··repudiation of" the district court's findings
since the facts established that unlike copper and aluminum cable, bare and insulated
aluminum cable require "different equipment and engineering skills ... for their manufacture
and sale." /d. at 2S6 (Stewart. 1., dissenting).
2 3

x See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281. at 587.

2 4

x That same term, the Supreme Court arguably engaged in gerrymandering another
relevant market definition when it lumped glass bottles and metal cans into one market and
found the acquisition of the third largest manufacturer of glass containers by the second largest
manufacturer of metal containers a violation of Section 7. United States v. Cont'l Can Co.,
37R U.S. 441 (1964). Justice Douglas voted with the majority in a 7-2 opinion. It would
appear that the Court could have considered both Rome Cable and Contmentol Can to he
conglomerate, rather than horizontal, cases. That designation would have obviated the Court· s
need to manipulate the relevant product market definition and would have enabled it to apply
potential competition and entrenchment theories to strike down the mergers. At the time these
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to group insulated and bare aluminum conductor together to gain a market
285
concentration level that could support a Section 7 violation.
Even with the relevant market manipulation, Rome Cable's l.3% of the
aluminum conductor market would appear to be de minimus. Not so for Justice
Douglas, however. He believed that figure was sufficient to trigger a Section 7
violation since Alcoa with 27.8% of the gerrymandered relevant market was its
leader. 286 According to Douglas, Rome Cable was "the prototype of the small
independent that Congress aimed to preserve by Section 7." 287
In Rome Cable, Justice Douglas' distaste for anything close to market
concentration took center stage 288 and he took full advantage of the preventative
language of the Clayton Act. 289 Two months earlier, he had written for the Court and
struck down the acquisition of Pacific Northwest Pipeline by the El Paso Natural Gas
Company. 290 El Paso was the sole out-of-state supplier of natural gas to California, a
large, rapidly expanding market at the time. 291 Although Pacific Northwest had no
pipeline into California, since it "was the only other significant pipeline west of the
Rocky Mountains," Douglas believed "we would have to wear blinders not to see
that the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into the California market, though
unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's business attitudes within the
State." 292

cases were decided, however, the Supreme Court had yet to apply those theories to Section 7
cases, with the exception of United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964)
decided earlier the same term. El Paso involved a geographic rather than product extension
merger, see infra text accompanying notes 401-10. The Court's (led by Justice Douglas)
expansion of Section 7 to product extension mergers was still a few years away. See infra text
accompanying notes 421-42.
285

See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281, at 624.

286

Rome Cable, 377 U.S. at 280-81.

287

/d. at 281. He characterized Rome Cable as "an aggressive competitor" and "a pioneer
in aluminum insulation" with "a special aptitude and skill insulation, and an active and
efficient research and sales organization." /d.
288

"It would seem that the situation in the aluminum industry may be oligopolistic." /d. at
280 (emphasis added).
289

For example, he quoted the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act to show
congressional intent to "prevent accretions of power which 'are individually so minute as to
make it difficult to use the Sherman Act test against them,"' /d. (quoting S.Rep. No. 81-1775,
at 5 (1950)).
290

United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).

291

/d. at 658.

292

/d. at 658-59.
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El Paso Natural Gas is thus the first occasion in which the Court focused on
potential competition, as opposed to requiring an impact on actual competition, to
invalidate a merger. 293
Arguably the case is a strong one if, as Justice Douglas asserts, Pacific Northwest
was the only potential competitor for the California natural gas market in an industry
with very high entry barriers (the cost of natural gas pipeline construction).
While El Paso Natural Gas may be defensible, Rome Cable seems typical of
Justice Douglas' and the Warren Court's seeming result-oriented manipulation of
relevant market definitions. The most readily criticized along these lines is Douglas'
opinion for the Court in United States v. Grinnell Corp. 294 There the government
sued an aggressive, Microsoft-like company (in terms of its conduct) that provided
accredited central station fire and burglary protection services to businesses, under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Douglas found that the relevant product market was
that of accredited central station protection services because "for many customers,
only central station protection will do." 295 Then, however, after focusing on the
customers' needs in defining the relevant product market, he inexplicably found the
geographic market to be national, ignoring the reality that consumers of protection
services choose from the options available locally. 296
In economic terms, Justice Douglas shifted from demand side analysis for the
product market to supply side analysis for the geographic market. He adopted,
according to the famous line from Justice Fortas' vigorous dissent, a "strange redIf otherwise
haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp classification." 297
indefensible, Douglas seems to have at least been consistent on the geographic
market definition issue in the oft-criticized Von's Grocery decision, joining with
Justice Black's majority holding that Los Angeles constituted the relevant
geographic market for retail grocery stores. 29 K The major difference between
Grinnell and Von's Grocery is that the latter is devoid of geographic market analysis
and simply assumes that Los Angeles is the proper market. 299

293
It was certainly not the last time, however. See, e.g .. United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat'! Bank, Inc .. 418 U.S. 656
(1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Co., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); Ford Motor Co. v. United
States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
294 384 U.S. 563 ( 1966).
For criticism of Grinnell, see. e.g., Frank Easterbrook. On
Identifying Exclusionary Conduct, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 972,973 n.2 (1986).
295

Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 574.

296

/d. at 575.

297

/d. at 591 (Fortas, J ., dissenting).

298 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
In his dissent, Justice
Stewart pointed out that the actual market foreclosure of the merger was less than one percent
of the total grocery store sales in Los Angeles since the two grocery chains were located in
different parts of the Los Angeles metropolitan area. !d. at 296 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See
also C. Paul Rogers, Perspectives on Corporate MerRers and the Antitrust Laws. 12 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 30 I, 304-06 ( 1981 ).
299
Later, in his dissent in the watershed United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974), Justice Douglas again applied a supply side analysis by focusing on the areas
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On the other hand, Justice Douglas also voted with the majority in the infamous
Brown Shoe decision, agreeing that the proper relevant geographic markets for retail
3
shoe sales were each city with a population exceeding 10,000. txJ Although Brown
Shoe involved retail goods rather than retail services, it is difficult to see how that
301
In
makes any difference since the purchaser demand for both are decidedly local.
Grinnell, Douglas argued that corporate planning is on a national level and that the
302
certification and inspection of the systems was largely done by national insurers.
Justice Fortas' dissent forcefully dismembered that argument, noting that Supreme
Court precedent and common sense required geographic markets to be defined by
303
"where ... a potential buyer look[s] for potential suppliers of the service .... "
Justice Douglas' narrowly defined relevant product market of accredited central
station protection services in Grinnell also drew heavy fire from the separate dissents
of Justices Fortas and Harlan. 30~ Fortas, in particular, noted that the record
established that customers frequently switch from one form of security system to
another and that accredited central station services operated at a loss in at least
twenty cities where alternatives such as watchmen, local alarm systems, proprietary
systems and unaccredited central stations were available. 305 He noted the apparent

in which the defendant coal companies sold their coal without a mention of from whom coal
buyers looked to purchase coal. /d. at 511-27 (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
300

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337-39 ( 1962). The decision is not
infamous for its relevant market definition but for its finding that enhanced efficiencies from a
merger support a finding of illegality because they tend to squeeze out "viable, small, locally
owned business." /d. at 344. For criticisms see, for example, John L. Peterman, The Brown
Shoe Case, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 81 (1975), Kauper, supra note 211, Bork & Bowman, supra note
21 L and Harlan Blake & Kenneth Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 422,456-57 (1965).
301

In the product market part of the Grinnell opinion, Justice Douglas makes a feeble
attempt to differentiate products and service~ in distinguishing Brown Shoe but provides no
analytical support. Grinnf'll, 384 U.S. at 572 ("First, we deal with services, not with products .
. . . "). Earlier, in United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S. 485,
490-91 (1950), Douglas had ruled that the prohibition against price fixing, at least, applied to
services as well as to goods. See supra text accompanying notes 122-25.
302

Grinnel!, 3H4 U.S. at 575.

103

/d. at 589 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas noted that "lt]he premises protected do
not travel" and also that "le]ven the central stations can provide service only within a 25-mile
radius." /d. at 587-88. In general, he characterized the majority's relevant market analysis as
"Procrustean-that it has tailored the market to the dimensions of the defendants." Jd. at 590.
Justice Fortas was a one··time student and former protege of .Justice Douglas at Yale and then
the SEC. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10, at 506-07. Although Justices Fortas and Douglas
remained friends until Douglas' death in early 1980, id., it is interesting to speculate about
whether Fortas' strident dissent in Grinnf'il may have temporarily jeopardized their personal
relationship. Perhaps the bond was strong enough that Justice Fortas felt free to use hyperbole
in his dissent.
104

See Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 585 (Fortas, J., dissenting); 384 U.S. at 583 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
305

Grinnel/, 384 U.S. at 592.
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inconsistency with the Court's "reasonable interchangeability of use and crosselasticity of demand" tests of earlier cases. 306
Justice Douglas' relevant product market analysis in Grinnell is indeed difficult.
if not impossible, to square with other Supreme Court precedent such as United
States v. E./. du Pont de Nemours & Co .. in which the Court ruled that cellophane
was simply part of the overall tlexible wrapping materials market even though
cellophane was of greater quality and two to three times more expensive than the
307
alternatives.
While Douglas may have had some difficulty following precedent, he
did maintain internal consistency in Grinnell since he had joined Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in the DuPont decision. 10 ~ That dissent argued stridently that
cellophane should be separated from the market because it was so superior that not
only did DuPont not consider other flexible wrapping materials to be competitors but
neither did the producers of those materials who priced their products independent of
DuPont. 309
Justice Douglas also voted for the narrower market division in the International
Boxing case, joining the majority that determined that championship boxing matches
were separate from non-championship prize fights. 310 Thus, he was in the three
principal monopolization cases decided by the Warren Court, at least consistent in
arguing for narrower relevant markets, the better to conclude that the defendant had
the type of dominant market power needed for the Section 2 case to proceed?''
Today Grinnell is still oft cited for establishing the two-prong test for monopolistic
312
conduct
and thus joins the group of Warren Court antitrust decisions such as
Brown Shoe and Griffith generally discredited for their holdings on the merits but

306

/d. at 592-93.

307

United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1951 ).

10

HDuPont, 351 U.S. at 414 (Wanen, C.J., dissenting).
WmTen dissent. /d.

Justice Black also joined the

/d. at 417-19. According to the dissent, buyer~ considered cellophane to be a separate
product as well. !d. at 417.
309

310

Int'l Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 242 (1959).

111

The relevant market analyse' of DuPonT and Grinnell are difficult at best to reconcile.
leading some to conclude that the cases are simply result-oriented. DuPont seems to have
been a relatively benign giant. obtaining their market dominance hy development of a superior
product while Grinnell was the opposite, buying up competitors and closing them down. Of
course in today·s more sophisticated Section 2 approach, DuPont might successfully defend
against the unlawful conduct element. In Grinnell, the government apparently did not believe
it could construct a strong Section I case; thus. the finding of monopoly power was necessary
for success against a "bad actor" defendant. See. e.g .. HANDLER, supra note 138. at 230-31
(suggesting that conduct evidence may influence market power analysis).
312
"The offense of monopoly ... ha~ two elements: (I) the possession of monopoly power
in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. See also Mark N. Berry. The
Uncertaillty of Monopolistic Conduct: A Comparative Rn•iew (if Three Jurisdictions, 32 LAW
& PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 263, 274 (200 I) ("[T]he Supreme Court in ... Grinnell fashioned a
general rule for monopolistic conduct that prevails to the cunent day.").
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well recognized for their articulation of the applicable legal principle or analytical
standard.m
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc.
provides interesting insight about the flexibility he and the Warren Court believed
that "the line of commerce" language of Section 7 of the Clayton Act gave the Court
in defining relevant markets. 314 There the Court reversed a lower court finding that
the printing of color comic supplements for newspapers that do not print their own
was a separate market from the printing of color comic supplements for syndicates
that sold copyrighted comic feature to newspapers. 315 Although recognizing that
"submarkets within this broad market" may exist, Douglas reiterated that a
316
submarket does not mean the Court must disregard the larger market.
In United States v. First National Bank and Trust Co. of LexingtoJJ, Justice
Douglas wrote for the majority in holding that commercial banking was "one
relevant market,"m following the ruling in Philadelphia National Bank one year
earlier that the "cluster of products . . . and services . . . denoted by the term
'commercial banking' ... composes a distinct line of commerce." 318 Because he
determined that the merger was illegal with the market so defined, he avoided
deciding whether trust department services constituted another relevant market. 319
A consistent thread seems to be present in Justice Douglas' view of relevant
product issues, articulated in Rome Cable, in which he characterized price as "the
single, most important, practical factor" in the insulated conductor market. 320 Earlier
he had joined Chief Justice Warren's dissent in DuPont, 321 which argued that the
much higher price of cellophane coupled with its physical superiority created a
market separate from other flexible wrapping materials. 322 Similarly, the majority

313

See supra text accompanying note 217. See also sources cited supra note 277.

m402 U.S. 549 (1971).
315

/d. at 552.

316

/d. at 553. Here Justice Douglas quoted from United States v. Phillipsburg National
Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350, 360 (1970), which held that commercial banking was a line
of commerce distinct from other types of financial institutions. /d.
317

376 U.S. 665,667 (1964).

mUnited States v. Philadelphia Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 356 (1963). See also Phillipsburg
National Bank, 399 U.S. at 360. Justice Douglas was in the majority in both Philadelphia
National Bank and Phillipsburg National Bank.
319

For a further discussion of First National Bank & Trust of Lexington, see infra text
accompanying notes 395-410.
320
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271, 276 (1964) (distinguishing
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962), which had focused on the style and
quality of shoes in addition to price).
1 1
· d states v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 414 (1956) (Warren,
"- umte
C.J ., dissenting).

322

The dissent was further troubled by the fact that seventy-five to eighty percent of all
cigarettes were wrapped in with cellophane rather than other flexible wrapping materials,
noting that all buyers of a product are entitled to competition. /d. at 424-25. Again there
appears to be some consistency with Justice Douglas' relevant market definition in Grinnell
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which he joined in International Boxing Club of New York v. United States323 based
its distinction of championship boxing matches from non-championship matches on
the much higher revenue, increased television ratings and ticket prices, and greater
television, radio and motion picture demand produced by championship fights. 324
Certainly, effect on price is the key issue in contemporary relevant market
325
Recognition of the practical importance of price, however, does not
analysis.
necessarily translate to a cogent, consistent application of price theory. Justice
Douglas, in fact, vacillated between supply and demand side analyses, even within a
single decision. About the only real consistency one can find in his relevant market
analysis is that he was sure to favor the definition of the narrowest plausible market,
the better to find supposed market power and thus an antitrust violation. As his
decision in Rome Cable illustrates, he was not even opposed to making it up as he
went along, even if the government had not briefed it that way. In the hands of
Douglas and the Warren Court, Section 7 of the Clayton Act (and, one might argue,
Section 2 of the Sherman Act) was indeed a powerful tool to stop "in their
incipiency" increases in market share through merger. 326
VIII. DIVESTITURE
It is not surprising, given his antipathy towards monopoly power, that Justice
Douglas' favored structural remedies to behavioral ones. In essence, he believed
divestiture was appropriate for any antitrust offense involving size or the
accumulation of market power, whether accomplished collectively or independently.
He was firm in his belief of divestiture as the antitrust remedy of choice and sought
its use broadly, including cases involving vertical integration, 327 conspiracies to
restrain trade, 328 abuse of patent rights in restraint of trade, 329 monopolization, 330 and

when he notes "that for many customers, only central station protection will do." Grinnell, 384
U.S. at 574.
323

358 U.S. 242 (1959).

324

/d. at 250-51.

325 See,

e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
§§ 1.0-1.322 (1992) (identifying a firm's ability to maintain a "small but significant and
nontransitory" increase in price as proof of market power).
326

See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 & n.32 (1962) (quoting
"incipiency" language and quoting legislative history).
327 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 573-74 (1972); United States v.
Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 173-75 ( 1948).
328 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 600-01 (1951); Schine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. II 0, 126-30 (1948); United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 188-90 (1944).
329

United States v. Nat' I Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319, 364-69 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting in

part).
330 United

States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563,577-80 (1966); Paramount Pictures, 334
U.S. at 171-72; Schine Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 126-30; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100 (1948).
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mergcrs. 111
In doing so, he made it clear that his interest was protecting
competitors 112 and that his fear of size overcame any thought of efficiency or
333
consumer welfare that, for example, vertical integration might achieve.
Writing for the majority in United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., Justice
Douglas early on employed divestiture to deprive antitrust offenders of "the fruits"
of their unlawful activity. 114 Thus, "[t]hose who violate the Act may not reap the
benefits of their violations and avoid an undoing of their unlawful project on the plea
of hardship or inconvenience." 135 He thought injunctive relief ineffective because it
enabled defendants to ''retain the full dividends of their monopolistic practices and
profit from the unlawful restraints of trade which they had inflicted on
competitors.'' 136 Surprisingly perhaps, this offensive use of divestiture broke new
ground and served as the basis for the use of divestiture as a punitive as well as
remedial remedy. 337
Justice Douglas had no qualms about taking any opportunity to force a divestiture
issue. In Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co .. 138 Douglas was
able to persuade a five-justice majority to remand and require divestiture in a case
119
before the Court on a Rule 24(a) right of intervention question.
The case was a
continuation of the United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co. litigation in which
Douglas, in a majority opinion for the Court, had three years before found El Paso in
violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act and directed the district court to order
divestiture. 140 The district court had subsequently denied the intervention requests of
the state of California and two private natural gas companies in the divestiture
proceedings below. Although divestiture was not briefed or argued, as Justice
Stewart's stinging dissent pointed out, that did not stop Justice Douglas from

311

Ford Motor. 405 U.S. at 573-74: United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S.
549.556 (1971); Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129. 136-43
I 1967); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 ( 1964).
'

12

Schi11e Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 128.

"'See, e.g., Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 174.
1

q323 U.S. 173, 189 (1944).

116

According to Justice Douglas, injunctive relief rendered enforcement of the Sherman
Act '·a futile thing" unless the Justice Department "moved in at the incipient stages of the
unlawful project:' Schine Chain Theatres, 334 U.S. at 128. Thus, divestiture or dissolution
was "an essential feature" of enforcement decrees. /d.

'"See Note, Standards Govemi11g Relief Under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 97 U. PA. L.
REv. 2.1+. 244 ( 1948). According to Justice Douglas, divestiture or dissolution served three

functions: I I) terminating the combination or conspiracy when that was the violation: (2)
depriving the defendants of the benefits of their conspiracy; and (3) breaking up or rendering
powerle,;s the monopoly power which the Sherman Act makes illegal. Schine Chain Theatres,
3.14 U.S. at 128-29.
"S386 U.S. 129, 129 (1967).
1 1
" Justices

White and Fortas did not participate and Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Harlan. dissented. /d. at 143 (Stewart, J .. dissenting).
Ho'\76 U.S. 651,662. See infra text accompanying notes 401-10.
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"roamfing] at large. unconfined by anything so mundane as a factual record
developed in adversury proceedings." 341
In point of fact. Justice Douglas wus very unhappy with the district court's
handling of the Court's broad divestiture order from the case's previous trip to the
Supreme Court, and rather than requiring the parties to brief and argue the issue,
~imply undertook the issue on his own accord. 342 One could characterize the
Justice's reaffirming of its divestiture order as the reassertion of judicial control over
a remand seemingly gone ustray or as an example of the judicial activism for which
Douglas and the Warren Court were so noted. His sua sponte order that the district
court judge be replaced is certainly an illustration of appellate court pique and
concomitant activism.
Today divestiture is used much more sparingly than in the Warren Court heyday
as skepticism about significant government intrusions into the economy has risen. 343
Even in monopolization cases. structuml relief is unusual as recognition of
efficiencies and other consumer benefits of size has grown. 344 Further, today hightech markets change so quickly, and, in many cases, contain network effects
necessary for consumer satisfaction, that the enforcement agencies have become
leery of asking for structural relief.' 45 Thus, both a change in markets through
technological change and a dramatic shift in antitrust thinking have rendered Justice
Douglas and the Warren Court's broad use of divestiture a remnant of antitrust
history.

1 1

-1 Justice Stewart characterized the m(IJOnty as having "rushed headlong into a
jurisprudential quagmire .... " 386 U.S. at !60 (Stewmt, J .. dissenting). Justice Douglas was
unhappy that the government had ''knuckled under" to El Paso in agreeing to a proposed
"settlement" of the case after remand. /d. at 129 (majority opinion). He responded by
aniculating in detail what the divestiture decree had to contain to assure that El Paso faced
competition for the California natural gas market. /d. at 136-40.

1 12
' Douglas

even took the extraordinary step of directing that a different district judge be
assigned to hear the case on this remand, id. at 142-43, a move the dissent characterized as
··not only unprecedented, but incredible[,]" since no one had requested his replacement at any
stage. ld. at 161 (Stewart. J., dissenting).
3 3
~ See. e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW I 02 (2d ed. 200 I). Judge Posner
argues that structural relief "such as divestiture should be limited to the divestiture of assets
recently acquired in an unlawful merger.'' /d. As a practical matter, that would effectively
eliminate divestiture as a remedy since under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification
Act all mergers of significant size are reviewed by the government enforcement agencies prior
to consummation.

1 4
-1 Judge

Posner characterizes the so-called 1968 Neal Report (officially the White House
Task Force Report on Antitrust Policy, reprinted in Small Business and the Robinson Patman
Act. Hearings !Jefi>re the Special Subcommittee of Small Business and the Rohinson-Patman
Act of the House Select Committee on Small Business, 91 st Cong. 291 (I 969)), which urged
that highly concentrated markets be forcibly deconcentrated through forms of structural relief
>uch as divestiture (as well as new legislative solutions), as today "completely off the wall"
even though its principal authors were at the time largely conservative. POSNER, supra note
343, at 117.
145

See, e.g., Thomas Piraino, An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by Electronic
NetH'orks. 93 Nw. U. L REv. I (1998).
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IX. MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
The Warren Court came into full bloom in the 1960s, at least with respect to
trade regulation issues, and decided a plethora of merger and acquisition cases under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 346 In the face of contemporary criticism that "[t]he sole
consistency that I can find is in litigation under Section 7, the Government always
wins," 347 Justice Douglas voted for the government in every case, frequently writing
the majority opinion. In fact, the government did always win.
The watershed General Dvnamics decision. 348 handed down only two years after
349
Ford Motor and eight years. after the horrific Von's Grocery decision,
vividly
illustrates the impact that the Burger Court had on merger analysis and how left
behind Justice Douglas and other Warren Court holdovers were by "the New
Learning" and thinking about industrial concentration. 350 In the 1966 Von's Grocery
case, Douglas joined his crony Justice Black in a 6-2 decision, with Justice White
concurring, to strike down a merger between the third and sixth largest grocery
chains in the Los Angeles area that together had a 7.5% market share, as measured in
retail grocery sales.
Justice Stewart, joined only by Justice Harlan, 351 penned a blistering dissent,
noting that the majority had blocked a merger resulting in 1.4% of the grocery stores
in Los Angeles with a market increase of 1.1% of the two largest chains in the
market and 3.3% of the six largest. 352 According to Stewart, even those meager
346
The merger wave of the late 1950s and early 1960s coupled with the passage of the
Celler-Kefauver Act in 1950, which expanded Section 7 coverage to asset as well as stock
acquisitions are at least partly responsible for the heightened merger enforcement activity. See
Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184. 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21
(2000)). An aggressive Department of Justice and receptive Supreme Court are certainly other
factors.

347
United States v. Von's Grocery Co .. 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See also Kauper, supra note 211, at 335-41 (examining growing cynicism of the Supreme
Court in antitrust cases where the government always wins).
348

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).

349

Von 's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270.

350

See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (HARVEY J. GOLDSCHMID
et al. eds., 1974). At the time, General Dynamics was a controversial decision and drew
substantial criticism from commentators. See James F. Ponsoldt, The Expansion of Horizontal
Merger Defenses After General Dynamics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act
Principles, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 361, 362 ( 1981) (asserting that General Dynamics
"dramatically changed horizontal merger litigation in favor of defendants"); Daniel F. Kolb,
The Impact of Business Realities in Recent Potential Competition and Horizontal Merger
Cases-The Government Can Lose, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 955 ( 1978); Howard R. Lurie, Mergers
Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VILL. L. REV. 213
( 1978). C.f Miles W. Kirkpatrick & Stephen Paul Mahinka. The Supreme Court and the "New
Economic Realism" of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Sw. L.J. 821 (1976); Richard A.
Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution,
Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 Cot.UM. L. REV. 282 (1975).
351

Justice Fortas did not participate. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. at 279.

152

/d. at 281, 302 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stewart pointed out that the
merger was really a market extension rather than horizontal acquisition because more than
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statistics were misleading because the acquired firm, Shopping Bag, was on the
decline with decreasing earnings and profits.m In addition, the lack of entry barriers
and the ability of small grocery chains to enter and compete suggested that any
increase in market share was not concomitant with an increase in market power. 354
The Court continued routinely to steamroll any and all mergers after Von's
55
Grocer/ until 1974 when the Burger Court had taken firm root. 356 As a result, that
year in General Dynamics, Justice Stewart was able to garner a 5-4 majority in
upholding a merger of a deep shaft coal producer and a strip mine coal company
competing in one of the four major coal distribution areas. 357 Douglas dissented and
was joined by Warren Court holdovers Brennan, White and Marshall. In effect, the
four Burger Court appointees joined Justice Stewart to allow the merger in General
Dynamics, replacing three Warren Court votes to enjoin the acquisition in Von's
Grocery. 358
The majority opinion in General Dynamics is strikingly similar to Justice
Stewart's dissent in Van's Grocery, as both opinions looked beyond statistical
evidence of potential market foreclosures to consider other market factors such as the
relative competitive strength of the acquired company. The General Dynamics
Court noted that United, the acquired company, had very limited uncommitted coal

fifty percent of the acqumng and acquired firms did not compete with each other for
customers. As a result, he asserted that the total market foreclosed by the merger was less
than one percent of the total grocery sales in the Los Angeles area. !d. at 296.
353

!d. at 298.

354

Justice Stewart noted that the advent of buying cooperatives enabled small chains to
purchase goods at prices competitive with those paid by the large chains. !d. at 298-99.
Ironically, four years later the Supreme Court, in another shaky decision in which Justice
Douglas voted with the majority, applied the per se rule to the market allocation rules of just
such a purchasing cooperative. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
355

See United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971) (Douglas majority
opinion rejecting failing company defense, see infra text accompanying notes 365-67); United
States v. Phillipsburg Nat'! Bank & Trust Co., 399 U.S. 350 (bank merger struck down);
Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (Douglas majority opinion rejecting
failing company defense, see infra text accompanying notes 351-62); United States v. Third
Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 ( 1968) (bank merger stuck down); United States v. First
City Nat'! Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361 (1967) (Douglas majority opinion holding that
under the Bank Merger Act of 1966 a court has de novo review of proposed bank merger
approved by the Comptroller of Currency).
356
Warren Burger had replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Justices Blackmun, Powell
and Rehnquist had been appointed by President Nixon to replace Justices Fortas, Black and
Harlan, respectively. Justice Marshall had joined the Warren Court as a President Johnson
appointment subsequent to Von's Grocery, replacing Justice Clark.
357

415 U.S. 486,511-12 (1974).

358

Justice Fortas had not participated in Von's Grocery. Justice Harlan had joined Justice
Stewart's dissent there but had been replaced in 1967 by Johnson appointee Thurgood
Marshall, who joined Justice Douglas' dissent in General Dynamics. Warren Court holdover
Justice White had concurred in Von's Grocerv but joined Justice Douglas' dissent in General
Dynamics. See generally Rogers, supra note 298.
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reserves with little hope for acquiring more. 359 Most coal was sold under long-term
supply contracts to electric utilities, which demanded assurance of future supplies.
Those were contracts for which United could not effectively bid. As a result, the
Court found proof of United's past and present market position misleading because it
did not reflect current competition for new long-term supply contracts. 360
Justice Douglas' dissent. while superior to the majority opinion he joined in
Von's Grocery, 361 did not tackle the majority's assessment of market impact head on.
It was obviously drafted as a majority opinion as it focuses mostly on the supposed
errors of the district court and not on the majority opinion. 362 In addressing the
majority, Douglas argued the technical point that proof of United's weak reserve
position constituted post-acquisition evidence not supported by the district court's
time-of-acquisition tindings. 363 The majority disagreed, noting that Section 7 of the
Clayton Act dealt with "probabilities, not certainties" and that the district court was
"fully justified" in relying on evidence of weak coal reserves because it directly bore
on the question of whether a future lessening of competition was probable. 364
In addressing the merits of the majority's weak reserve argument, Justice
Douglas was reduced to arguing that United might in the future develop deep-mining
expertise to remain a competitive factor, even though it had not extracted deep
reserves in twenty years. 365 He also took issue with the district court's lack of
finding of market shares at the time of acquisition of uncommitted coal reserves 366
and concluded that affirming the district court's judgment could only reflect "a deepseated judicial bias against [Section] 7 of the Clayton Act."
There is no little irony there since the Supreme Court had not ruled against the
Justice Department in a merger case since Columbia Steel twenty-six years before
and then only because the case fell under Section I of the Sherman Act rather than
Section 7 of the Clayton Act. As noted, Justice Douglas had vigorously dissented.' 67
359

United ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in annual production but tenth in
reserve holdings, controlling less than one percent of reserve holdings in Illinois, Indiana and
Western Kentucky. United's reserves were so depleted that it had already closed several
mines. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 502.
360

/d. at 501-02.

361

Von's Grocery, however. is probably the weakest. most poorly analyzed Supreme Court
antitrust opinion on record.
362

0ne wonders, who was the swing vote? Justices Blackmun and Powell would appear to
be the most likely candidates based on their later voting records.
363

General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 523-24.

364

/d. at 505 (quoting Bmwn Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323 ).

365

/d. at 525. The majority responded by stating that "the hypothetical possibility that
United Electric might in the future acquire the expertise to mine deep reserves proves
nothing-or too much'' since that theoretical possibility was available to all "with the
inclination and the corporate treasury to do so." /d. at 509.
366

/d. at 527. The majority had concluded that the government's prima facie statistical
case did not establish the likelihood of a substantial lessening of competition in any market.
/d. at 510-11.
367

See supra text accompanying notes 179-85.
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It is probably more accurate to say that Douglas held a deep-seated judicial bias in
favor of Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
It is illuminating to consider General Dynamics and Warren Court decisions like
Von's Grocery in the context of the Hertindahl-Hirschman Index, the present-day
index the Department of Justice uses to assess the concentration of a given market
and the likely competitive impact of a given merger, to illustrate just how out of step
Justice Douglas and his Warren Court brethren have become. 16' Von's Grocery, for
example, is not a case the government would today pursue and, in fact, probably
would not get a second request under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Pre-Merger Notification
369
The pre-merger index would likely have been under 300 with the increase
Act.
from the merger at only about forty. 370 General Dynamics presented a similar
picture, even before the lack of coal reserves was factored. 171 Nonetheless, Douglas
used Von's Grocery and the even smaller market foreclosure in United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co.m as benchmarks in his General Dynamics dissent. 373 Douglas
did note that those were cases involving merging ''trends," which, under Warren
Court doctrine, allowed for more liberal application of Section 7:174
Consistent with his aggressive use of Section 7 to combat increased market
concentration, Justice Douglas authored two opinions 375 late in his career in which he
refused to apply the so-called "failing company" defense first recognized by the
Court in International Shoe Co. v. FTC. 376 In the Citizen Publishing case, Douglas
upheld a divestiture order for a joint operating agreement between the two daily
newspapers in Tucson, Arizona.
Although the agreement provided for the

36
RSee generally DEP'T of JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES § 4 ( 1997).
369

!5 U.S.C. § 18(a) (2001).

The Guidelines indicate that the government i~ unlikely to challenge a merger in a
market with a post merger index of under I 000.
370

371

See General Dynamics, 415 U.S. at 495 n.6 ("degree of concentration in two coal
markets chosen by ... [gjovernment were 'roughly comparable' to those in Von's Grocery").
372

384 U.S. 546 (1966).

The market foreclosure in Von's Groce~y was 7.5% and in Pabst Brewing 4.49%.
Pabst Brewing was another questionable Warren Court decision, written by Justice Black.
Worried about industry trends. Justice Douglas concurred. appending an Art Buchwald
Washington Post column to his opinion ""hich, tongue in cheek, predicted that, due to slack
antitrust enforcement, the United States would soon be down to one company and that one
company would then attempt to purchase the United States. General Dynamics, 384 U.S. at
553.
373

374
Justice Douglas also acknowledged that "uncommitted reserves or sales of previously
uncommitted coal would be preferahle indicia of competitive strength," but argued that the
district court had made no such time of acquisition findings under either standard. General
Dynamics, 415 U.S. at485.

375
See Citizen Publ'g Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 138; United States v. Greater
Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 ( 1971 ).
376

Jnt'l Shoe Co, v. FTC. 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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continuing independence of each paper's news and editorial departments, it
377
combined circulation, advertising, subscription and other business operations.
The defendant asserted the failing company defense since The Citizen had
operated in the red for many years and sold fifty percent less advertising than its
competitor, The Star. Justice Douglas quickly ruled that neither requirement for the
defense-"the grave probability of a business failure" nor proof that The Star was
the only available suitor for The Citizen-was present.m As a matter of policy,
Douglas announced that the Court was "confin[ing] the failing company doctrine to
its present narrow scope." 379
In dissent, Justice Stewart expressed his belief that the majority was in effect
further restricting the failing company defense by requiring the defendant to
affirmatively show that it tried to sell to a non-competitor. 380 Stewart pointed out
that the district court had before it "substantial" and "convincing evidence" that no
outside suitor would have considered purchasing The Citizen because of its "dire
financial condition."381 According to Stewart, that was all the law required prior to
the majority's new standard that failing company defendants "prove that they made
tangible efforts, however futile, to find an outside buyer." 382
In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas does not cite International Shoe, and
quite rightly so, for the proposition that a failing company defendant must
affirmatively establish that it was the only available purchaser. Although the
International Shoe decision mentions parenthetically that the competitor purchaser
should be the only "prospective purchaser," there is no evidence in that case that the
distressed company had actually sought other suitors. 383 In fact, the Court there gave
considerable deference to the good faith of the failing company's "officers,
stockholders, and creditors, thoroughly familiar with the factors of a critical situation
and more able than commission or court to foresee future contingencies, [who] after
much consideration, felt compelled to choose the latter alternative."384
Justice Douglas did drop a "Cf." cite to United States v. Diebold, Inc., a brief
(one long paragraph) 1961 per curiam decision in which the Court reversed
summary judgment for a failing company defendant. 385 According to the Court, one

377

Citizen Publishing, 394 U.S. at 133-34.

378

!d. at 136-38. Justice Harlan concurred in the result, questioning whether it was
appropriate for the Court to consider the failing company defense only at the time of the
original operating agreement (1940) rather than when the agreement was renewed (1953). /d.
at 140 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
379

/d. at 139.

380

/d. at 143 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

381

/d. at 143-44.

mid. at 143.
383

/d. at 137 (citing Int'l Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302-03).

384

The Court went on to say that "[t]here is no ... doubt that in doing so they exercised a
judgment which was both honest and well informed . . . in the familiar presumption of
rightfulness which attaches to human conduct in general." Int 'I Shoe, 280 U.S. at 302.
385

369 U.S. 654 ( 1961 ).
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of the genuine issues of material fact not resolved adequately for summary judgment
was whether the defendant "was the only bona fide prospective purchaser for HHM's
.
" ·186 Th e Issue
.
" at Ieast m
. part " was " a hea d -on f'actua I controversy ... of
b usmess.
whether other offers for HHM's assets or business were actually made." 3 x7
Thus, Justice Douglas, who of course was part of (and probably authored) the
Diebold per curiam opinion. took the failing company doctrine down a slippery
slope. Taking the doctrine as he found it in International Shoe, where the distressed
company's opinion as to whether any non-competing suitors existed was presumed
to be in good faith and superior to a reviewing court's second guessing, he
transformed it to an affirmative duty of the failing company defendant to seek those
suitors, even if futile. That affirmative duty extends beyond Diebold, in which the
Court did not require evidence of other offers and held they were merely probative of
whether the defendant was the only viable purchaser of the failing entity.
The year following the Citizen Publishing decision, Congress passed The
Newspaper Preservation Act 3 x8 to validate joint newspaper operating agreements
under the antitrust laws as long as no more than one of the newspapers entering into
the arrangement was "likely to remain or become a financially sound publication."
The Act requires prior written consent of the U.S. Attorney General. 3 x9
Justice Douglas also made quick work of the failing company defense two years
after Citizen Publishing in the Greater Buffalo Press case. 190 There he reversed a
lower court's application of the defense, which had allowed the merger of two color
comic supplement printers, ruling that the defendant had not satisfied either
requirement. International Color Printing, the acquired company, had not exhibited
"the grave probability of a business failure" even though its sole customer was
threatening to place its business elsewhere. 391 International Color Printing had also
failed to meet its affirmative duty, arising from Citizen Publishing, to contact
potential buyers beyond Greater Buffalo and King, its sole customer. 192
In sum, Justice Douglas wanted it both ways with respect to Section 7. He was
responsible both for expanding the reach of the section, as further noted below, and
for limiting the failing company doctrine so as to restrict its viability as a legitimate
Section 7 defense. While the affirmative duty requirement imposed in Citizen
186

/d. at 655.

187/d.

ml5 U.S.C. §§ 1801-04 (1988).
389

Under the Act, the Attorney General can only give consent if it is found that all the
newspapers in the joint operating arrangement but one are failing newspapers. § 1803(b). For
an appellate review of the Attorney General's approval of a merger proposal between
competing Detroit newspapers. see Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v.
Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285 (D. C. Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 490 U.S. I 045 ( 1989).
390

United States v. Greater Buffalo Press,402
Inc ..

U.S. 549 ( 1971 ).

391 The customer, King Features Syndicate, had not threatened or invoked the six month
cancellation clause in its contract. Further, the company had increased its profits and was
planning for expansion. !d. at 555.

192
Not surprisingly. Justice Douglas cited the International Shoe decision for the first
requirement but not for the second. affirmative duty prong. For that, he cited Citizen
Publishing. /d.
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Publishing appears to have stood the test of time, 3'n most of the Warren Court's
Section 7 jurisprudence, led by Douglas, has not.
X. BANK MERGERS

The Warren Court, with Justice Douglas playing a prominent role, decided a
number of cases involving the merger of competing banks. In some ways the bank
merger cases were sui generis because they often concerned questions about the
applicability of Section 7 to the banking industry. Not surprisingly, the Warren
Court always found the means to strike down the targeted merger, although
sometimes incurring the wrath of Congress.
The initial bank merger case, United States v. Philadelphia National Bank
decision, 194 is famous for establishing the ''presumptive illegality'' standard of
mergers resulting in undue market concentration. First. however, the Court had to
travel a tortuous path to determine whether Section 7 even applied to the merger in
question. The tirst question was whether Section 7. as amended by the 1950 CellerKefauver Amendments, covered bank asset mergers. 195 The Court somewhat
surprisingly held that it did. 396 Second, the Court ruled that the Bank Merger Act of
1960397 did not impliedly repeal the application of Section 7 to bank mergers. 39 ~
Although the Justice Department challenged the Philadelphia National Bank
merger under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, it sued to enjoin a contemporaneous
merger between banks in Lexington, Kentucky under the Sherman Act because of
concerns about the applicability of Section 7 to bank mergers. 399 That case, United
States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 41m proceeded to the Supreme

393
See DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, §~
5.0-52 ( 1997).
394

374

u.s. 321 (1963).

Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184,64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §~ 18.
21 (2000)).
395

39

"'rhe Celler-Kefauver Amendments plugged the "asset" loophole by extending Section 7
to asset acquisitions by a "corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission." Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 18,21 (2000)). Since the FTC's jurisdiction specifically excluded banks. 15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (a)(6), the Celler-Kefauver Amendments likewise appeared to exclude banks. The
Philadelphia National Bank Court ruled, however, that Congress intended to exclude from
Section 7 "only assets acquisitions by [banks] . . . when not accomplished by merger."
Philadelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 342.
397

74 Stat. 129.

wxPhiladelphia Nat'/ Bank, 374 U.S. at 350. The 1960 Act directed banking regulatory
agencies to consider competitive factors before approving bank mergers. The Court, applying
the standard maxim that implied immunity from the antitrust laws "are strongly disfavored[.!"
ruled that the Act had no impact on the antitrust laws.
399

United States v. First Nat' I Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665, 673 ( 1994)
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
400

/d. at 665.
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Court in the term following the Philadelphia National Bank decision. 4111 The Court.
with Justice Douglas writing for the majority, had no difficulty reversing the district
court decision and striking down the merger under Section I of the Sherman Act
even absent the "prophylactic" language of the Clayton Act. 402
The merger involved the first and fourth largest hanks in Fayette County,
Kentucky which resulted in a bank controlling about fifty-two percent of the area· s
assets and deposits. 403 Justice Douglas relied on four forty to sixty-year-old railroad
cases decided under the Sherman Act in finding that the hank merger met the
restraint of trade standard. 4114 He summarily dismissed the Columbia Steel precedent
from which he had so vigorously dissented, 405 stating that it "must be confined to its
special facts," 406 with little explanation as to what those special facts might he. 407
Instead he included a long quote from Columbia Steel, which identified factors that
support an unreasonable restraint of trade finding 40 H and simply concluded that "I i]n
the present case all those factors clearly point the other way, as we have seen."40'J
In 1966, on the heels of the Philadelphia National Bank and Lexington Bank
decisions, Congress expressed its displeasure with the Court, as well as clarified the
applicability of the Clayton Act to bank mergers, by passing the Bank Merger Act
"exempting existing bank mergers, including those in pending government suits,
401

The Comptroller of Currency approved the Philadelphia bank merger on February 24.
1961, Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. at 333. and the Lexington bank merger three days
later on February 27. 1961. First Nat'! Bank and Trust. 376 U.S. at 667. The Justice
Department formally challenged both mergers immediately.
402
Firsr Nat'! Bank and Tmst. 376 U.S. at 672-73. The Clayton Act language "may he
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly" focuses on the probable
competitive impact on the merger in the future in contrast to the Sherman Act's "restraint of
trade" language which requires proof of an actual, as opposed to probable. offense. See. e.g .•
FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37.54 (1948).

~ 03 First Nat'!

Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 668-69.

40
~United States v. S. Pac. Co .. 259 U.S. 214 ( 1922J; United States v. Reading Co .. 253
U.S. 26 (1920); United States v. Union Pac. R. Co .. 226 U.S. 61 ( 1912 J: N. Sw,. Co. v.
United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). According to Justice Douglas, "[tjhe four railroad cases
at least stand for the proposition that where merging companies are major competitive factors
in a relevant market. the elimination of significant competition between them. by merger or
consolidation. itself ..:on~titutes a violation of l Section] I of the Sherman Act." First Nat'/
Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 671-72.

405 United

States v. Columbia Steel Co .. 334 U.S. 495. 534-40.
accompanying notes 118-19.
406

See sur>ra text

First Nat'! Bank and Trust, 376 U.S. at 672.

407 In

describing Columbia Steel. he noted that the Court had ·'observed. inter alia. that
because of rate structures and the location of United States Steel's fabricating subsidiaries. the
latter were unable to compete effectively in Consolidated's market." !d. (emphasis added).
40

x!d. (quoting Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. at 527-28).

409 First Nat'! Bank and Trust. 376 U.S. at 672. Justices Brennan and White concurred in
the result but believed the result was dictated solely on the Columbia Steel precedent. /d. at
673. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented. as they did with most of the merger decisions in
the 1960s. /d. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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from Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 7 of the Clayton Act." 410 The Act
specified that future bank mergers were "subject to the Clayton Act scrutiny unless
their anticompetitive effects were 'clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community served. "'411
Although the Bank Merger Act of 1966 seemingly provided a new defense for
the proponents of a bank merger, the Douglas-led Court soon minimized its efficacy.
In United States v. First City Bank of Houston, decided the term following the Bank
Merger Act, Justice Douglas wrote for the Court and held that the burden to establish
"the public interest" defense was on the banks purporting to merge. 412 Further, even
though the Act required the Comptroller of Currency find that the anticompetitive
effects of a bank merger must be "clearly outweighed in the public interest by the
probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the
community to be served[,]" 413 Douglas ruled that Congress intended that judicial
review be de novo. 414 That meant, according to Douglas, an independent
determination of the issues by the reviewing court. 415 Thus, Douglas rejected the
argument that the judiciary must sustain an administrative agency's decision unless it
is not supported by substantial evidence. 416
One term later, in United States v. Third National Bank in Nashville, the Court
applied the de novo review specified in the Bank of Houston case and overturned a
district court finding that upheld the merger between the second and fourth largest
banks in Nashville. 417 Although the Court stated that "the legislative history of the

410

12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1966). See United States v. Third Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390
U.S. 171, 177 (1968) ("Congress was evidently dissatisfied with the 1960 Bank Merger Act as
that Act was interpreted in United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963),
and in United States v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665 (1964),
and wished to alter both the procedures by which the Justice Department challenges bank
mergers and the legal standard which courts apply in judging those mergers.") (citations
omitted).
411

§ 1828(c)(5)(B). The Act gives the Department of Justice only thirty days to challenge
bank mergers following approval by the appropriate banking agencies but automatically stays
any merger challenged, thus preventing the necessity and difficulty of unraveling a
consummated merger. § 1828(c)(6).
412
413

United State v. First City Nat' I Bank of Houston. 386 U.S. 361, 366 (1967).
§ 1828(c)(5)(B ).

414

Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. at 367-70. The statute provided that a court in an antitrust
action "shall review de novo the issues presented." Justice Douglas rejected the argument that
the use of the word "review" rather than "trial" indicated a more limited scope of judicial
review. /d. at 368.
415/d.
416

/d. at 366-67. Justice Douglas characterized the 1966 Bank Merger Act as "the product
of powerful contending forces, each of which in the aftermath claimed more of a victory than
it deserved, leaving the controversy that finally abated in Congress to be finally resolved in the
courts." /d. at 367.
417

Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. at 173, 192-93 (1968). The Court's opinion by
Justice White was joined by Justice Douglas and three other justices. /d. Justice Harlan.
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Bank Merger Act of 1966 leaves no doubt that the Act was passed to make
substantial changes in the law applicable to bank mergers[,]" the Court again held
that it was not bound by an administrative agency's determination of the
convenience and needs of the community.m According to the Court, the defending
bank must establish that it could not meet the community's convenience and
necessity needs without merging with a competitor. 419
In effect, the Bank r~f Houston and Third National Bank in Nashville decisions
continued to apply standard Warren Court Section 7 analysis to bank mergers,
undeterred by the 1966 Act. 420 Its interpretation of the "convenience and needs"
standard, placing the burden on the defendant to meet the standard, and giving little
or no weight to administrative determinations of the standard produced no
demonstrable change to "pure" antitrust enforcement of bank mergers under Section
7, irrespective of congressional intent. 421 Justice Douglas and his Warren Court
brethren made it clear that they were not about to cede Clayton Act enforcement
authority to an administrative agency absent an unequivocal congressional mandate.
XI. POTENTIAL COMPETITION
In the 1960s and 70s, the Warren Court aggressively expanded the application of
Section 7 to mergers that were not between direct competitors or firms in a vertical
relationship but involved companies in complementary markets, whether by virtue of
their products or geography. Not surprisingly, on that Court, Justice Douglas was
the leading expansionist of Section 7 to what became known as conglomerate
422
mergers.
He wrote three of the first four Supreme Court opinions applying
potential competition theory to mergers, 421 wrote a dissent in the other, 424 and penned

joined by Justice Stewart, again dissented and Justices Fortas and Marshall did not participate.
ld. at 192-93.
418

/d. at 177.

419

Poor management was the problem for the Nashville Bank. The Court held that
defendant had to show that it made reasonable efforts to solve the management problem short
of merger or that any attempts would have been unlikely to succeed. !d. at 188, 192.
42

<>-r'he Court had commented that the 1966 Bank Merger Act "was more clear and more
specific in prescribing new procedures for testing mergers than in expounding the new
standard by which they should be judged." !d. at 178.
421

See also ROGERS, ET AL., supra note I 06, at 533.

422

Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Douglas' most recent biographer, points out that in 1962
with the appointment of Justice Goldberg to replace Justice Frankfurter, Douglas finally had a
five-vote liberal majority (Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black, Brennan and Goldberg)
with which to push his individual rights agenda. (In 1962 President Kennedy also appointed
Justice White to replace Justice Whittaker but White was not the liberal that Kennedy had
hoped for). MURPHY, supra note I 0, at 360. It is not perhaps too much of a stretch to suggest
that the same liberal majority gave Douglas somewhat of a carte blanche to push his hawkish,
expansionist antitrust agenda. In any event, he produced more questionable antitrust decisions
in the 1960s and early 1970s than at any other period during his long career on the Supreme
Court.
423

See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Proctor & Gamble
Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
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the only opinion in which the Court has ever ruled that the opportunity for reciprocal
dealing is sufficient to block a merger between non-competing companies. 425
El Paso Natural Gas was the first Section 7 case to directly consider the impact
of potential competition on a merger. 426 It involved the planned acquisition by El
Paso Natural Gas, the sole out-of-state natural gas supplier to California, of Pacific
Northwest Pipeline. the operator of pipelines throughout the west but not in or to
Ca\ifornia. 427 At the time of the merger, Pacific Northwest had tentatively agreed
with Southern California Edison, the largest industrial user of natural gas in the state,
to build a pipeline into California to supply Edison with natural gas.m While El
Paso successfully opposed Pacific's plan to build a pipeline into California
throughout the regulatory process, it also offered Edison much better gas prices and
promises of unintetTupted deliveries. 424
Justice Douglas quickly seized on the impact Pacific had on the California
natural gas market as a potential, rather than actual, entrant, stating that "[ w]e would
have to wear blinders not to see that the mere efforts of Pacific Northwest to get into
the California market, though unsuccessful, had a powerful influence on El Paso's
business attitudes within the State."430 According to Douglas, the fact that Pacific
Northwest was effectively locked out of the California market and thus had no
present market share was not relevant because, with the demand for natural gas
growing by 200 million feet per day, 431 it would have future opportunities to
compete. 432
Justice Douglas did not articulate a test for establishing a potential competition
claim, although he did suggest that the high entry barriers in the pipeline industry
and Pacific Northwest's singular position as a potential entrant were important
factors. 433 The closest he came to language that might have general application was
424

United States v. Penn-Olin Chern. Co., 379 U.S. 158, 177 (1964) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
425

FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 ( 1965).

426

United States v. El Paso Nat'! Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964). The Court in the
Columbia Steel case, which was brought under Section I of the Sherman Act, had briefly
considered the impact of potential competition. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S.
495. 528-29 ( 1948). Justice Douglas' dissent in Columbia Steel did not deal with potential
competition. /d. at 534-40. See supra generallv text accompanying note 186.
427

EI Paso supplied more than fifty percent of the natural gas in the state. El Paso Nat '1
Gas. 376 U.S. at 652 n.2.
42

REd'1son
· pre.erre
"
d that arrangement to contmumg
. . to purchase natural gas from
.
El Paso
because El Paso was only able to offer interruptible gas service through its distributors.
Pacific's gas would be non-interruptible and, because no distributors would be involved, less
expensive than El Paso's. Id. at 654-55.
424

/d. at 655.

430

/d. at 659.

431

/d. at 658.

mid. at 660.
413

/d. at 660-61. El Paso actually took control of Pacific Northwest in 1957. /d. By the
time the case wound its way to the Supreme Court seven years later, however, two more
interstate pipelines had entered California. /d. at 661.
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when he wrote that "[tjhe effect on competition in a particular market through
acquisition of another company is determined by the nature or extent of that market
and by the nearness of the absorbed company to it, that company's eagerness to enter
that market. its resourcefulness, and so on." 434
Although little doctrine comes from El Paso Natural Gas. it is hard to quibble
with the result since Pacific Northwest's attempts to enter California were certainly
affecting El Paso's decisions within the market. Further, the decision, the first to rest
on potential competition. is an innovative one. 435
Only two months later, however, in United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., the
Court faced a more difficult application of the potential competition theory. 436 The
government had challenged a joint venture between Pennsalt Chemicals and Olin
Mathieson Chemical Corporation for the purpose of producing and selling sodium
chlorate in the southeast. 417 The majority applied dual potential competition tests: (I)
determining whether both of the joint venturers were potential entrants to see if the
joint entry foreclosed the competitive benefits of individual entry and, if not, (2)
determining whether only one of the joint venturers was a potential entrant and, if so,
whether the other was a potential entrant that would exert competitive influence "in
the wings" of the market. 438 Since the district court had not considered the second
test, the Court vacated and remanded.
Penn-Olin represents a substantial expansion of potential competition doctrine
beyond El Paso Natural Gas because it questions whether new market entry through
a joint venture is as pro-competitive as individual entry might have been. 439 Still,
Justice Douglas did not believe that the majority had gone far enough and dissented,
joined by his regular ally, Justice Black. 440 In Douglas' view, the joint venture was
434

/d. at 660.

435

Arguably the Warren Court would have been better advised to apply potential
competition analysis to some of its earlier, questionable ''horizontal" merger cases. See, e.g.,
United States v. Von· s Grocery Co .. 384 U.S. 270 ( 1966) (holding there was a horizontal
merger even though only twenty-five percent of grocery stores of two companies competed);
United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 ( 1964) (treating metal and glass containers as
one market in spite of fact that there was little current end use competition between the two
and Court acknowledged fact that merger involved '·inter-industry" competition).
43

":l78 U.S. 158 (1964).

437

Pennsalt did not produce sodium chlorate in the southeast; Olin Mathieson did not
produce sodium chlorate but did market it, although not in the southeast. /d. at 160-203.
418
/d. at 175-76. See also Joseph F. Brodley, Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 94
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1537-38 (1982); Thomas Piraino, Beyond Per Se. Rule of' Reason or
Merger Analysis: A New Antitrust Standard for Joint Venture, 76 MINN. L. REV. I ( 1991 );
Robert Pitofsky, Joint Ventures Under the Antitrust Lmrs: Some Reflections 011 the
Significance of Penn-Olin, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1007 ( 19fi9).

439

Accord Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa. Rethinking the Potential Competition
Doctrine. 2004 WIS. L. REv. I 035. 1050. Pennsalt had never sold directly in the southeast
market targeted by the joint venture while Olin had never produced sodium chlorate. although
it had for the last few years distributed the product in the southeast for Pennsalt to test the
demand. Cont'l Can, 378 U.S. at 161-62.
440
/d. at 177-184 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices White and Harlan also dissented;
White without opinion and Harlan with a memorandum opinion.
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akin to a per se market division between the two since it divided the market "fiftyfifty" and foreclosed all competition between them. 441 He thought it probable442 that
one of the two, if not both, joint venturers would have entered the market
independently with the other on the periphery as "a potent competitive factor." 443 He
saw no reason to remand a case when the joint venture "was launched at the very
threshold of the entry of two potential competitors into a territory." 444
Thus, Justice Douglas took the extreme view that two firms, which had not
entered a market but might, engaged in what amounted to a per se market division by
agreeing to enter the market together. Since he placed the per se tag on the activity,
the concentration of the market, the level of entry barriers, and number of other
potential competitors were apparently not relevant. 445
Justice Douglas wrote for a six-justice majority in the next potential competition
case to reach the Court, FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 446 decided three years after
Penn-Olin. There the Court found that Procter & Gamble had violated Section 7 by
acquiring Clorox, the largest manufacturer of household bleach, because P&G was a
potential entrant in that market.
Justice Douglas noted that P&G had considered entering the liquid bleach market
by internal expansion but had decided that acquiring Clorox, with its fifty percent
market share, would quickly give it a dominant position. 447 He concluded that the
acquisition produced two likely anticompetitive effects.
First, since P&G
manufactured complementary detergent products marketed and advertised in the
same manner as liquid bleach, through grocery stores and by mass media, it
influenced the liquid bleach market as a potential competitor. 448 Second, the
acquisition of Clorox by as large a company as P&G would serve to entrench Clorox
as the industry leader, discouraging entry by others and effectively raising entry
barriers. 449 In addition, Douglas rejected the notion that efficiency gains resulting

441

/d. at 182.

442

"1 Section! 7 deals only with probabilities, not certainties." !d.

443/d.
444

/d. To allow such a joint venture would be to avoid Section 7 "by sophisticated
devices." !d.
445

In contrast to the majority opinion which looked to several criteria such as the structure
and history of the market, the stated reason for the joint venture, actual competition between
the two firms, and the level of competition in the market but for the joint venture to assess
whether the joint venture has caused or was likely to cause an anticompetitive effect. !d. at
176-77. See also Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at I 051.
446

386 U.S. 568 (1967). Justices Stewart and Fortas did not participate and Justice Harlan
wrote a concurring opinion.
447

/d. at 574.

44

x/d. at 578. The FTC had found that P&G was the most likely entrant into the liquid
bleach market. /d. at 580-81.
449

/d. at 578.
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from a merger could ever be used as a defense to illegality, 450 a point vigorously
disputed by Justice Harlan in his concurrence. 451
Although the Procter & Gamble Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's dismissal of
the FTC's complaint Justice Douglas believed that only a summary of the FTC's
findings was necessary since "the anticompetitive effects with which this productextension merger is fraught can be easily seen ... .''452 Justice Harlan and many
commentators have disagreed that the case was easym and perhaps more telling,
have asserted that Douglas improperly made assumptions and drew conclusions from
the facts presented. For example, Douglas' characterization of the liquid bleach
market as "oligopolistic" and non-competitive, which formed the basis of his finding
of both likely anticompetitive effects, is suspect. 454 Further, his "entrenchment"
theory, mentioned almost in passing at the end of the Procter & Gamble opinion,
created a lot of attention but has found little or no favor subsequently. 455
Similarly Justice Douglas' rather cavalier and summary dismissal of efficiency
gains as a defense to a Section 7 action, harkening back to the misguided Brown
456
Shoe opinion, is at odds with current thinking. 457 Just as in Brown Shoe, the FTC

450

/d. at 580, citing the infamous Brown Shoe decision. Later in United States v. First
National Bank and Trust Co. of Lexington, 376 U.S. 665. 669 (1964), Justice Douglas, writing
for the majority, ruled that a merger of two banks violated Section 7 because "the multiplicity
of extra services in the trust field which the new company could offer tends to foreclose
competition." See supra text accompanying notes 392-401. So much for the needs of
consumers of trust departments in Lexington, Kentucky.
451

Proctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 603-04.

452

/d. at578.

453

"1 consider the case difficult within its own four corners. and beyond that, it portents for
future administrative and judicial application of Section 7 ... to this kind of merger important
and far-reaching." !d. at 58 I -82.
454
In addition to Clorox's almost 50% market share, the top two firms controlled 65% of
the market and the top six 80%. Two hundred small producers accounted for the remaining
20%. !d. at 575-76. There was no indication, however, that Clorox or the other market
leaders could have priced above competitive levels or reduced output to increase price, thus
rendering Procter & Gamble's intluence as a potential entrant a nullity. See ROBERT H. BORK.
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 259-60 (1978); Donald F. Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARV. L. REV. 13 I 3, 1363
(1965).
455
The entrenchment theory can actually be traced to a vertical merger case, Reynolds
Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. I 962), a case that Justice Douglas did not cite in
Procter & Gamble. perhaps in keeping with his sometimes remark to friends that "I don't
follow precedents, I make 'em." MURPHY. supra note 10, at 340. For examples of subsequent
cases in which an entrenchment theory has failed, sec FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d
289, 298 (4th Cir.), and Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d
Cir. 1974). Cf Kennecott Copper Co. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67,78 (lOth Cir. 1972), cert denied,
416 U.S. 909 ( 1974). See also Lawrence K. Hellman, "Entrenchment" Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act: An Approach for Analy~ing Conglomerate Mergers, 13 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 225
( 1982) (arguing for use of entrenchment theory in conglomerate mergers if certain conditions
are present).
-1

56

See supra notes 292-93 and accompanying text.
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paradoxically viewed the efficiencies that P&G would gain in marketing and
di~tributing Clorox bleach as anticompetitive.m Douglas, of course, accepted the
FTC's finding that those efficiencies would raise entry barriers without consideration
4
of the fact that they might enhance consumer welfare. YJ
Justice Harlan seems to have gotten it right when he lamented that Justice
Douglas' Procta & Gamble opinion '"leaves the Commission, lawyers, and
businessmen at large as to what is to be expected of them in future cases of this
kind."'"0 The decision applies the concept of potential competition without any real
contours. endorses a questionable new theory, entrenchment, with little analysis, and
summarily trashes efficiencies as a Section 7 defense.
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas wrote the majority opinion in the next
461
conglomerate merger case to reach the Court, Ford Motor Co. v. United States.
The case was made to order for Douglas since it allowed for his expansionist theories
in both vertical and conglomerate contexts. 462 Ford Motor's acquisition of Autolite,
one of three major spark plug manufacturers that together controlled eighty-five
percent of the market, was in lieu of its entering the market de novo, which it had
463
Although the
determined would be more costly and would take up to eight years.
464
main issue before the Court was whether divestiture was the appropriate remedy,
Justice Douglas also agreed that the district court had properly found that as a
potential entrant Ford Motor exacted significant pro-competitive effects on the
concentrated spark plug market. 465
Ford had argued that its acquisition had actually benefited the spark plug market
since it would make Autolite, with only fifteen percent of the market, a more
457

See

DEr'T OF JUSTICE AND FED'L TRADE COMM'N HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES

*-+ (1997) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.htm.
mProcter & Gwnhle Co., Docket 6901,63 FTC 1465, 1580 (1963).
45
YJustice Harlan thought that the question should be asked and that economies in
advertising could benefit consumers by providing brand identification and quality assurance,
although he concluded that P&G had not shown any real advertising efficiencies. Proctor &
Gwnhle, :186 U.S. at 603-04. He was probably conect that advertising efficiencies were
lacking. See, e.g" John L. Peterman, The Clorox Case and the Television Rate Structures, 12
J.L. & ECON. 321 (1968) (asserting that Procter & Gamble did not actually have advertising
cost advantages which could entrench it in the liquid bleach market). Accord BoRK, supra
note 454, at 254-55. There is a substantial debate about whether conglomerate mergers ever
produce real efficiencies. at least any that ultimately benefit consumers. See, e.g., Rogers,
sul'ra note 298, at 312-17: F. M. Scherer, Book Review. The Posnerian Harvest: Separating
the Wheatfimn the Chajj; 86 YALE L.J. 974, 987-88 (1977).
4
wProctor & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 583. Judge Bork wrote that Justice Douglas' '"murky"
opinion '·makes sense only when antitrust is viewed as pro-small business-and even then it
dues not make much sense, because small business is protected from Clorox' s cost advantages
only when they happen to be achieved through a merger." BORK, supra note 454, at 255.

461

405 U.S. 562 (1972).

4"2See s11pra text accompanying notes 414-37; sources cited supra notes 482-96.
4

',;/d.

at

566.

464

The majority. per Justice Douglas. thought it was. /d. at 571-78.

465

/d. at 574.
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effective competitor against Champion. with almost a fifty percent share, and
General Motors, which controlled thirty percent of the market. 466 Justice Douglas
disagreed, in part because the merger would also eliminate Ford as one of the two
largest purchasers of original equipment spark plugs. 467
More questionable, however. was his quotation from Philadelphia National Bank
to the effect that choosing between "economic debits and credits" is beyond ')udicial
46
competence. " E Here Justice Douglas is at least consistent with his quick dismissal
of the relevance of efficiencies in Procter & Gamhle, 469 since that would require
some weighing or judicial choice-making, as well as the anti-Rule of Reason position
of the Warren and early Burger Courts. 470 Douglas favored bright line per se rules
generally and in the merger arena, any showing of likely anticompetitive effect was
enough to render the merger illegal. 471
The Douglas-led expansion of Section 7 into potential competition posited that a
firm sitting on the sidelines of a market exerted competitive influence on market
participants who are worried about the threat of new entry. This thinking became
known as the doctrine of perceived potential competition 472 and was the subject of
further Court scrutiny in three decisions in 1973 and I 974. 473 In Falstaff, a sharply
466

/d. at 569-70.

467

/d. at 570-71. He also believed that Ford would gain access to the spark plug
aftermarket which would help perpetuate the so-called original equipment tie, the replacement
of the same brand of spark plugs as the original. !d. at 570.
468

/d. at 569-70 (quoting United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 371
( 1963)).
469

See supru text accompanying notes 415, 438-53.

70

+ See, for example. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), which
established a per se rule the Court overruled ten years later once Justices Douglas and Black
had retired. See Cont'l T.V .. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc .. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Justice Douglas·
position in Ford Motor parallels that of the Court in United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1972), decided that same year. There, in a 4-1-1 opinion with Justices Powell
and Rehnquist not participating. the majority. including Justice Douglas, applied the per se
rule to horizontal non-price restraints, stating that whether they would decide the case the
same wav under the rule of reason ''is irrelevant to the issue before us." !d. at 609. According
to Justic~ Marshall, writing for the Court. Congress could overturn per se rules if it so chooses,
·'Jeav[ingj courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory in order to maintain a
flexible approach." /d. at 609 n.l 0.
-PI See,

e.g., FTC

V.

Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568,576-77 (1967).

472

See. e.g., ROGERS. ET AL., supra note 106, at 632-33; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note
28 I. at 659-61.
473
See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp .. 410 U.S. 526 (1973); United States v.
Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. Conn. Nat'! Bank, 418 U.S.
656 ( 1974l. The Court in those cases also discussed, without ratifying, the actual potential
competition theory which attempts to predicate Section 7 liability upon a showing that the
acquiring company would have entered the market de novo or by a "toehold" acquisition if not
permitted to acquire the company at issue and that such an alternative entry would be
procompetitive. See, e.g .. BOC Int'l, Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 26-28 (2d Cir. 1977);
Tenneco. Inc. v. FTC. 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982). See generally RoGERS, ET AL., supra note
I 06, at 630-33.
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divided Court reversed a lower court ruling that failed to consider the effect of
Falstaff as a potential entrant to the New England beer market. Falstaff, the fourth
largest brewer nationally and the largest brewer that did not have a presence in New
England, had acquired Narragansett, a regional brewer with the largest share of the
New England market. 474 Although Falstaff argued, and the district court found, that
it would never have entered the New England market de novo, the Court reversed
and remanded, directing the lower court to consider the probable impact of Falstaff
on the market as a potential competitor.+75
The majority opinion drew two strong opposing opinions, one concurring in the
result by Justice Marshall and the other by Justice Rehnquist dissenting, which both
argued stridently that the majority had gone too far.+ 76 Justice Douglas, however,
was moved to write a partial concurrence arguing that the majority had not gone far
enough in merely reversing and remanding. 477 In spite of pointed language by
Marshall and Rehnquist that there was no factual basis for the Court's remand
order, 478 Douglas asserted that the Court should have reversed and rendered. After a
polemic on the inherent evils of corporate growth by acquisition or merger, 479
Douglas argued that even though Falstaff would not have entered the New England
market de novo had it not been allowed to acquire Narragansett, it might sometime in
the future change its mind. 48° Further, he opined, that Falstaff was the most likely
new competitor and that replacing the leading regional brewer with a beer seller
"with national capabilities increased the trend toward concentration" and was
sufficient to violate Section 7. 481
With its changing composition, the Court further reigned in the application of
potential competition in two bank cases decided the term after Falstaff. Although
Justice Douglas did not participate in the first decision, United States v. Marine

474

Falstaff, 410 U.S. at 528-29.

475

!d. at 537.

476

/d. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result); /d. at 572 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting,
joined by Stewart, J.). Justices Marshall and Rehnquist both pointed out that the government
had provided no factual basis on which a court could conclude that Falstaff was a perceived
potential entrant into the New England beer market; thus the basis for the remand was not
supported by the record. /d. at 546, 574-75.
477

/d. at 538 (Douglas, J ., concurring in part).

478

"Thus, our remand leaves the hapless District Judge with the unenviable task of
reassessing nonexistent evidence under a theory advanced by neither of the parties." /d. at 546
(Marshall, J., concurring in the result). "For this Court to reverse and to remand for
consideration of a possible factual basis for a theory never advanced by the plaintiff is a
drastic and unwarranted departure from the most basic principles of civil litigation and
appellate review." /d. at 574-75 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Stewart, J.).
479

"The 'rising tide' of concentration in American business" was creating "a nation of
clerks"' and leading "predictably to socialism." /d. at 540, 543 (quoting United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546. 552).
480

/d. at 544.

481

/d. at 545.
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Bancorporation, x he did join Justice White's four-justice dissent in the companion
case United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 483 which was argued and then
decided at the same time. That dissent took issue with the majority's narrow
definition of the relevant market as the localized area in which the acquired bank
operated which precluded the finding of an "in the wings" competitive effect outside
of that market. 484
The dissenters in Connecticut National Bank were all Warren Court holdovers, 485
thus illustrating that, by the narrowest of margins, the worm had turned on the
extension and utilization of potential competition theories under Section 7. 486 The
two bank cases, together with the General Dynamics decision that same term, 487
brought the "government always wins" heyday of Section 7 to an abrupt halt.
After its flurry of potential competition decisions in the 1960s and early 1970s,
the Supreme Court has not addressed the topic since. 488 Lower courts have found
that substantial proof and certainty problems plague the use of potential competition
489
theories.
Commentators have likewise criticized the validity of potential
competition generally as well as the lack of measurable standards or guidance from
490
the Supreme Court.
Although the 1984 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines
482

418 U.S. 602 (1974). Marine Bancorporation was a 5-3 decision in which the Court
held that regulatory barriers precluded both de novo entry and any "in the wings" competitive
influence by the acquiring bank.
483

418 U.S. 656 (1974).

484

The dissent argued that more than one relevant market could be found as in Pabst
Brewing Co., harkening to Section 7's "any section of the country" language. /d. at 674.
485

Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, in addition to Justice
Douglas.
486

The dissenters in the companion Marine Bancorporation decision in which Justice
Douglas did not participate were also Justices White, Brennan and Marshall. Marine
Bancorporation, 418 U.S. at 643.
487

See supra text

488

In fact, the Supreme Court has not selected for review any Section 7 case since its 1974

United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
accompanying notes 349-58.
term.
489

See, e.g., Tenneco, Inc. v. FTC, 689 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Siemens
Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1980); FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977);
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Ohio 1977); FTC v.
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); United States v. Hughes Tool, Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (D. Cal.
1976).
490
See. e.g., Joseph F. Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87
YALE L.J. I, 26 ( 1977) ("[T]here is no way the judicial process can directly handle concepts of
this complexity and indeterminancy."); Joseph F. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers:
The Need for Legislation, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 869 n.8 (1979) (calling potential competition
"a doctrine of almost metaphysical complexity"); William Allen Alper, Potential Competition:
An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 431 (1984) ("No objective evidence
is likely to prove, with the degree of certainty courts must require, those facts that would
invoke potential competition theory in any real situation."); Joseph P. Bauer, Challenging
Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's
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do consider potential competition as the only viable theory for attacking
conglomerate mergers,' 91 the government has run into a skeptical judiciary and has
492
relatively little incentive for challenging conglomerate acquisitions.
Although the government has obtained consent decrees in a few cases involving
potential competition, 493 enforcement efforts have been sporadic and uncertain. Its
future does not seem bright and, as one commentator has suggested, it may soon join
494
"the scrap heap of defunct merger theories."
Justice Douglas' contributed another theory to that "scrap heap." In FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp. ,495 he wrote for the Court and condemned a merger
because it facilitated reciprocal dealing with third parties. Consolidated, which
operated food processing plants as well as retail food stores, had acquired Gentry,
Inc., a manufacturer of dehydrated onion and garlic commonly used in processed
foods. For the ten years following, Consolidated often urged its processed food
suppliers to purchase their dehydrated onion and garlic from Gentry.
The Seventh Circuit had relied mostly on post-acquisition evidence and
concluded that the probability of a lessening of competition was not established,
pointing out that while Gentry's share of the dehydrated onion market had increased
by seven percent, its share of the dehydrated garlic market had decreased twelve
Legislation, 58 B.U. L. REV. 199, 225-26 (1978); Richard S. Markovits, Potential
Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers
Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 658, 664-66 (1975).

§*

491

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES,
4.111, 4.112, 4.131, 4.132, 4.133, 4.134
( 1984 ). The jointly issued 1992 Merger Guidelines apply only to horizontal mergers and
provide more guidance and specificity with respect to defining the relevant market. See DEP'T
OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM' N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, § 1.32 (1992).
492

The government often proceeds under the 1992 Guidelines, arguing for a broad market
definition and avoiding potential competition issues by asserting that the claim is one of
actual, ongoing competition. It has had a long history of success under this approach. See
United States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066
(D.D.C. 1997). See also Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at 1070-73, 1085. However, the
strategy does not always work. See, e.g., Equifax, Inc. v. FTC, 618 F.2d 63 (9th Cir. 1980).
493

See cases cited in Bush & Massa, supra note 439, at 1085. See also John E. Kwoka,
Non-Incumbent Competition: Mergers Involving Constraining and Prospective Competitors,
52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 173, 174 (2001) (asserting that government enforcement agencies
have been lax in pursuing potential competition cases).
494

HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 570. See also SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281, at
661 (stating potential competition doctrine "has fallen on hard times"). The so-called Actual
Potential Competition theory, which attempts to measure the likelihood of actual entry by the
acquiring firm, was never officially embraced by the Supreme Court. Although it has had
limited success in attacking mergers, see Yamaha Motor Co. v. FTC. 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982), and Mercantile Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors,
638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981) (approving doctrine in principle). The "reasonable probability
of entry in the near future" standard is one that the government has not been able to meet and
has essentially abandoned. See, e.g., United States v. Siemens Corp., 621 F.2d 499 (2d Cir.
1980); FTC v. Atl. Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v.
United Techs. Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249, 1285-86 (D. Ohio 1977); United States v. Black &
Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
495

380 U.S. 592 (1965 J.
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percent. 496 It also noted that reciprocal buying had been unsuccessful on a number of
occasions. 497
Justice Douglas disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's evaluation of the postacquisition evidence, finding that ··rrleciprocity was tried over and over again and it
sometimes worked." 498 He rejected the view, however, that post-acquisition
evidence was necessary, stating that "the force of Section 7 is in probabilities, not
what later transpired. " 499 It was enough to condemn the merger when the FTC found
the probability of reciprocity involving an acquired company with a substantial
market share. 500
Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, believed that Section 7 required
"more than a bare potential for reciprocal buying'' to bar a merger and argued that
"the law requires a more closely textured economic analysis" than provided by the
majority. 501 He doubted that Consolidated could "strong-arm'' Armour or Swift into
buying dehydrated onions from Gentry but believed it could influence smaller
suppliers, which led him to concur in the judgment. 502
Following Consolidated Foods, the use of reciprocity to condemn mergers
initially found some success in the lower courts. 50 ' Later decisions, however,
applying the more closely textured economic analysis urged by Justice Stewart, 504
rejected attempts to challenge mergers on reciprocity grounds. 505 The more modern

496

/d. at 598.

497/d.
498
/d. at 600. According to Justice Harlan's concurrence. Consolidated was able to
pressure suppliers to purchase from Gentry only seven times in a decade. !d. at 602 (Harlan,
1., concurring in the judgment).
499

/d. at 598.

500Gentry

controlled thirty-two percent of the combined dehydrated garlic and onion
market prior to the acquisition. It and industry leader Basic Vegetable Products together
controlled almost ninety percent of a rapidly expanding market. Consolidated Foods, 380
U.S. at 595, 600.
501
/d. at 603 (Stewart, .1.. concuiTing in the judgment). He required more than evidence
that attempts at reciprocity "sometimes worked." /d. at 604.
502

/d. at 607.

503 See

Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., 414 F.2d 506 (3rd Cir. 1969).
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 ( 1970); United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3rd
Cir. 1963); United States v. White Consol. Indus., 323 F. Supp. 1397 (D. Ohio 1971); United
States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.Y. 1966).
50-I See Note, Reciprocitv as a Basis for Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under the
Clayton Act, 12 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 4S L 494-97 ( 1981 ).

e.g., Carrier Corp. v. United Techs. Corp .. 19n-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'II 62,393
(N.D.N.Y. 1978), ajf'd per curiam, !9n-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
62,405
9[
(2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 1971 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'j[ 73,619 (N.D. Ill. 1971) (regarding
Canteen Corporation merger): United States v. ITT. 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1970)
(regarding merger resulting from acquisition of stock in Grinnell); United States v. Int'l Tel. &
Tel. Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn. 1969) (regarding stock acquisition in Grinnell and
Hartford), appeal dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971): United States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301
505 See,
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thinking is that the mere opportunity for reciprocity is not enough because
reciprocity is not necessarily anticompetitive absent evidence of coercion or forcing
and, further, reciprocal dealing arrangements often enhance efficiency. 506 It appears
that no reciprocity case has succeeded in well over thirty years. Further, the 1984
Merger Guidelines do not even mention reciprocity as a basis for a merger challenge
and the government has not raised a reciprocity issue in many years. 507
Justice Douglas also has the distinction, if that is the correct term, of writing the
majority opinion in the last vertical merger case decided by the Supreme Court, Ford
Motor Co. v. United States. 50 H There the Court struck down the acquisition by Ford
Motor of Autolite, one of the three leading makers of spark plugs with about 15% of
the market. Since General Motors owned the AC brand of spark plugs and
controlled 30% of the market, Champion was the only significant independent spark
plug manufacturer remaining after Ford's acquisition of Autolite. Champion's
market share had declined from just under 50% in 1960 to about 33% in 1966. In
contrast, Autolite's market share had climbed from a pre-acquisition 15% to about
30%.509
Justice Douglas characterized the remedy issue as "[tjhe main controversy
here" 510 and quickly found substantively that the acquisition violated "the Jetter and
spirit of the Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act." 511 He readily upheld the district
court's findings that the elimination of Ford both as a major customer of Champion
and as a potential entrant into the sparkplug market de novo rendered the acquisition
unlawful. 512 Secondly, he agreed with the district court that the merger increased
entry barriers in the sparkplug industry by foreclosing Ford as a purchaser for about
ten percent of the spark plug market and, considering General Motors' ownership of
the AC brand, would transmit to the sparkplug industry "the rigidity of the
oligopolistic structure of the automobile industry." 513
In Ford Motor, Justice Douglas thus succinctly displays his antipathy to vertical
market foreclosure and his favor with potential competition theory, both of which
have now fallen on hard times. 514 Indeed, in Ford Motor the defendant argued that
F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Ill. 1969); United States v. Penick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J.
1965).
506

See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 561-63; SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 281,
at 626.
507

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 211, at 563.

508

405 U.S. 562 (1972). Ford Motor Co. also involved potential competition issues and is
also characterized as a conglomerate merger decision. See supra text accompanying notes
453-60.
509

Ford Motor Co., 405 U.S. at 566.

510

/d. at 571.

511

/d. at569.

512

/d. at 567-68.

513

/d. at 568 (quoting United States v. Ford Motor Co., 315 F. Supp. 372, 375 (D. Mich.
1970)).
514

With regard to vertical mergers see, for example, Fruehauf Corp. v. FTC, 603 F.2d 345,
359 n.9 (2d Cir. 1979). in which the court was "unwilling to assume that any vertical
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the acquisition had actually improved competition in the spark plug market because
Autolite, with fifteen percent of the market, would be a more effective rival of
Champion and General Motors, each with about thirty percent market shares. 515
Douglas refused to see the benefit, however, summarily rejecting the argument and
characterizing the acquisition as "aggravat[ing] an already oligopolistic market." 516
Today, of course, it is hard to imagine the same result on similar facts.
Overall, Justice Douglas' expansive use of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to outlaw
mergers through use of potential competition, entrenchment, and non-coercive
reciprocity theories has indeed been relegated to the antitrust bone yard. Similarly,
his sharp dismissal of proposed efficiency gains as ever being relevant in defense of
a merger is subject to considerable debate, although the bar remains high for
establishing an efficiency defense. He used Section 7 most aggressively in an
attempt to protect small business and because of his abhorrence for anything
resembling corporate growth or power. Today's Section 7 focus, by contrast, is on
consumer welfare and, as a result, the oftentimes inefficient small business is no
longer on the antitrust radar screen. Rather, a working marketplace that provides
competition and innovation for the consumer has taken center stage.
XII. VERTICAL RESTRAINTS
Justice Douglas' populist view of vertical restraints, last articulated in his 1972
Ford Motor opinion, traces at least back to 1948 when he penned his ringing dissent
in Columbia Steel and wrote for the majority in United States v. Paramount Pictures,
Inc. 517 It was a close corollary to his distrust of corporate size. Indeed in Paramount
Pictures he strongly hinted that if it were up to him, vertical integration, at least of
the production, distribution and exhibition of motion pictures, would be illegal per
se. 518 When reviewing the several restraints present in the case, he frequently
focused on the adverse impact on the small, independent competitor as a basis for
finding illegality. 519

foreclosure lessens competition," and Alberta Gas Chemicals Ltd. v. £.!. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 826 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988) (virtually rejecting
foreclosure theory in principle). See also HovENKAMP, supra note 211, at 386 ("Prevailing
judicial opinion now seems to be that vertical mergers should be condemned only in the most
extreme circumstances.").
515

Ford Motor Co .. 405 U.S. at 569-70.

516

/d. at 570.

517

334 U.S. 131 (1948).

518 /d.

at 173-74. Throughout the Paramount Pictures opinion Justice Douglas uses the
pronoun "we" when referring to the majority for whom he is writing. Only when, however, he
notes that vertical integration is not per se illegal does he deviate and refer to the majority by
name, "(bjut the majority of the Court does not take that view. In the opinion of the majority
the legality of vertical integration under the Sherman Act turns on .... " /d. at 174. The
message seems clear; he is acquiescing to his brethren on this point.
519 /d.

at 162 ("The trade victims of this conspiracy have in large measure been the small
independent operators.").
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Even his majority opinion in White Motor Company v. United States, 520 which
some might view as a moderation of his normal hard line view since he declined to
impose the per se rule to vertical territorial restrictions, is rife with his populist
perspective. 521 Although he pointed to the Court's lack of experience in this area
generally, he noted that vertical territorial restraints may be "the only practicable
means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business." 522 Thus.
Justice Douglas' seeming reticence to too quickly expand the per se rule is in large
part because of his fear that to do so might harm small businesses. 523
Justice Douglas wrote a special concurrence five years later in Albrecht v. Herald
Co., a maximum vertical price fixing case that also involved exclusive dealer
territories for newspaper distributors. 524 The majority declined to rule on the
exclusive territories issue since that aspect of the case had not gone before the jury. 525
Douglas viewed the case as "therefore close" to White Motor but noted that. in
determining the legality of a newspaper distributor's exclusive territory, one would
normally consider the impact on a newspaper boy who would likely need the
protection of an exclusive territory to "wage competitive warfare." 526
That same term Justice Douglas voted with the majority in the controversial
Schwinn case, in which the Court announced a per se rule for vertical customer or
territorial restrictions when title or dominion of the goods had passed to the
distributor or retailer. 527 The decision attempted to resurrect the common law
restraint against alienation concept found in the landmark Dr. Miles decision of
1911, which made resale price maintenance illegal. 528 It is not at all surprising that
Douglas found favor with the majority in Schwinn, which seemingly embraced the
right of small business to determine its own destiny by determining its price and
customers free from manufacturer or supplier interference. 529

520

372 U.S. 253 (1963).

521

Justice Douglas also declined to impose the rule of reason. The case arose on appeal
from summary judgment for the government and the majority believed a trial on the merits
was required before a rule of law was "designed." /d. at 254, 261.
522

/d. at 263.

523

ln White Motor. Justice Black joined Justice Clark's dissent, along with Chief Justice
Warren. /d. at 275. It is one of the very few times Justices Douglas and Black split in an
antitrust case.
524
525

390 U.S. 145, 154 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
/d. at 153-54.

526

He noted that here, however, the Court had before it a "large retail enterprise." calling
into question the legality of the exclusivity. /d. at 155 (Douglas. J., concurring).
527

United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 ( 1967). See C. Paul Rogers III,
Restraints on Alienation in Antitrust Law: A Past with No Future, 49 SMU L. REV. 497
( 1996).
528

Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911 ). Here Justice
Douglas parted company with his reputed antitrust mentor, Louis Brandeis, who was opposed
to restrictions on resale price maintenance. See BRANDEIS, supra note 78, at 243.
529

See supra text accompanying notes 509-14.
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Of course, ten years later, or two years after Justice Douglas' retirement, the
Burger Court overruled Schwinn and installed the rule of reason in vertical non-price
cases in the landmark Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. decision. 510
Sylvania (and Schwinn) had the effect of rendering White Motor and Douglas'
concurrence in Albrecht moot, 531 since the rule of reason replaced the uncertainty
stemming from the lack of judicial experience with vertical non-price restraints in
White Motor. One might conclude that here Douglas was intluential, or at least in
the mainstream, since he was reluctant to assert per se rules in this area. 532 Nothing
could be further from reality, however, since Douglas' leanings toward the rule of
reason were based on hi" deference to small, independent businesses that should be
given every opportunity to compete, while Sylvania and later Khan were based on
efficiency concerns and the promotion of interbrand competition. 533
Justice Douglas' loyalty to the little guy trying to make it in the business world
was early on apparent in his ringing dissent in Standard Oil Co. of California v.
United States 534 (generally known as Standard Stations), in which the Court. per
Justice Frankfurter, ruled unlawful exclusive supply contracts required of
independent retailers by the oil company defendant. While the Court recognized that
requirements contracts provide at least short-term efficiencies for the parties. it
concluded that when a substantial share of the market was thereby foreclosed, the
contracts violated Section 3 of the Clayton Act.'"
Although one might assume initially that Justice Douglas was happy with this
seemingly anti-efficiency result, he was anything but. He cared not a whit about
efficiencies and could not restrain himself from taking a couple of more jabs at the
majority opinion in Columbia Steel, even though the ink was hardly dry on his
dissent there. 536 More to the point. however, he viewed the Court's decision in
Standard Stations to be a formula that ''promises to wipe out large segments of

5311

Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 ( 1977).

511

More recently the Court overtumcd Alhrecht, holding that vertical maximum price
fixing should fall under the rule of reason. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 ( 1997). In doing
so, it eradicated one of the worst antitrust opinions in history. See, e.g., William L. Reynolds
& Spencer Weber Waller. Legal Process and the Past of Antitrust, 48 SMU L. REV. 1811,
1813, 1820 ( 1995) (labeling Alhrecht as "awful" and as "tortur[ing I the concept of agreement
beyond common sense'').
532
His concurrence in Alhrecht, however, is quite confusing. He begins by saying Alhrecht
is a rule of reason case. He then states that "[wjhether an exclusive territorial franchise in a
vertical arrangement is per se unreasonable under the antitrust laws is a much mooted
question." Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 154 ( 1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). He
then notes that the majority "quite properly" refuses to say whether such a vertical restraint in
the newspaper distribution business is illegal. /d.
533

Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-55; Khan, 522 U.S. at 13-15.

534

Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 315 ( 1949)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
mid. at 306-14 (majority opinion).
536

/d. at 318 (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Under the guise of increased efficiency hig
business has received approval for easy growth.") (citing United States v. Columbia Steel Co.,
334 U.S. 495 (1948)).
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independent filling-station operators." 537
According to Douglas, requirements
contracts were necessary to protect small, independent service stations from
"service-station empires" by Standard Oil and other oil companies. 538 He viewed the
requirements contracts as the lesser of two evils and as superior to vertical
integration by the major oil companies because they maintained the viability of the
independent service stations. 539 While he recognized that competition between the
majors would remain if and when they did integrate, he viewed the majority's
holding as simply legitimizing "the growth of bigness." 540
Although Standard Stations is certainly subject to criticism as an anti-efficiency
holding, 541 Justice Douglas' dissent does not stand the test of time. He not only
ignored the potential efficiencies to independent stations, as did the majority, but he
also focused on maintaining the viability of those small independents without any
expressed concern about the impact on consumers. 542
Justice Douglas actually first showed his antipathy for exclusive dealing
arrangements four years earlier when he specially concurred in Associated Press v.
United States. 543 There the Court struck down as an unlawful restraint of trade the
Associated Press bylaws that forbade its 1200 newspaper members from selling news
to non-members and also granted each member veto power over the entry of nonmembers.544 Due to the collective action of AP members through the bylaws, the
537
/d. at 319. See also United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 154
(1948), in which Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, struck down licensing agreements
between motion picture distributors and theatre "circuits" because "they eliminate the
opportunity for the small competitor to obtain the choice first runs, and put a premium on the
size of the circuit. They are, therefore, devices for stifling competition and diverting the
cream of the business to the large operators." /d.
538

Standard Stations, 337 U.S. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

539
Justice Douglas lamented that "[t]he small, independent business man will be
supplanted by clerks." /d. at 321.
540

/d. at 320-21.

541

See, e.g., William B. Lockhart & Howard R. Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors
in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 65
HARV. L. REV. 913,922 (1952).
542Compare Countryman, supra note 88, at 367, arguing that Justice Douglas' dissent in
Standard Stations shows that Douglas was not simply a "hopeless" anti-bigness "doctrinnaire
[sic]." Professor Countryman, a former Justice Douglas law clerk, was regarded, along with
Professor Fred Rodell of Yale, as Douglas' principal academic defender and champion. See
Skeel, supra note 21, at I 105-06; see also Vern Countryman, Scholarship and Common Sense,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1407 (1980); Vern Countryman, Search and Seizure in a Shambles?
Recasting Fourth Amendment Law in the Mold of Justice Douglas, 64 IOWA L. REV. 435
( 1979); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas and Freedom of Expression, 1978 U. ILL L.F. 301
(1978); Vern Countryman, The Contribution of the Douglas Dissents, I0 GA. L. REV. 331
(1976); Vern Countryman, Justice Douglas: Expositor of the Bankruptcy Law, I 6 UCLA L.
REV. 773 (1969); Fred Rodell, Bill Douglas: American, 61 AM. MERCURY 656 ( 1945).
543
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. L 23 (1945) (Douglas, J., concurring).
544
Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, one of the few times he was not on all fours
with Justice Douglas in antitrust cases. /d. at 3 (majority opinion). See also White Motor Co.
v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,275 (1963) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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majority treated the case as a concerted refusal to deal or boycott case, expressly
stating that it involved more than a simple exclusive agreement between two
newspapers or a reporter and a newspaper. 545
In his concurrence, Justice Douglas felt compelled to discuss "the narrow
compass" of the decision "in view of the broader issues which have been injected
into the discussion." 546 His was, in essence, a slippery slope argument. While he
acknowledged that a Seattle newspaper and a New York newspaper could agree to
furnish local news exclusively to each other, he noted that "such an exclusive
arrangement, though innocent standing alone, might be part of a scheme which
would violate the Sherman Act .... " 547 That, he asserted, was what had occurred in
the case before the Court. 548
Five years after Standard Stations, Justice Douglas wrote for a 7-2 majority in
FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 549 a little known and completely
ignored case that is noteworthy only for being one of Justice Douglas' worst
opinions. Motion Picture Advertising was an exclusive dealing case brought under
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In a decision highly suspect by
contemporary exclusive dealing standards, 550 Douglas struck down the exclusive
dealing contracts of an advertising motion picture producer/distributor with
theaters. 551 According to the Court, the defendant had exclusive dealing contracts
with almost forty percent of the theaters in its areas of operation, with the majority of
the contract terms ranging from one to two years. 552 The Court found it significant
that three competing distributors, all separately sued, also did business via exclusive
contracts and that collectively seventy-five percent of available outlets for the films
were under exclusive distribution agreements. 553

545

Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 14.

546

Jd. at 23 (Douglas, J., concurring).

547/d.
548

In so stating, Justice Douglas seemingly downplayed the collective nature of the
restraint while the majority opinion emphasized that without the collective action of the AP
members, a very different case would have presented itself. /d. at 14 (majority opinion).
549

FTC v. Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953 ).

550 See,

e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 486 U.S. 2, 45-46 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 595 (I st
Cir. 1993); Chuck's Feed & Seed Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 810 F.2d 1289 (4th Cir. 1987):
Roland Mach. Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 749 F.2d 380,393 (7th Cir. 1984).
551 Advertising motion pictures were in effect advertisements that theaters ran in addition
to the featured motion picture.
552 Some

contracts ran for up to five years. Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 393.

553 /d. at 395. No conspiracy among the distributors was charged, thus each had to be sued
individually. /d. at 398.
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Justice Frankfurter. who often was at odds with Justice Douglas, vigorously
dissented, joined only by Justice Burton. 555 He characterized the Commission and
the majority's conclusion that the use of exclusive contracts constituted an
unreasonable restraint of trade as "dogmatic" and took issue with Douglas' reliance
upon the seventy-five percent collective market foreclosure absent a Sherman Act
conspiracy or concerted action charge:'56 Lamenting the lack of specificity in the
record, Frankfurter noted that apparently more than one-half of the contracts ran for
only one year. 557 Since the Commission's tinding was directed to exclusive contracts
of more than one year's duration, he concluded that the majority's affirmation of the
Commission was really based on defendant's "hold" over about six percent of the
theaters in the country or about ten percent of the theaters that accepted
advertising. 558
Justice Douglas did not attempt to rely on the Standard Stations case or any other
for that matter. 559 He did note that "[t]he vice of the exclusive contract in this
particular field is in its tendency to restrain competition and to develop a monopoly"
but provided little explanation how either could occur on the facts before the
Court. 560 Instead, in broadly deferring to the FTC's determination of what
constitutes "unfair methods of competition" under Section 5 of the FTC Act,
Douglas provided a misleading summary of the market (without attempting to define
what the market was) and mischaracterized the nature and length of the exclusive
contracts at issue. Indeed, if he was trying to protect some group of competitors, as
was his want, it is unclear who they were-the theaters that had their choice of at
least three other advertising film vendors under one year exclusive agreements and

554

See, e.g .. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). On the
friction and animosity between Justices Douglas and Frankfurter, see, for example. MuRPHY,
supra note 10. at 187, 300-01, PHILLIP J. COOPER. BATTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 25-27,40-41,69-70, 72-73, 80-81, 95, 108-10, 112, 133-35, 145-46
(1995). and BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY. THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 261-68
(1982).
555

Motion Picture Adver., 344 U.S. at 398 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

556

/d. at 399.

557

!d. at 398.

558

ld. at 399. Justice Douglas' forty percent market foreclosure figure was based on the
area in which the defendant did business, which, of course. may or may not have been the
relevant geographic market. /d. at 393 (majority opinion).
559

Justice Frankfurter, however, made a point of differentiating Standard Stations,
pointing out, for example, that the bargaining power of the seller vis-a-vis the buyers in the
two cases varied greatly. In Standard Stations the retail gas stations were dependant on their
supplier for gasoline. In Motion PiCTures Advertising, however, films containing advertising
were not the central business of theaters and accounted for only a small portion of their
revenues. It was thus unlikely that the defendant had any real bargaining power over its
theater customers. /d. at 402 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
560

ld. at 397. There were no allegations of conspiracy among the four advertising film
distributors. There was also a complete lack of relevant market analysis or market !>hare
statistics. In other words. Justice Douglas expected one to take it on faith that exclusive
dealing contracts restrained competition and developed monopoly power.
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that certainly had substantial bargaining power. or perhaps other unnamed
advertising film vendors seeking to break into the market. Either way, consumers, in
this case, moviegoers, were little impacted by which advertisements they had to sit
through to see the movie of their choice. 561
Seven years later Justice Douglas again dissented in an exclusive dealing case,
Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co. 5" 2 This time, however, he disagreed with
the majority's reversal of the lower court's determination that the contracts at issue
were unreasonable restraints of trade. His joint dissent with Justice Black simply
stated that they were of the opinion that the lower courts had gotten it right and thus
should be affirmed. 5(>3
At issue was a requirements contract in which the Nashville Coal Company
entered into a twenty-year agreement to supply an electric utility with its coal
requirements, with a stated minimum. 564 The utility sought declaratory relief but the
Supreme Court viewed the market foreclosure as too insignificant to run afoul of the
rule of reason. even if the relevant line of commerce was bituminous coal. 565 The
lower courts. in contrast had focused on coal consumption in "[p]eninsular Florida,"
700,000 tons previously as opposed to an expected I ,000,000 tons under the
requirements contract at issue, rather than the sources of supply for those needs,
which numbered 700 producers in seven states. 5" 6 Thus, the majority viewed the
market foreclosure from the suppliers' perspective rather than just focusing on the
quantity of the demand.
What, then. were Justices Douglas and Black thinking? Tampa Electric appears
to be an easy case, viewed from forty-plus years forward. Most likely. the justices
were concerned about the foreclosure of rival coal producers from selling to Tampa
Electric for the twenty-year life of the contract. 5" 7 But today the case would likely be
viewed as enhancing efficiency and keeping energy costs down by providing both
seller and buyer with long term market guarantees. Given the very small market
foreclosure, even if coal is considered the relevant product, most antitrust lawyers
would counsel against even bringing the case today.
Three years after Tampa Electric, Justice Douglas was again able to gamer a
majority to protect independent retailers in Simpson v. Union Oil Co. (!f

561

Most, presumably, would have preferred not to sit through any advertising films at all.

562

Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co .. 365 U.S. 320, 335 ( 1961) (Black, J. & Douglas.
J ., dissenting).
563ld.
564

Id. at 321 (majority opinion).

565

Because coal for consumption in Tampa, the location of the utility, came from seven
states, the market foreclosure caused by the requirements contract at issue was less than one
percent. ld. at 333.
566

/d. at 330. The Court noted that coal accounted for less than six percent of the fuel
consumed in Florida (oil and natural gas predominating) but was willing to consider coal as
the relevant line of commerce. Id. at 330. 331 n.8.
567

At least that was the concern of the Sixth Circuit. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 276 F.2d 766, 771 (6th Cir. 1960). That court did recognize that requirements
contracts "may well be of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers." !d.
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Cal({ornia. 568 This time he found consignment sales unlawful. In doing so, he
seemingly overruled a forty-year-old precedent569 and created confusion that the
lower courts are still sorting out. 570
Simpson was a Union Oil retail gas station lessee. It sued, complaining of its
consignment agreement with Union whereby Union set the retail prices of gasoline
consigned to it. In reversing the Court of Appeals, Justice Douglas labeled the
consignment arrangement, coupled with the station lease, "coercive" 571 since it
"depriv[ed] independent dealers of the exercise of free judgment whether to become
consignees at all, or remain consignees, and, in any event, to sell at competitive
prices." 572 Although he recognized that consignments "perform an important
function in trade and commerce,"573 his focus was on the "nominal 'consignees' who
are in reality small struggling competitors seeking retail gas customers."574
In his zeal to protect the independent retailer, Justice Douglas was not put off by
the 1926 United States v. General Electric Co. 575 precedent, which had permitted the
defendant to set prices on consigned goods. While acknowledging that General
Electric was not limited to patented goods, 576 Douglas nonetheless treated General
Electric as if it were and held that it was "not apposite to the special facts here." 577
In dissent, Justice Stewart was dumbfounded, calling Douglas' distinction of
General Electric "specious" and asserting that the majority had in effect overruled a
doctrine that had stood unquestioned for almost forty years. 578 The majority had
56

xSimpson v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).

569

United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926).

5711

See, e.g., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986),
after remand, 889 F.2d 751,752-53 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990); Ryko
Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988).
571

Simpson, 377 U.S. at 17.

572

/d. at 16.

573

/d. at 17.

574

/d. at 21. Justice Douglas also expressed concern that consignment "device" would
result in the fixing of retail prices because of Union's "vast" distribution system. !d.
575

General Electric, 272 U.S. 476.

576

ln General Electric, Chief Justice Taft had specifically held that "[t]he owner of an
article, patented or otherwise, is not violating the common law, or the Anti-Trust law, by
seeking to dispose of his article directly to the consumer and fixing the price by which his
agents transfer the title from him directly to such consumer." !d. at 488.
577

Simpson, 377 U.S. at 23. Specifically, Justice Douglas wrote:
The Court in the General Electric case did not restrict its ruling to patented articles; it,
indeed, said that the use of the consignment device was available to the owners of
articles "patented or otherwise.'' But whatever may be said of the General Electric
case on its special facts, involving patents, it is not apposite to the special facts here.
See also Kauper, supra note 211, at 340 (describing the distinction of General Electric
"far too transparent").
!d.
578

Simpson, 377 U.S. at 30 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart noted that the
existence of a patent had no bearing on whether a consignor can control the price at which a
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taken this drastic step, he noted, even though neither party had challenged the
validity of General Electric in their briefs or oral argument. 579
In retrospect, one can see that the Union Oil Company stood little chance against
Justice Douglas in Simpson. The facts of the case presented a double whammy for
the defendant and allowed Douglas to protect the small business consignee and
restrict the reach of patent-holder rights in one fell swoop. The decision in Simpson
also, as Justice Stewart predicted, 580 created a good deal of uncertainty in the law.
For example, later, after GE's patents had expired, a federal district court held that
the GE consignment system was illegal per se. 5 x1
More recent decisions have focused on language in the original General Electric
582
decision, differentiating between a consignment to a true agent or representative of
the seller and what amounts to a sale of the consigned goods to the consignee at the
time of the consignment. 5x3 More recently, in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp
Electronics Corp., 584 the Supreme Court verified the so-called agency exception to
vertical price fixing's then per se rule, thus giving the lower courts more ammunition
with which to distinguish Simpson. 585

consignee sells because the consignor's right to set the price derives solely from its ownership
of the goods.
579

/d. at 29.

580

/d. at 30.

581

United States v. Gen. Elec. Co .. 358 F. Supp. 731 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).

582

United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476,485 (1926) ('The validity of the Electric
Company's scheme of distribution turns ... on the question of whether the sales are by the
company through its agents to the consumer, or are in fact by the company to the so-called
agents at the time of consignment. The distinction in law and in fact between an agency and a
sale is clear.").
mSee, e.f?., Ill. Corporate Travel, Inc. v. Am. Airlines, 806 F.2d 722, 725 (7th Cir. 1986),
after remand, 889 F.2d 751, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 919 (1990)
(holding travel agents are air carriers' agents. thus carriers' price restrictions are lawful);
Belfiore v. N.Y. Times Co., 826 F.2d 177. 182 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067
( 1988) (finding consignment where publisher paid newspaper distributors on a per paper sold
basis and picked up unsold newspapers the following day); Kowalski v. Chi. Tribune Co., 854
F.2d 168 (7th Cir. 1988); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1224 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1026 ( 1988) (finding consignment for independent distributor which
sold custom made car washes); Morrison v. Murray Biscuit Co., 797 F.2d 1430 (7th Cir. 1986)
(holding consignment "exception" should apply only if manufacturer bears an unusually high
proportion of the risk of nonsale).
584

Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 733 (1988) (per se vertical
pricing fixing rule "does not apply to restrictions on price to be charged by one who is in
reality an agent of ... the manufacturer").
585

Lower courts had long found that Simpson did not outlaw purported consignments in
large distribution networks as long as an actual agent was utilized. See, e.f?., Mesirow v.
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 703 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 820 (1983);
Hardwick v. Nu-Way Oil Co., 589 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1979), rehearing denied, 592 F.2d
1190 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 836 ( 1979); Pogue v. lnt'l Indus., Inc., 524 F.2d
342 (6th Cir. 1975).
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In Simpson, Justice Douglas did recognize the agency distinction ~ but failed to
emphasize it and obfuscated the issue by focusing on the coercive element of Union
Oil's consignments to its dealers. 587 Arguably the Justice's antipathy toward the
rights of patent holders unduly influenced his dismissal of General Electric.
Ironically, Douglas could more easily have avoided limiting General Electric to
patent holders and achieved the same result in Simpson because General Electric
does require a real agency for antitrust immunity, a requirement that was not present
in Simpson.
Instead Justice Douglas took on General Electric even though that decision
588
expressly failed to limit its holding to consignments involving patents.
Thus,
Douglas' handling of Simpson suggests more than bias but perhaps intellectual
dishonesty. 589 He certainly understood that he could achieve the result he desired
without limiting General Electric, but that would eliminate the opportunity presented
to take a swipe at the scope of intellectual property rights for which he had such
disdain.scJo
586
0ne who sends a rug or a painting or other work of art to a merchant or a gallery for
sale at a minimum price can, of course, hold the consignee to the bargain ... When,
however, a 'consignment' device is used to cover a vast gasoline distribution system,
fixing prices through many retail outlets, the antitrust laws prevent calling the
"consignment" an agency ....
Simpson. 377 U.S. at 18, 21.
587
Justice Douglas provides little guidance about what constitutes coercion. stating that "it
matters not what the coercive device is." !d. at 17. Although Simpson seems to leave open the
potential for a finding of :my supplier's attempt to impose prices on a consignee as coercive,
the lower federal courts have tended to distinguish Simpson on the coercion issue. See. e.g.,
Mesirow, 703 F.2d 339, cert denied. 464 U.S. 820. See also Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of
Vertical Restraints Doctrine. 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 535 ( 1989); Rogers, supra note 527, at
514-15.

588
Meaning presumably, as Justice Stewart pointed out in dissent, that General Electric
would seem to apply to consignments of non-patented goods.
5 9

~ See William F. Baxter. The Viability of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 75 CAL. L. REV.
933, 935 ( 1987) (stating that the Court in Simpson eliminated the agency device, and
characterizing the decision as ''one of the most dishonest opinions of all time in a field with
many serious contenders ... "); Kauper, supra note 211, at 340 (Simpson used as illustration
of a decision which "lacked candor"). Recent evidence documents that Justice Douglas was
less than veracious in his personal life, often embellishing or even fabricating events,
including exaggerating his academic record at Columbia In fact, late in his life, his Columbia
classmates began referring to the Justice as "the Approximate Mr. Justice Douglas" due to his
penchant for chauging his own history, including his supposed class rank. See, e.g., MURPHY.
supra note 10. at 474.
590

ln :m earlier concurrence, Justice Douglas had advocated overruling General Electric.
United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 316 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring)("'
would be nd of United States v. General Electric Co. My reasons for overruling it start with
the Constitution itself."). Taking the easier course in Simpson may have also reduced the
likelihood of defections among his brethren, such as occurred with Justices Stewart, Brennan
and Goldberg. For a far less controversial distinction of General Electric by Justice Douglas,
see United Swtes l'. Masonite Corp .. 316 U.S. 265, 276-81 (1942) (licensing agreements
among patent holders, which restricted price competition, was not protected by General
r)el"tric).
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Simpson is a triumph of competition policy against both intellectual and common
law property rights. 591 Irrespective of the wisdom of that, the problem, as with most
of Justice Douglas' antitrust work, is that the competition policy Simpson sets forth
is anti-consumer and indeterminate at best and incoherent at worst. 592
Justice Douglas seemingly painted the Warren Court into a corner in the now
overruled Schwinn decision, in which the Court reasserted the importance of title in
antitrust analysis, distinguishing between bicycles consigned and sold to authorized
dealers."'' The former was to be judged under the rule of reason because of the
constraints of the ancient rule against alienation while the latter was judged to be
inherently anticompetitive and per se illegal. But what of Simpson, decided only
three years earlier? The majority, in an opinion written by Douglas protege Abe
Fortas and joined by Douglas. virtually ignored it, citing it only for the proposition
that "unreasonably restrictive" agencies or consignments violate Section 1. 594
In sum, one can only conclude that Justice Douglas' impact in the vertical
restraints area has been almost completely erased. Happily, the Court overruled
Albrecht in its Khan decision, which instituted the rule of reason for maximum resale
price maintenance. More recently, the Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc. v. PSKS. li1c., 5"5 did away with the per se rule for resale price minimums and
overruled Dr. Miles, another Douglas favorite. On the negative side, his opinion in
Simpson remains as a potential significant roadblock to modern antitrust analysis.
One might point to his White Motor decision as having a continuing impact, as it is
often cited for the proposition that courts should not too quickly adopt per se rules.
It does not withstand contemporary scrutiny, however, because Douglas avoided the
per se rule only to protect the viability of small companies. And in Tampa Electric,
the one other Warren Court decision in the vertical restraints arena that retains
modern vitality, he dissented and voted for liability on facts that today likely would
not survive a motion to dismiss.

XIII. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
Justice Douglas' term on the Supreme Court virtually paralleled the first forty
years of the Robinson-Patman Act. which was passed in 1936 as an amendment to
the Clayton Act. 596 Critics have long criticized the Act, which prohibits price
discrimination in certain scenarios, as a protectionist measure similar to the

591
Sec PFRITZ, supra note 47. at 204 (by elevating competitiOn over the right of
consignment, the Court "shook loose a cornerstone of common-law property rights secure for
three hundred years ... ").

5 2
" See,
593

e.g .. Rogers, supra note 527. at 515.

United States

V.

Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).

594
/d. at 380. Neither opinion contained any market analysis. Schwinn made no effort to
distinguish Simpson on its facts (e.g. the relevance of the lack of coercion) and thus Simpson
remained an indeterminate precedent. For criticism of that aspect of Schwinn, see for example
Kauper, supra note 211, at 340-41 (Simpson and White Motor were "treated in an almost
inexplicable manner in Schwinn."). See also Page. supra note 33, at 34.
5 5
" Leegin
596

Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc .. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007).

15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976).
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discarded fair trade laws. 597 Even more criticism has been levied at the interpretation
and enforcement of the Act, beginning with the FTC and ending with the Supreme
Court."J 8
Unsurprisingly, since the Act favors small, independent businesses, Justice
Douglas was a strident advocate of its enforcement and always sided with the
government or plaintiff. For example, Justice Douglas voted with the majority in the
heavily criticized Utah Pie decision 599 which protected a local company with a nearly
dominant market share against larger companies seeking to enter the local market.
In doing so, the Court equated below cost pricing with the predatory intent requisite
to establish primary line, i.e., seller, injury but gave no guidance as to how one
would determine '"cost." 600 Earlier, Justice Douglas was also in the majority in FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 601 a controversial decision in which the Court ruled that a price
discrimination affecting competing buyers was in essence prima facie evidence of
competitive injury to the disfavored buyer. 602
Of course, the Robinson-Patman Act did provide a ready-made platform for
Justice Douglas to pontificate about the rights of small business and the evils of
monopoly power. For example, he vigorously dissented in Automatic Canteen Co. v.

597
In general, the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits price discrimination, which often harms
smaller buyers and disallows volume discounts that cannot be cost justified. As such, it tends
to "protect" the small, independent purchaser of commodities against the buying power of
large chain stores. See generally ROGERS, ET AL., supra note 106. at 1177-80; BORK, supra
note 454, at 382-40]; EARL W. KINTNER, A ROBINSON-PATMAN PRIMER 8-11 (2d ed.1979);
FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 3-11
(1962); CORWIN EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 2-5 (1959).

598

See, e.g., 1 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No.4, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, 3 (1980); Edward F. Howrey, et al., The
Robinson-Patman Act: How-Not Whether-It Should Be Amended, 22 REC. N.Y.C. B.A. 621
( 1967); Philip Elman, The Robinson-Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for
Reappraisal, 42 WASH. L. REV. I ( 1966); Davis W. Morton, Jr. & Albert H. Cotton, The
Robinson-Patman Act-Antitrust or Anti-Consumer, 37 MINN. L. REV. 227 (1953): Frederick
M. Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competition, and Confitsion, 60 YALE L.J. 929 (1951).
599

Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 ( 1967).

60

°For criticisms of Utah Pie, see Daniel J. Gifford, Primary-Line Injury Under the
Robinson-Patman Act: The Development of Standards and the Erosion of Enforcement, 64
MINN. L. REV. I (1979), Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, Utah Pie and the
Consequences of Robinson-Patman, 21 J.L. & EcoN. 427 (1978), and Ward Bowman,
Restraint of Trade by the Supreme Court: The Utah Pie Case, 77 YALE L.J. 70 ( 1967).
601

FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 ( 1948).

602

At issue were discounts in salt given to grocery chains that purchased large quantities.
The Court affirmed the FTC's finding of proof of a reasonable probability of competitive
injury even though salt purchases and sales made up a very small portion of a grocery store's
business. ld. at 48-49. For a more contemporary applications of the Morton Salt rule, see
Coastal Fuels of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Caribbean Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 191-93 (1st
Cir. 1996), Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421. 1447. n.l8 (9th Cir. 1995),
and Stelwagon Manufacturing Co. v. Tarmac Roofing Systems, Inc., 63 F.3d 1267, 1271 (3d
Cir. 1995). See also Paul H. LaRue, The Rubinson-Patman Act in the Twentv-First Centurv:
Will the Morton Salt Rule Be Retired?, 48 SMU L. REV. 1917 ( 1995 ).
.
.
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FTC, 603 a case in which the majority restricted the reach of Section 2(f) of the Act,
which makes it illegal for a buyer to knowingly induce or receive illegal price
discrimination. 604 The Court held that the Section 2(f) knowledge requirement meant
that the favored buyer must know that the lower price it induced or received was not
cost justified for a violation to occur. 605 It further held that evidence that the favored
buyer knew that its price was lower was not sufficient to shift the burden of proof to
the buyer to prove the seller's cost justification or other defenses. 606
Justice Douglas emphatically disagreed both as a matter of statutory
interpretation and as a matter of policy. 607 In his view the majority was, in essence,
catering to the ability of large buyers to coerce suppliers into granting discriminatory
low prices. 608 He noted that "[t]here is no doubt that the large buyers wield clubs that
give them powerful advantages over the small merchants." 609 He believed that the
language of Section 2(f) as well as the legislative history required that the
"bludgeon[ing]" buyer "show that the privileges he demanded had cost
justifications. " 610
Justice Douglas also published a concurring opinion in United States v. Borden
Co., 611 a case in which the Court significantly narrowed the application of the cost
justification defense by requiring the showing of actual cost differences to justify
price discrimination. According to Douglas, however, the majority had not gone far
enough. He believed that when no centralized purchasing by a large price favored
chain was involved, cost differentials could be justified only on a store-by-store
basis. 612 "Otherwise those with the most prestige get the largest discounts and the
independent merchants are more and more forced to the wall." 613
Justice Douglas went on to say that the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act is
"to control practices that lead to a monopoly and an impoverishment of our middle
class."614 He viewed restricting the cost justification defense as necessary to
"preserve ... as much of our traditional free enterprise as possible" because "[f]ree

603

Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).

604

! 5 U.S.C. § I 3(f) (1976).

605

0r, in Justice Frankfurter's famous double negative, "not known by him not to be
within one of those defenses." Automatic Canteen Co., 346 U.S. at 74.
606

/d. at 78-79.

607

/d. at 82 (Douglas, J .. dissenting) (joined by Justices Black and Reed).

608

!d. at 83-84.

609

/d. at 84.

610

He thought it unfair that. as mandated by the majority, the FTC was obliged to prove
that the price discrimination was not cost justified as well as "what lay in the buyer's mind."
!d. at 85.
611

United States v. Borden Co., 370 U.S. 460 (1962).

612

/d. at 475 (Douglas, J.. concurring).

613/d.
614/d.
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enterprise is not free when monopoly power is used to breed more monopoly."615 In
his view, price discounts and price cutting led to "the aggrandizement of power by
the chains and the ploughing under of the independents. The antitrust laws ... were
designed to avert such an inquest on free enterprise."616
Thus, Justice Douglas' concurrence in Borden succinctly summarized much of
his views of antitrust policy. It displayed his antithesis and perhaps paranoia to even
the idea of monopoly power. irrespective of any market share data or any factual
basis to support such a claim. 617 Likewise, his zeal to protect small business
overshadowed any recognition that price discounts potentially benefit consumers and
may simply be indicia of vigorous price competition. 618
Somewhat surprisingly, given his position in Morton Salt and later in Automatic
Canteen and Borden, Justice Douglas joined the majority in the 1951 Standard Oil
Co. v. FTC decision, 614 in which a divided Court ruled that the "good faith" standard
of the Act's meeting competition defense 620 provided an absolute defense rather than
merely a rebuttable presumption. The decision broadened the defense considerably
and cleared up confusion from the earlier FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co. decision, 621 in
which the Court was unclear whether "good faith" was a substantive or procedural
requirement. 622 Douglas also was with the majority in FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 623 a
decision, however, that restricted the meeting competition defense to meeting the
price of the discriminating seller's competitor. 624
In Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 625 Justice Douglas objected to what he
perceived was the narrowing of the right of private enforcement of the RobinsonPatman Act, leading a four-justice dissent over the question of whether a private

615/d.
616

/d. at 475-76.

617

The Borden opinion is devoid of any market share data for the favored or disfavored
groceries. It does state that the A&P and Jewel chains had 254 stores combined, compared to
1,322 independent stores, and that the defendant's volume discounts in favor of the chains,
created two classes of customers. ld. at 465.
618
0f course, the Robinson-Patman Act is designed to do just that: protect small business
against price competition. Lower prices are actually made illegal if the product of a price
discrimination competitively injures a disfavored buyer.
619

Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 (1951).

620

15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976).

621

FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1945). Justice Douglas was in the
majority of the 7-0 decision with Justice Jackson concurring in the result without an opinion.
622

See 1 MONOGRAPH No.4, supra note 598, at 119.

623

FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 ( 1963).

624

The Sun Oil decision held that the meeting competition defense does not enable a seller
to reduce its price for one buyer to enable that buyer to meet the lower price of one of its
competitors. Rather, the Court concluded "that [Section]2(b) of the Act contemplates that the
lower price which must be met by one who would discriminate must be the lower price of his
own competitor .... " !d. at 529.
625

Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co .. 355 U.S. 373 ( 195R).
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right of action accrued under Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act for violations of
Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act. 626 The majority held that Section 3, which
criminalized price discriminations when "an unreasonably low price'' and predatory
intent are involved, was separate and apart from the rest of the Robinson-Patman
Act, which was an amendment to the Clayton Act. 627 Since the private rights of
action under Sections 4 and 16 accrue only for violations of the Sherman and
Clayton Acts, those sections did not apply to the stand-alone Section 3 of the
Robinson-Patman Act. 62 x
Justice Douglas in dissent disagreed with the majority's reading of the legislative
history of the Act, particularly since the type of price discrimination targeted under
Section 3 is more onerous than that of Section 2(a) for which the treble damage
remedy certainly applies. 629 He lamented, further, that the Court's decision
effectively repealed Section 3, since the Department of Justice had never attempted
to enforce the criminal statute. He was. it turns out, pretty much correct. 630
During his long tenure, Justice Douglas also joined the majority in two cases
which assured a liberal application of Sections 2(d) and 2(f) of the Act, which
prohibit sellers from discriminatorily providing buyers with advertising allowances
or sales promotional services. 631 In FTC v. Hent)' Broch & Co., 632 however. Douglas
wrote for a 5-4 majority and, perhaps to gain that slim majority, greatly narrowed
Section 2(c) of the Act. which outlaws the so-called "dummy" brokerage practices of
large buyers who would allegedly refuse to deal through independent brokers or
middlemen. 613
The section was designed to deal with situations in which a seller paid a
brokerage fee to an intermediary controlled by the buyer or allowed a direct buyer a
discount because a broker's services were not utilized. 634 Prior to the Henry Broch &
626
627

15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).

Nashville Milk, 355 U.S. at 377.

628

/d. at 378-79. Section 3 was originally the Borah-Van Nuys Bill which was introduced
by opponents of the Robinson-Patman Act in an effort to logjam its passage. The Senate
tacked the bills together and passed both. However, Section 3 was not made part of the
Clayton Act, perhaps because it is a criminal statute and thus enforceable only by the Justice
Department, whereas the DOJ and FTC otherwise have joint enforcement responsibilities for
the Clayton Act. See RoGERS, ET AL., supra note 106, at 1288-89.
629

Nashville Milk, 355 U.S. at 383-84 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

630

The Department of Justice did pursue one Section 3 case to the Supreme Court, where
the statute withstood a challenge that it was unconstitutionally vague. United States v. Nat'!
Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963). Justice Douglas voted with the 6-3 majority. Since
National Dairy, the DOJ has not attempted to enforce the criminal statute.
631 See

FTC v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 390 U.S. 341 (1968) (a supplier dealing with large
retailers and wholesalers, who in tum sell to small retailers, must still treat all retailers
equally); FTC v. Simplicity Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959) (cost justification not an available
defense for Sections 2(d) and (e)).
632

FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960).

633

15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).

634 See,

e.g., 2 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH NO.4, THE
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT: POLICY AND LAW, 32 (1983); KINTNER, supra note 597, at 206-07.
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Co. decision, lower courts tended to read the seemingly absolute language of Section
2(c) quite literally to operate as a total ban on brokerage payments or discounts to a
middleman who had any relationship with the other side of the transaction. 635
In a confusing and poorly drafted opinion, Justice Douglas ruled in Henry Brach
& Co. that Section 2(c) was violated by a broker reducing its commission to secure a
sale at a reduced price when a manufacturer would not otherwise agree to a buyer's
price. 636 He noted that Section 2(c) was designed to prohibit large buyers from
receiving allowances for cost savings in distribution because they often dealt directly
with the seller and did not need brokerage services. 637 Even acknowledging potential
cost savings, he ruled out application of the cost justification defense. 638 Douglas did
state, however, that "we would have quite a different case" if there was evidence that
the buyer had rendered actual services to the seller or to the broker to gain a reduced
brokerage charge. 639 He also limited the holding to situations in which a seller's
broker accepts a reduced commission in order to obtain a "particular" order. 640
Although Justice Douglas may have won the Henry Brach & Co. battle, in doing
so he appears to have lost the Section 2(c) war. Intentionally or not, the case called
into question earlier decisions, with the result that both the courts and the FTC have
severely limited the reach of the statute. 641 Also, the viability of the provision as a
part of the price discrimination law has been called into question. 642 Today, the
courts have expanded the "for services rendered" exception to Section 2(c),643 pretty

635

See, e.g., Modem Marketing Serv., Inc. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970, 978 (7th Cir. 1945);
Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, 150 F.2d 607 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 326 U.S. 774 (1945);
Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 625 (1939);
Oliver Bros., v. FTC, 102 F.2d 763 (4th Cir. 1939); Biddle Purchasing Co. v. FTC, 96 F.2d
687 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 634 (1938).
636

Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. at 171-72.

637

/d. at 176.

638/d.
639

/d. at 173.

640

/d. at 176. The dissent would have restricted Section 2(c) even further and argued that a
seller's broker who has agreed on a general commission rate should be able to renegotiate the
rate with his principal to effect a sale that would otherwise be lost. /d. at 177 (Whitaker, J.,
dissenting). See also KINTNER, supra note 597, at 209. The dissent position has become the
law as the courts have, post-Henry Brach & Son, substantially narrowed Section 2(c). See
supra text accompanying notes 613-19.
641

See, e.g., Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068
(1983); Central Retailer-Owned Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1963);
Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
642

See 2 MONOGRAPH No. 4, supra note 588, at 34; see also James F. Rill, Brokerage
Under the Robinson-Patnum Act: Towards a New Certaintv, 41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 337
(1966).
"
643

See, e.g., Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 982 (1979); Central Retailer-Owner Grocers, Inc. v. FTC, 319 F.2d 410 (7th Cir.
1963); Thomasville Chair Co. v. FTC, 306 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1962).
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much limiting the statute to situations involving so-called "dummy" brokerages 64 "
and in a few instances, commercial bribery."45
Thus, there is more than a little irony stemming from Henry Broch & Co., for it
gave life to the services rendered proviso of Section 2(c). Arguably, it also, because
"its meaning was obscured by the many internal inconsistencies in the opinion," 646
provided ample interpretative fodder for the FfC and the courts seeking to limit the
admittedly anti-consumer reach of Section 2(c). Justice Douglas ended up writing
the watershed opinion for narrowing Section 2(c), a provision designed to protect
small businesses against the power of large buyers, irrespective of lower prices or
cost savings. 047 It is probably not what he intended.
Overall, Justice Douglas' Robinson-Patman legacy is one of expansive
interpretation and application. His record is not surprising, given that the Act is
designed to protect small, independent businesses against the discriminatory pricing
practices of large sellers and buyers. He apparently was unmindful that prohibitions
on price discrimination interfere with the price mechanism which he otherwise
sought so to protect. 648 He also was not troubled by the potential harm to consumers
that the outlawing of price discriminations brings. 649

644
A dummy brokerage typically involves actual unearned brokerage payments to a buyer
through a fictitious or shell broker set up by the buyer. See, e.g., Gibson v. FTC, 682 F.2d 554
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. I 068 ( 1983 ); Burge v. Bryant Public School District of
Saline County, 658 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1981 ); Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills,
Inc., 713 F. Supp. 937 (E.D. Va. 1989).

645

Commercial bribery in this context generally involves payment of a secret commission
to an employee of a purchaser or to a state purchasing agent. See, e.g., Harris v. Duty Free
Shoppers Ltd., 940 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir. 1991 ); Grace v. E.J. Kozin Co., 538 F.2d 170 (7th Cir.
1976 ); Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965). cert. denied. 383
U.S. 936 (1966). Of course. whether commercial bribery should be part of the price
discrimination law is questionable. See Keller W. Allen & Meriwether D. Williams.
Commercial Brihery. Antitrust Injury and Section 2(c) of' the Rohinson-Patman AntiDiscrimination Act, 26 GoNz. L. REV. 16 7 ( 1990-91 ).
646
KINTNER, supra note 597. at 210. For other criticisms of Henry Brach & Co, sec
FREDERICK ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 330 ( 1962).
Rill, supra note 642, Note. Beleaguered Brokers: The Evisceration ~~l Section 2(c) of the
Rohinson-Patman Act, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1308 (1964). and Carl W. Scwarz, Note, Un{air
Trade Practices-Robinson- Patman Act-Savings Realized on Salesmen's Commissions
Cognizable Under Section 2( c), 30 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 137 (1961 ).
647

See 2 MONOGRAPH No.4, supra note 588. at 38.

648

In United States v. Socony- Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), discussed in Antitrust
Monograph, supra note 547. at ch. 4, Justice Douglas made known his opposition to any
interference with the free market's determination of price, whether direct or indirect. Of
course, a prohibition on price discrimination does interfere with price, to the detriment of the
favored purchasers, since it renders illegal certain price discounts which the market would
otherwise allow.
649
Theoretically, at least, a favored purchaser may pass along some or all of the savings
occasioned by the price discount it receives in order sell more of goods. Consumers, thus,
may benefit from a price discrimination just as they do from any lower price. The prohibiting
of price discrimination often results in higher prices to buyers who would otherwise be
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Recent Supreme Court interpretations have attempted to reconcile the RobinsonPatman Act with a consumer welfare antitrust model, focusing on competition rather
than competitors. 650 As a result, the interpretation of the Act has narrowed and it has
become significantly more difficult to prevail against an alleged price discriminator.
Justice Douglas would certainly not approve. One can just imagine his reaction to
the Wal-Marts and CostCos of the marketplace, particularly in smaller towns and
cities where the locally owned retailers have been squeezed out of business and the
town squares are largely boarded up. The fact that consumers in small town America
have a far greater choice of goods and services at lower prices would probably not
appease him.
XIV.

ANTITRUST AND THE REGULATED ECONOMY

The tension between antitrust law and governmental regulation of portions of the
economy created real conflict for New Dealers like Justice Douglas, who believed
stridently in both the antitrust laws as the guardian of our free market economy and
government regulation as a cure-all for aberrations in that economy. Congress
typically refrained from granting explicit antitrust immunity from regulated sectors
and gave little or no guidance about the continuing reach or role of antitrust in those
areas, in effect leaving those questions to the judiciary. 651
Not surprisingly, given realist judges, little congressional direction <Jnd
cont1icting values, the results seem inconsistent. For example, as noted in Part X,
Justice Douglas and his brethren seemingly emasculated the Bank Merger Act of
1966. which Congress, in the wake of several controversial Supreme Court decisions
involving bank mergers, passed to curtail antitrust scrutiny of bank mergers."" 2 In
Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., however, Douglas, writing for a sixjustice majority, held that Toolco's agreement to acquire control of TWA was
immune from antitrust review because the acquisition had been approved by the
Civil Aeronautics Board pursuant to the board's authority under the Federal Aviation
Act.6s3
favored and thus may affirmatively harm consumers who do not benefit from prices which
would otherwise be lower.
650

See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC. Inc., 546 U.S. 164, 181 (2006)
("[W]e ... resist interpretation geared more to the protection of existing competitors than to
the stimulation of competition ... [W]e continue to construe the act 'consistently with broader
policies of the antitrust laws."') (quoting Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Corp.,
509 U.S. 209, 220 (1993)). See also Falls City Indus. v. Vanco Beverage, Inc., 460 U.S. 428
(1983); J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557 (1981 ); Great At!. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. FTC, 440 U.S. 69,80 n.l3 (1979); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co .. 438 U.S. 422
(1978). Cf Texaco, Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 496 U.S. 543 (1990).
651

See generally Jerome Shuman, The Application of' the Antitrust Laws to Regulated
Industries, 44 TENN. L. REV. I, 20-28 ( 1976).
See United States v. First City Bank of Hou~ton, 386 U.S. 361 ( 1967); United States v.
Third Nat'! Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); see also supra text accompanying notes
402-13.
652

653

Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973). See also Sunshine
Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940) (where Justice Douglas, writing for an 81 majority, ruled that Congress' grant of rate-making authority to the National Bituminous
Coal Commission exempted its rates from antitrust scrutiny). "Certainly what Congress has
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In Hughes Tool, Justice Douglas gave deference to the CAB's determination that
the acquisition was in the public interest. 654 Conversely, in First Cit\' Bank of
Houston. Justice Douglas held that judicial review of the Comptroller of Currency's
finding of public interest must be de novo and, further. that the merging banks bore
the burden to establish the defense. 655
Justice Douglas' general view, shared by his Warren Court brethren, was that
"[i]mmunity from the antitrust laws is not lightly implied."656 In California v.
Federal Power Commission, he applied that notion to dueling administrative and
judicial proceedings. There, writing for a 5-2 majority, 657 Douglas ruled that the
Federal Power Commission must stay its consideration on the merits of a merger
application under the National Gas Act in deference to a pending antitrust challenge
in federal court. Since the Federal Power Commission, unlike other agencies, was
not specifically authorized to enforce Section 7 of the Clayton Act, Douglas held that
it must defer to an antitrust suit. 65 ~
Justice Douglas, again writing for the Court, reached the same conclusion in
Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, a case involving a power company's refusal to
sell power to municipal utilities. 659 The defendant as~erted that since the Federal
Power Commission had the statutory authority to compel involuntary
interconnections of power under the Federal Power Act, it should be immune from
antitrust scrutiny. 660 The Court. per Douglas, dismissed that argument, pointing to
Congress' rejection of a pervasive regulatory scheme under the Act in favor of
voluntary decision-making about connections with other systems. 061 According to
forbidden by the Sherman Act it can modify. It may do so. by placing the machinery of pricctixing in the hands of public agencies." /d. at 396.
654

Hughes Tool Co., 409 U.S. at 382.

655

First City Bank ofHouston, 386 U.S. at 366-70.

656

Cal. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 4S5 ( 1962). See also Otter Tail Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321.
350 (1963); Silver v. N.Y.S.E., 373 U.S. 341. 357 (1963); Milk Producers Ass'n v. United
States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
657

Fed. Power Conun 'n, 369 U.S. 482. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dis,ented
while Justices Frankfurter and White did not participate. /d.
658

/d. at 486. He reached this conclusion even though Section 7 of the Clayton Act did
provide that "Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly consummated
pursuant to authority given hy the ... Federal Power Commission ... under any statutory
provision vesting such power in such Commission," since that "was plainly not a grant of
power to adjudicate antitmst issues." Not surprisingly, Justice Harlan strongly disagreed.
asserting that the majority had "in effect, transfer[ed] to the Antitrust Division ... regulatory
functions entrusted to administrative agencies .... " It did so, according to Harlan, "without
ad vetting to any legal principle or statute to support its decision" but by "lay[ ing] down a
pervasive rule born by its own abstract notions of 'what orderly procedure' requires.'· /d. at
491 (Harlan, .1 •• dissenting).
659

0tter Tail, 410 U.S. 366 (! 973).

660

/d. at 373.

661

/d. at 374. He also noted the lack of any legislative history which would support the
granting of antitrust immunity. !d. at 373-74.
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Douglas, when power companies' interconnection decisions are governed initially by
their own business judgments, rather than regulatory coercion, "courts must be
hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the fundamental national
policies embodied in the antitrust laws." 662
As illustrated by Cal(fornia v. Federal Power Commission and Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States, the Warren and early Burger Courts usually declined to defer
antitrust adjudication to administrative or regulatory action, unless it found the
agency's authority pervasive enough to preempt antitrust law. 660 Justice Douglas,
however, was less likely to defer to regulatory schemes than his brethren,
particularly in instances in which the Court found that the regulatory control was
sufficient to provide the relevant agency with primary but not exclusive
jurisdiction. 664 For example, he dissented in Far East Conference v. United States, 665
a case in which the Court ordered the dismissal of a government enforcement suit
brought before the Federal Maritime Board, which had considered the legality of
steamship companies' dual system of rates. 666
The majority's view was that in cases requiring administrative discretion or not
involving facts within the normal experience of judges "agencies created by
Congress for regulating the subject matter [rates] should not be passed over." 667
According to Justice Douglas, however, the government should be able to proceed
on its antitrust challenge because the Federal Maritime Board had never approved
the dual rate agreement, only a more general agreement that the Conference would
adopt a tariff of rates. 668 In his view, the Conference was "operat[ing] outside the
law not only because they have failed to submit their schedule of rates to the Board
but also because the rates adopted would, if approved, be illegal."669
In Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, Justice
Douglas again took issue with the majority's assessment of a regulatory agency's

662

/d. at 374.

663

See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973); see also Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963); Gordon v. N.Y.S.E. 422 U.S.
659 (1975); United States v. Nat'! Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
664

But cf. Epstein, supra note 63. Writing in 1949, Epstein stated that "it is not entirely
impossible that Justice Douglas' concern for anti-trust law enforcement is merely an
expression of a desire to have the government regulate business in whatever way happened to
be available at the moment." /d.
665

Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1951 ).

666

The Far East Conference was made up of steamship companies engaged in outbound
Far East shipping. They had established a dual rate system which charged shippers a lower
rate if they agreed to use exclusively the bottoms of the steamships. /d. at 572.
667

/d. at 574.

66

Rif the Board had approved the dual rates in compliance with the Shipping Act, Justice
Douglas acknowledged that it would have exclusive jurisdiction and the rates would be
immune from the Sherman Act. /d. at 578 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
669

/d. at 579. The steamship companies were "therefore, tlout[ing] the law as plainly as if
they used rates that had been disapproved by the Board." !d.
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dispute with a regulated entity, here a public power utility. 670 The case is perhaps
mostly notable for being one of the very few times that Justices Douglas and Black
disagreed in a case involving antitrust issues. 671 It involved the FPC's order to Penn
Water & Power Company to reduce its rates in response to complaints by Maryland
officials that Penn Water had been gouging a purchaser utility in Maryland. Penn
Water alleged that the order required it to continue performing a contract illegal
under the Sherman Act. 6 n The Court refused to set aside the Commission's order,
holding that the agency was merely acting under its ratemaking authority and was
not compelling Penn Water & Power to perform illegal contracts. 673 According to
Black, the plaintiff was attempting to use the Sherman Act to nullify a rate reduction
order issued under the FPC's authorized regulatory power. 674
Justice Douglas saw the issue quite differently, stating that "[t]here is lawless
conduct that overshadows the evils of extortionate rates." 675 The contract that
eliminated competition between the two public utilities was a "greater evil" than
"[t]he desire to reduce excessive rates." 676 According to Douglas, the FPC had
approved and thus sought to perpetuate an "unholy alliance" between the utilities. 677
While the Court in Pennsylvania Water & Power thought that the FPC was doing
its job in reducing excessive rates, Justice Douglas believed that the majority was
missing the forest for the trees. He would have imposed on the regulatory agency
not only the job of benefiting consumers by lowering rates but, presumably, also of
untangling the underlying "unholy alliance" contract that divided markets. 67 x It was
not enough that regulatory agencies they regulated rates; in his view they should also
assure that the competition was alive and well within their regulated sphere.
Justice Douglas also dissented in Ricci v. Chicw;o Mercantile Exchange, a 5-4
decision in which the Court ruled that antitrust proceedings should be stayed pending
the Commodity Exchange Commission's review of the respondent's allegedly

670

Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm"n, 343 U.S. 414 ( 1952).

671

Justice Black wrote the opinion for the six justice majority while Justice Douglas was
joined in dissent by Justice Reed. Justice Frankfurter was ill and did not participate. !d. at
424.
672
Apparently Penn Water's contract with the Maryland public utility, Consolidated Gas
Electric Light and Power Company of Baltimore, divided markets and insured that the two
would not be in direct competition. See Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Consol. Gas, Elec., Light &
Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir. 1950).
673

Pa. Water, 343 U.S. at421-22.

674

/d. at 424.

675

/d. (Douglas. J., dissenting).

676

/d. at 424-25.

677

/d. at 425-26.

6

nOr at a minimum Justice Douglas believed the Commission should not act to indirectly
support a private restraint of trade. He would have reversed and remanded the case to the
Commission "with directions that the Commission build its rate order on the powers that it has
under the Federal Power Act. not on the unholy alliance that these utilities created and that the
Commission has sought to perpetuate." !d. at 426.
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unlawful conduct. 67 ~ He joined Justice Marshall's four-justice dissent and added an
additional statement of his own.(' 80 Marshall would have struck the balance between
administrative and judicial proceedings in favor of immediate court action when a
private plaintiff had uncertain access to the administrative process. 681 Douglas added
that he would tip the scales even more toward judicial action, particularly when the
administrative agency, as in the case at hand, has not acted to enforce the alleged
wrongdoing on its own. 682
Much earlier in De Beers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, Justice
Douglas had objected to the Court's overturning of a preliminary injunction granted
by a district court against foreign defendants charged by the Justice Department with
a conspiracy to restrain trade and monopolize gem and industrial diamonds. 681 The
injunction forbade the seven corporate defendants from removing, transferring, or
selling any assets located within the United States during the pendency of the
litigation.
The five-justice majority viewed the injunction as an unlawful
sequestration of defendants' property prior to the entry of ajudgment. 684
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black, Murphy ahd Rutledge, objected to the
Court's hearing of what he termed an interlocutory appeal. 685 He could see no
extraordinary circumstances warranting the taking of the appeal, characterizing the
actual hardship upon the defendants from the issuance of the injunction as "no more
than the cost of procuring of a bond." 686 One would doubt whether Douglas would
have supported a similar injunction if issued against small U.S. companies struggling
to compete but nonetheless the target of an antitrust suit. It is hard to imagine that he
would have then hidden behind a procedural disinclination to hear interlocutory
appeals when the effective sequestration of property prior to judgment was at issue.
But he did not see a problem in an antitrust enforcement action against foreign
defendants.
Thus, even more than the hawkish Warren Court, Justice Douglas favored
generous application of the antitrust laws, whether procedurally or substantively.
And while he joined the Court in finding that the constitutionally protected right to
petition the government trumped the antitrust laws and thus created antitrust
immunity for certain types of collective action, 687 later in California Motor Transport

679

Ricci v. Chi. Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1972).

680

/d. at 308-09 (Douglas, J., Marshall. J., dissenting).

681

/d. at321.

682

/d. at 308-09.

683

De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212 (1945).

684

/d. at 222. The Court suggested that if the preliminary injunction should stand, any
plaintiff would be able to seek a similar injunction in equity which would in effect sequester
any defendant's assets pending a later judgment on the merits. /d. at 222-23.
685

/d. at 223-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

686

/d. at 224.

687

E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Co., 365 U.S. 127, 135-45
( 1961 ).
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Co. v. Trucking Unlimited."xx Douglas was the architect of the so-called "sham
exception" to what had become known as the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.w> In
Cal(fornia Motor Transport, one group of motor carriers sued another, claiming that
the latter had conspired to monopolize trade by filing a series of repetitive, meritless
federal and state actions to contest plaintiffs' applications to acquire operating rights
to transport goods. 690
Writing for the Court. Justice Douglas referred to dicta in Noerr in holding that
the antitrust immunity arising from the right to petition did not extend to "a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor ... .''691 In activating the Noerr dicta,
Douglas sought to distinguish between legitimate attempts to influence public
officials and attempts "to bar ... competitors from meaningful access to adjudicatory
tribunals and so to usurp that decisionmaking process." 692 Accordingly, "a pattern of
baseless, repetitive claims may emerge which leads the factfinder to conclude that
the administrative and judicial processes have been abused." 693
Thus, even when confronted with a purported constitutionally protected right,
Justice Douglas seemed reluctant for the antitrust laws to be supplanted. At a
minimum, he wanted an appropriate balance and did not want parties hiding behind
the Noerr-Pennington immunity while they abused the system for competitive gain.
For example, writing for the Court in Otter Tail Pov.·er Company v. United States, 694
he remanded a district court decision to determine whether the sham exception
applied when defendants sponsored litigation for the purpose of delaying or stopping
the establishment of competing municipal electric utility systems. 695
The Supreme Court's view of the reach of the commerce clause and thus
Sherman Act jurisdiction expanded significantly during Justice Douglas' tenure. 6 Y6
688

Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,508,
404 U.S.

511-16 (1972).

689

Justice Douglas had written a separate concurring opinion in United Mine Workers of
A me rim \'. Penninf{ton. 381 U.S. 657, 672-74 (1965), applying the second prong of the NoerrPennington immunity, but on the labor exemption issue in the case. For a brief history of the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine, see Rogers, supra note 135, at 169-73.
69

°Ca/. ,'l,fotor Transport Co., 404 U.S. at 509.

69 1

/d. at 51 I (quoting E. R. R. Presidents Conference, 365 U.S. at 144 ).

692

/d.at511-l2.

643

/d. at 513. Not surprisingly, the sham exception has generated a good deal of litigation
as courts attempt to draw the line between legitimate access to government tribunals and abuse
of the system. Sec. e.g .. Profl Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Picture' lndus .. Inc.,
508 U.S. 49 (1993 ); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver. lnc .. 499 U.S. 365 (199! ).
694

0tter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 ( 19Tl).

695

The district court had ruled that the Noerr-Pennington immunity could not apply to
issues concerning access to the judicial branch. as opposed to the legislative and executive
branches. Calijinnia Motor Transport, decided after the district com1 decision in Oller Tail,
had held otherwise but raised the specter of the sham exception. Thus. the district court may
have reached the correct result but for the wrong rea,on. /d. at 379-80.
696

See. e.g., United States v. lnt'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 ( 1955); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951); Mandeville island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 ( 1948): United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 ( 1947); United States v. Sec.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2008

97

992

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:897

Douglas was in the forefront, writing the opinion for a unanimous Court in Moore v.
Mead's Fine Bread. 697 There the plaintiff was a bakery in Santa Rosa, New Mexico
competing locally with a bread company which also sold bread in Farwell, Texas, on
the Texas-New Mexico border. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had cut
prices in Santa Rosa, forcing it out of business in violation of the Robinson-Patman
Act. Douglas held that the defendant's act of sending a truck to Farwell each day to
sell bread was sufficient to confer jurisdiction, even though plaintiff was not itself
engaged in interstate commerce. 69 R He later acknowledged that finding that "the
destruction of a local competitor by purely local tactics" conferred antitrust
jurisdiction was "probably as far-reaching as any decision under the Commerce
Clause." 699
Justice Douglas' view of Sherman Act jurisdiction was ultimately even more
expansive than the rest of the Court's. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas dissented in
Flood v. Kuhn, a case that upheld professional baseball's long-standing exemption
from the antitrust laws. 7011 In doing so, he admittedly changed his position from
almost twenty years before when he had voted to uphold baseball's judicially created
antitrust exemption. 701
In Flood, the majority rigidly applied stare decisis to uphold the 1922 Federal
Baseball decision that had held that organized baseball was not involved in interstate
commerce. 702 The Court in Federal Baseball had ruled that there could be no
Sherman Act jurisdiction involving organized baseball, since Congress' ability to
legislate was constrained by the commerce clause. In the intervening fifty years, the
Court's notion of interstate commerce had greatly expanded 703 and the antitrust laws
had been readily applied to other professional sports. 704 Justice Blackmun, writing
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944): Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). For
Justice Douglas' view of the Supreme Court's expansion of the commerce clause as applied to
the antitrust laws see WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES: STUDIES IN AMERICAN AND
INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW FROM MARSHALL TO MUKHERJEA 210-217 (1956).
697

Moore v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115 (1954).

698

/d. at 119.

699

DoUGLAS. supra note 696, at 216-17.

711

°Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 ( 1972).

7111

Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953). In his words, "I have lived to
regret it; and I would now correct what I believe to be [Too/son's] fundamental error." Flood,
407 U.S. at 286, n.l.
7112

Fed. Baseball Club of Baltimore. Inc. v. Nat'! League of Prof) Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200, 209 (1922).
7 13

l See United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Lorain Journal Co. v.
United States, 342 U.S. 143 ( 1951 ): Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947); United States v. Sec.
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944); Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
704

See, e.g., Radovich v. Nat' I Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); United States v. Int'l
Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955); Deesen v. Prof') Golfers' Ass'n, 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966 ); Peto v. Madison Square Garden Corp., 1958 Trade Cas.
(CCH) 'll 69,106 (S.D.N.Y.) (hockey); Wash. Prof! Basketball Corp. v. Nat'! Basketball
Ass'n, 147 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See also Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402,408-
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for the Flood majority, 705 nonetheless held that congressional silence in the years
since the Federal Baseball decision and organized baseball's long reliance on its
antitrust exemption mandated that the Court "adhere" to its earlier decisions. 706
The year before Flood, Justice Douglas had, as Circuit Justice for the Ninth
Circuit, reinstituted an injunction that allowed Spencer Haywood, who was
challenging the NBA's so-called four-year rule, to play in the NBA playoffs. 707 In
doing so, Douglas noted in passing, without citing authority, that professional
basketball was not exempt from the antitrust laws. 708 In his dissent in Flood, he
argued, correctly it seems, that the Court, not Congress, should overturn Federal
Baseball since the Court, not Congress, penned the decision. 709 He also made it clear
that he believed organized baseball's reserve clause, which bound a player to his
team beyond the term of the contract but for the player's entire playing career, was
an unreasonable restraint of trade. 710

09 (2d Cir. 1949) (Frank, J., concurring opinion) (labeling Federal Baseball "an impotent
zombi"); United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 ( 1955) (refusing to apply Federal Baseball to
theatrical business).
705
Part I of Justice Blackmun's opinion, captioned 'The Game," was a panegyric to
baseball, quoting Grantland Rice and George Bernard Shaw, among others. Blackmun also
included a long list of baseball's legendary names including Tris Speaker, Rogers Hornsby,
Wahoo Sam Crawford, Amos Rusie, Three-Finger Brown, Smokey Joe Wood, Wee Willie
Keeler, Lefty O'Doul, Old Hoss Radbourne, Goose Goslin, Dizzy Dean, Dazzy Vance, Iron
Man McGinnity, Stuffy Mcinnis, Eppa Rixey, Pie Traynor, Nap Lajoie, Rabbit Maranville,
Big Ed Delahanty, Honus Wagner, Christy Mathewson, Grover Cleveland Alexander, Babe
Ruth, Ty Cobb, Lou Gehrig, Walter Johnson and many more. Flood, 407 U.S. at 262 n.2.
Blackmun was later heard to lament that he had neglected to include Van Lingo Mungo.
Interestingly, two justices. White and Burger, voted with the majority and concurred in all but
Part I of Blackmun's opinion. Perhaps Justice White, a former football All-American at the
University of Colorado (whose football nickname was "Whizzcr" White) did not share
Blackmun' s view of baseball as the National Pastime.
706
F/ood. 407 U.S. at 283-85. See generally C. Paul Rogers III, Judicial Reinterpretation
of Statutes: The Example of' Baseball and the Antitrust Laws, 14 Hous. L. REV. 6 I I ( 1977). In
I 998 Congress finally did act, at the behest of the baseball owners and players' union, to strike
down baseball's antitrust immunity with respect to activities affecting the employment of
players. The Curt Flood Act of 1998, Pub.L.No. 105-297, 112 Stat. 2824. The Act retains the
status quo with regard to franchise relocation, the amateur baseball draft, and the relationship
of major league baseball and the minor leagues. /d.

707
Haywood v. Nat'! Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971). The four-year rule
restricted a player from entering the NBA until four years after his graduation from high
school.
708

/d. at 1205.

709

Justice Douglas characterized Federal Baseball as "a derelict in the stream of the law
that we, its creator. should remove." Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
710
According to Justice Douglas, "[t]he equities are with the victims of the reserve
clause ... since a contract which forbids anyone to practice his calling is commonly called an
unreasonable restraint of trade." /d. at 287. On the reserve clause, see, e.g., C. Paul Rogers
Ill, Napoleon Lajoie. Breach of Contract and the Great Baseball War, 55 SMU L. REV. 325
(2002), ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 64-69 (1998), G. EDWARD
WHITE. CREATING THE NATIONAL PASTIME: BASEBALL TRANSFORMS ITSELF 1903-1953 275-
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Jn his last term, Justice Douglas dissented in two other antitrust jurisdictional
decisions, arguing for a more expansive interpretation of the "in commerce"
requirement of the Clayton Act.
In Gu(f Oil Corporation v. Copp Paving
Companv71 1 and United States v. American Building Maintenance lndustries, 712 the
Court held that the Clayton Act's "in commerce" language must be read more
narrowly than the Sherman Act's "in or affecting commerce" language, thus
narrowing the jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act to actions "in the flow" of
commerce. Douglas reasoned, to the contrary, that since the Clayton Act was
intended to complement the Sherman Act by curtailing anticompetitive practices in
their incipiency, the Court should not "lightly assume'' that Congress intended the
jurisdictional reach of the Clayton Act to be narrower than the Sherman Act. 713
Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas favored allowing states to enforce the antitrust
laws through Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. Writing for a narrow 5-4
majority in Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, Justice Douglas ruled that
the State of Georgia could bring suit as parens patriae for its citizens for injunctive
relief under Section 16 of the Clayton Act against twenty railroads accused of
conspiring to fix rates. 714 Then, twenty-seven years later in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
of Caliji>rnia, the Court held that a state could not recover damages for injury to its
general economy in a parens patriae suit. 715 Douglas vigorously dissented,
characterizing the majority's approach to remedies as "miserly" and asserting that he
saw '"no way of distinguishing the instant case from Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Company.'' 716
Justice Douglas also joined Justice Brennan's lengthier dissent, which pointed
out that in the earlier case Georgia was denied damages only because its recovery
might have violated the Keogh doctrine as an illegal rebate. 717 Brennan and Douglas
both favored allowing the State of Hawaii to recover damages as parens patriae for
overcharges paid by its citizenry because of an oil company price fixing
conspiracy. 718
315 ( 1996). and BASEBALL AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 75-137 (Spencer Weber Waller,
Neil B. Cohen & Paul Finkelman, eds., 1995).
71 1

Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186 ( 1974).

712

United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Ind., 422 U.S. 271 ( 1975 ).

711

Gu/f Vii. 419 U.S. at 206 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Am. Bldg., 422 U.S. at 286
(Douglas. J .. di,senting). In what perhaps was some vindication ti1r Justice Douglas' position,
in I 980 Congress broadened Section 7 of the Clayton Act to cover mergers "affecting
commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1980).
71

'Gcurgia v. Penn. R.R. Co .. 324 U.S. 439 ( 1945).

1

' -;Hawaii v. Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251.264 (1972).
The Court held that a stz.te
could recover damages for injury to its commercial interests under Section 4 of the Clayton
Act. !d.

71

''/d at 266-68 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

717

/d. at 270. 272 (Brennan. J., dissenting).
The contested rates in Georgia 1'.
Penns_v!l'aniu Railroad Co. had been approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission,
arguably bringing it within Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156 (1922).
m!fmmii v. Standard Vii, 405 U.S. at 277.
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In his separate dissent, Justice Douglas acknowledged that there "are doubtless
rationales that express a prejudice against liberal construction of the antitrust
laws." 719 His solution was to let the case to go to trial and to leave it to Congress to
decide if states should be restricted under Section 4 of the Clayton Act to their own
proprietary interests. 720 In acknowledging his "liberal" construction and punting to
Congress if they did not like it, Douglas reaffirmed his position as the leading
antitrust hawk on the Court. 721
Thus, the record establishes that Justice Douglas favored a more expansive
application of the antitrust laws than even his liberal brethren. Although as a New
Dealer he could hardly be said to oppose government regulation to boost the
economy, he certainly believed that the antitrust laws should trump regulatory
schemes whenever possible, even if Congress suggested otherwise. If an implied
antitrust immunity was necessary, he was sure to impose limits. Subject matter
jurisdiction was to extend to the full, some would say exaggerated, reach of the
commerce clause.
Was this liberal application of the antitrust laws because of his abiding belief in
the free market economy? That is certainly part of the answer. But a more accurate
assessment would posit that Justice Douglas was concerned about loss of judicial
control over the economy. He wanted to apply his brand of antitrust, including its
use to protect small, independent businesses and to regulate the economy, rather than
to cede authority to agencies with other regulatory concerns. The antitrust laws are,
at bottom, nothing less than a kind of government regulation of business conduct.
The Sherman and Clayton Acts, written as generally as they were, necessarily have
required the courts to play a large role in their interpretation and enforcement.
Douglas was not only loath to give any part of that responsibility away but sought to
expand it whenever possible.
XV. LABOR AND ANTITRUST

Although Justice Douglas was most assuredly pro-labor, 722 his zeal for antitrust
enforcement must have caused him considerable anxiety when the two came into
conflict. In fact, his opinions in the area seem somewhat schizophrenic. He was at
his contrarian best in dealing with the labor exemption, almost always dissenting,
writing no majority opinions and rarely voting with the majority. 723 He dissented
when he thought the majority was expanding the exemption and when he believed
the Court was applying it too strictly. The sole consistency seems to be that he never
724
agreed with his brethren about where the line should be drawn.

71

''td. at270.

721

0ne wonders why Justice Douglas penned a separate dissent from Justice Brennan since
they agreed on the construction of Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co. and the reach of
Section 4, other than to display his independence on this issue.
722

See. e.g.,

723 See

SIMON.

supra note 9, at 267-68. 270-71.

Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3. Int'1 Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797

(1945).
724 0ne

exception is United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards, 339 U.S.
485, 490-91 ( 1950). There, writing for a 6-1 majority, with Justices Frankfurter and Clark not
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He sometimes believed that the majority was interpreting the non-statutory labor
exemption to allow organized labor too much intrusion into the marketplace. An
example is his dissent in Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters &
Butcher Workmen of N.A. v. Jewel Tea Co., Inc., in which a divided Court held that
an agreement between a trade association of food retailers and local unions
restricting the operating hours of fresh meat departments was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny. 725
The plaintiff had resisted a union proposal to restrict operating hours to 9 a.m. to
6 p.m., which a large trade association of 1,000 merchants and 300 meat dealers had
agreed to under the duress of a strike vote. 726 Justice Douglas in dissent argued that
"unions can no more aid a group of businessmen to force their competitors to follow
uniform store marketing hours than to force them to sell at fixed prices." 727 As he
viewed it, the unions had "induced a large group of merchants to use their collective
strength to hurt others who wanted the competitive advantage of selling meat after 6
[p.m.]."m In sum, he believed that a conspiracy between a union and a large number
of merchant-employers to impose competitive conditions on other merchantemployers should not be shielded from antitrust under the rubric of collecting
bargaining.
Justice Douglas also felt compelled to concur in United Mine Workers of
America v. Pennington, 729 decided the same day as Jewel Tea. There the Court held
that the participation of a union in an industry-wide collective bargaining agreement
whereby employers and the union agreed on a wage scale, which forced some small
employers out of business, was not within the nonstatutory labor antitrust exemption.
Justice Douglas' concurrence was motivated by the fact that the conspiracy imposed
high wages to drive "the small, marginal companies" out of business. 730 He noted
that Congress is "ft]he only architect of our economic system." Thus, the Court is
correct "in adhering to [our] free enterprise system as expressed in the antitrust
laws ... until the Congress delegates to big business and big labor the power to
remold our economy in the manner charged here." 731

participating, Justice Douglas ruled that real estate commissions fixed by a real estate board
were simply fees and were not wages falling under the labor exemption.
725

Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butchers of N. Am. v. Jewel Tea
Co., 381 U.S. 676, 691 (1965). The Court concluded that the hours of operation were "well
within the realm of 'wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment' about
which employers and unions must bargain." /d.
726

/d. at 680-81.

727

/d. at 737 (Douglas, J., dissenting). He was joined by Justices Black and Clark. Justice
Douglas believed that the Court had failed to follow the well-established Allen Bradley Co.
decision, which had outlawed unions from combining with employers and manufacturers of
goods to restrain competition in or to monopolize the marketing of the goods.

mld.
724

United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 672 (1965) (Douglas, J.,
concurring). He was joined by Justices Black and Clark.
730

/d. at 675.

731/d.
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Earlier, in Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union v. United States, 732
Justice Douglas had disagreed with the Court about the appropriate remedy for
activity among "grease peddlers" who fixed prices and allocated territories under the
guise of union activity. While the full range of antitrust remedies was available
against the defendants, Justice Douglas disputed that the Court had the authority to
expel them from the union under the Norris-LaGuardia Act for their restraint of trade
activities. 733 He was willing to interpret "labor dispute" under the Act broadly so as
to protect the right of small, independent contractors to maintain union membership
even when the defendants were not engaged in actual collective bargaining.
He also dissented in Ramsey v. Leon Nunley Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of
America, 734 disagreeing with the majority in a 5-4 decision about the standard of
proof necessary to establish an antitrust violation by a union under Section 6 of the
Norris LaGuardia Act. 735 He argued that the statute required "clear proof' rather
than a preponderance of the evidence of the union's complicity in the illegal
scheme. 736 The union had allegedly joined with major coal producers to set wages
and other conditions of employment at a level that would force smaller producers out
of business. 737 Justice Douglas agreed that the allegations, if true, would subject the
union to antitrust liability. He was wary of accurately differentiating, however,
between the union's best efforts to increase the wage scale industry-wide, which is
what a union lawfully seeks to accomplish, and its conspiring with some employers
to set wages at levels that would drive some producers from the market and thus
benefit the conspiring producers. 738 To make that distinction, he argued, a clear
proof standard was needed. 739
Justice Douglas also disagreed with the majority in Connell Construction Co. Inc.
v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 740 arguing that the Court had
construed the non-statutory exemption too narrowly, in contradistinction to his
earlier dissents in Jewel Tea and Pennington. In Connell the Court ruled that a
multi-employer collective bargaining agreement that required general contractor
employers to contract only with subcontractors who also had agreements with the
same union was not protected by the non-statutory exemption. Douglas joined
Justice Stewart's four-justice dissenr1 41 but also dissented separately. 742 Stewart
732

Los Angeles Meat & Provision Drivers Union, Local 626 v. United States, 371 U.S. 94
(1962).
733

/d. at 108, 112 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The decision was 8-1.

734

Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 401 U.S. 302 (1971).

735

/d. at 314 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

736

/d. at 315-16.

737

/d. at 304.

738

/d. at 318-20.

739

/d. at 319-20.

74

°Connell Const. Co., Inc. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616
(1974).
741

/d. at 638 (Stewart. J., dissenting).

742

fd. (Douglas, J ., dissenting).
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argued that Congress did not intend for secondary boycott activities like those
engaged in by the union to be subject to the antitrust laws. 741 Douglas agreed, but
noted the lack of a conspiracy allegation between the union and union subcontractors
to force nonunion subcontractors from the market which was, for him, "the
determinative feature of the case."m
Thus, at the labor-antitrust juncture, Justice Douglas was capable of asserting the
antitrust laws and restricting the labor exemption if he was convinced that small
competitors were being squeezed by unions in collaboration with large employers
such as in Jewel Tea and, more particularly, Pennington. But he was concerned that
labor unions not face antitrust liability too readily or too easily. From his pro-labor
stance, grease peddlers should not be expelled from a questionable union affiliation
because they divided markets and fixed prices. Clear proof and specific conspiracy
allegations should be required for union liability under the antitrust laws.
Justice Douglas' antitrust philosophy, deeply rooted in populism, favored the
small competitor. His labor philosophy favored the worker and his right to unionize
and collectively bargain for higher wages and better working conditions. Small,
independent businesses tend to pay lower wages and are not necessarily noted for
their working environment. The collision of interests is inevitable and, given his
strong beliefs and values, Justice Douglas' apparent inconsistency in drawing the
line between antitrust and labor was perhaps predictable.
XVI. CONCLUSION
So at the end of the day (and in Justice Douglas' case it was the longest "day"
ever on the Court) what kind of antitrust report card did the Justice earn? If one were
to be most generous, one might label his antitrust record as mixed, given his stellar
There he unequivocally recognized and made
opinion in Socony- Vacuum.
preeminent the importance of the price mechanism to a competitive market, a
position from which he never wavered. One good, perhaps great opinion, however,
cannot counterbalance the many stinkers he produced. If one attempts to be
objective in light of both contemporary developments in antitrust law and the
frequent confusion he generated in his own time, one must give Douglas a failing
grade. Although Douglas, historically viewed, led the way in the expansion of the
antitrust laws, the precedents he created have not, with the exception of price fixing,
stood the test of time.
The intrinsic inconsistency of his antitrust philosophy is palpable. While SoconyVacuum has been characterized as "[p ]erhaps the best known and most ruthle~s
evocation of the consumer,'' 741 most of his opinions are patently anti-consumer. If
nothing else, his opinions demonstrate that a coherent antitrust policy cannot protect
both small business and the C(lnsumer. The former reduces the Sherman Act to the
protection of the opportunity to compete, rather than the protection of competition
itself. The incoherency of Justice Douglas' approach produces an antitrust law
without form and with little ~ubstance.

743

/d. at 654-55.

744

/d. at 638.

745

PERITZ,

supra note 47, at 173.
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Justice Douglas must rate as the leading antitrust hawk in our history and, with
his brethren on the Warren Court. is re~ponsible for an unprecedented expansion of
the antitrust laws. If Douglas had had his way, the expansion would have been even
more dramatic. His fervor against big business and for the small businessman has
not stood the test of time, however, at least not for a body of laws that seeks to
enhance consumer welfare. There i~ irony in the fact that Douglas, who was so
passionate about individual civil rights and liberties, actually harmed consumers in
his populist attempt to protect small busines!-.. 746
Indeed, it is unclear whether Justice Douglas recognized the inherent conflict
between the protection of small business and consumer welfare. More likely, he did
see it at some level but was simply resolute in his determination to frame the antitrust
laws to protect the opportunity to compete, rather than as the watchdog of
competition. The Warren Court and Douglas seemingly tipped their hand in the
Brown Shoe decision when, despite their rhetoric, small business protectionism
trumped consumer welfare.
Equally problematic is the poor quality of his opinions in his later years on the
Court. Even in the areas of horizontal restraints where the law has changed less,
Justice Douglas issued opinions containing generalized, non-specific language with
the lack of any real factual analysis. They often read like they were written by
someone in a rush to do something else. With that approach, he managed to muck
up and create uncertainty in the law for years to come.
In merger and
monopolization cases, his opinions were simply result-oriented and the government
did always win if he had anything to say about it. He and the Warren Court not
infrequently posited legal principles or standards while then proceeding to misapply
those principles to the facts before them.
One can argue that Justice Douglas' antitrust record is of a legal realist and
functionalist run amuck. Legal realism posits that judges will be influenced by their
own predilections and Douglas certainly was. The difficulty is that indeterminacy
may result and precedent may be subverted if a judge goes too far. Douglas'
abhorrence of market power and domination and concern for small business provided
all too predictable results but no boundaries since he so often, even in the days of the
Warren Court, argued to extend the reach of antitrust beyond his liberal brethren.
Justice Douglas' functionalism was supposed to be fact-dependent and lead to
greater certainty and efficiency in the law. In a superficial sense, it did since under
Douglas the government always won. But as Douglas' time on the Court wore on,
his antitrust opinions became less fact dependent and more doctrinaire. Often his
fact analysis was superficial and incomplete, the precise opposite of what his
functionalism preached.
Another irony is that one can make a case that, in the antitrust arena, Justice
Douglas, the product of humble circumstances who literally cleaned up Wall Street
during the New Deal and who lived his life with a profound distrust of
accumulations of economic wealth, came close to abusing his power on the Court in
746

Another contradiction stems from the fact that despite Justice Douglas' earned
reputation as an expansive libertarian and populist who distrusted all exhibitions of power, he
was by all accounts a tyrant to work for and commonly was abusive to his law clerks and
secretaries. Most of his law clerks, for example, endured several "firings"' and Justice Douglas
typically took no interest in their personal lives or careers. See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 10,
at 407-15, 422-25; SIMON, supra note 9, at 224-27.
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combating economic power. He did so by issuing opinions that were not fact driven
but were instead fueled by ideology rather than economic and legal analysis. He
further sought to protect and extend judicial control of competition policy by
refusing to cede antitrust authority to other government entities and by expansively
asserting Sherman Act subject matter jurisdiction.
While Justice Douglas' antitrust record is there for all to consider and critique,
the more difficult and ultimately more speculative questions center around the
underlying reasons for his flawed legacy. Initially, it is difficult to argue that the
lack of sophistication in his later antitrust opinions emanated from a mediocre mind.
Douglas was perhaps not as brilliant as he made himself out to be, but certainly he
had a first-rate legal mind. He was also a prodigious writer747 and, as an academic
early in his career, a "star" by any measure. 748 He was a man in a hurry with many
interests and passions, and one cannot help but wonder when reading some of his
poorer opinions where his mind really was that day.
One should also consider that Justice Douglas, even with his irascible
personality, had considerable political ability and even greater political ambition.
Within the confines of the Court, he certainly had influence and no doubt knew how
and when to exercise it to get votes on issues important to him. It may be that
compromise sometimes "made a camel out of a horse" but he was in fact an
influential voice during his four decades on the Court.
His distrust of concentrations of economic power that so fueled his antitrust
philosophy most likely had its roots in his impoverished childhood and college years.
His academic work with financial institutions and his path-breaking role in reforming
the SEC in the 1930s, where he was privy to greed and manipulation by corporate
insiders, must have solidified his distrust of big business. Certainly he was
influenced by Justice Brandeis, who he acknowledged "helped crystallize my views"
of "the free enterprise system," as well as the economist Veblen. They gave voice to
his own experience dealing with the SEC. Thurman Arnold, his colleague and close
friend at Yale, must have been influential as well. Both appeared to leave the New
Deal's ambivalence about the value of competition, as opposed to government
regulation, in their wake.
Certainly Justice Douglas' populism caused him to focus on the small business
owner as antitrust's principal beneficiary. In fairness, the disconnect between
consumer welfare and small business protectionism was not as well understood
during Douglas' years on the Court, although cases like Brown Shoe showed that the
Court could simultaneously utter totally inconsistent policies. Nor had the procompetitive utility of efficiencies or the primacy of interbrand over intrabrand
competition yet been given their due. Wealth maximization as an antitrust goal was,
for the most part, not in the lexicon. Further, the uneven antitrust terrain Douglas
inherited contained the property concept of restraints against alienation as an

747

Douglas wrote, excluding casebooks, thirty-six books or monographs during his life,
including his two-volume autobiography. Many were on outdoor or travel topics not related to
law.
748

1n his short full-time academic career at Columbia and Yale, Douglas produced nine
law review articles, mostly co-authored and many based on empirical research, and seven coauthored casebooks, prodigious scholarly production by any contemporary or historical
measure.
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antitrust goal and precedent like Appalachian Coals. But the fact remains that
Douglas and his Warren Court brethren did not advance the antitrust ball in any
coherent or lasting manner.
Ultimately perhaps the most telling observation of Justice Douglas' antitrust
legacy is that the Socony- Vacuum decision, the first antitrust opinion of the longest
sitting Supreme Court justice in our history (and the Justice who authored more
antitrust opinions than anyone on the high Court), is the only lasting antitrust
precedent flowing from Douglas' pen. Unfortunately, it was all downhill after that.
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